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ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND VALUE SURVEY
THE CONSUMER IN THE MARKETPLACE - A SURVEY OF THE LAW OF INFORMED
BUYING.
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THE CONSUMER IN THE MARKETPLACE - A SURVEY OF THE LAW OF INFORMED
BUYING.
I. INTRODUCTION
If consumers are offered inferior products, if prices are exorbitant, if drugs
are unsafe or worthless, if the consumer is unable to choose on an informed
basis, then his dollar is wasted, his health and safety may be threatened,
and the national interest suffers. On the other hand, increased efforts to
make the best possible use of their incomes can contribute more to the
well-being of most families than equivalent efforts to raise their incomes.'
President John F. Kennedy
The difficulties confronting the consumer today are manifested in countless
forms and varieties. The abuses are, in some instances, flagrant; but, because the
consumer is not effectively organized to present a unified front in his fight for fair
treatment, his views often go unheard. Attention here is focused on the consumer's
inability to purchase on an informed basis and the law's attempt to secure his
protection.
More particularly, consideration will be directed to three important aspects
of the problem: the labeling and packaging of goods, the credit terms of installment
purchasing, and guarantees and warranties. The "consumer in the marketplace"
is the topic of discussion. It may be a television commercial or magazine ad2 which
excites interest and prompts the consumer to enter the marketplace; but once
within its confines he is met by the hard sell of attractive labels and packages, easy
credit terms, lifetime guarantees as well as the salesman.
The section of the note dealing with labeling and packaging will examine the
law as it exists today and incidentally trace its origins and development. Emphasis
is here placed upon federal control, simply because of the greater stature it has
attained in this field. State law, however, will be considered. Attention is also given
to the federal "Truth in Packaging" Bill,3 introduced by Senator Philip Hart of
Michigan, in order to assess future development in this field.
The purpose of the section concerned with credit protection is to analyze
the efforts that have been made, both on the state and federal levels, to "disclose
to borrowers in advance the actual amounts and rates which they will be paying
for credit." The core of the discussion relates to state legislative activity. Here,
in contrast to the above, the states have made the more significant law. But
throughout the survey, various portions of Senator Paul Douglas' "Truth in
Lending" Bill 4 will be interjected in an attempt to expose the existing deficiencies
of state law.
In the final area of study, once again both state and federal law have been
assigned a role in protecting the purchaser. Here, the efforts of the Federal Trade
Commission to prevent misrepresentation of manufacturers' guarantees are explored.
Such efforts operate prospectively, as does the administration of the law in prior
two sections. But the law of warranty, as embodied in the common law, the
Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, offers its remedy only
after the purchase has been made - when the representations, whether express
or implied, that induce sale have been discovered to be untrue. Particular scrutiny
will be given the seller's attempt to limit these representations through disclaimer
clauses in the contract of sale.
As a result, it is hoped that the reader will be aided in his accumulation of
knowledge concerning an area of law which bids fair to be a paramount one.
1 Kennedy, Consumers' Protection and Interest Program, Message from the President
of the United States, H. R. Doc. No. 364, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as 1962 Consumer Protection Message].
2 See generally Handler, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLUM. L. R. 1018 (1956).
3 S. 387, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
4 S. 750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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II. LABELING AND PACKAGING
If you found yourself in a typical American supermarket or drugstore for the
first time, one would hardly blame you if you stood somewhat in awe upon view-
ing the seemingly infinite number of items on display. A rapid tour up and down
the numerous aisles would be sufficient to convince you that a man-sized job lay
ahead in making a good choice among products. No friendly corner grocer, for
example, would be at hand to assist you in your dilemma. With the emphasis of
modem merchandising on .self-service, competing commodities on the shelves
veritably cry out by means of their labels and packages urging your purchase.
Unquestionably, this is American marketing life today at the retail level. With
the inanimate label and package giving most of the sales pitch, there is the possi-
bility of deceiving the unwary buyer by leaving much unsaid. The "hidden per-
suaders" of color scheme and design and size of package may not always lend
themselves to adequate disclosure of what lies behind the label or within the package.
Obviously, the unscrupulous avail themselves of such possibilities with abandon.
Hence, it follows that the consumer must be afforded some measure of protection
in order to pursue his shopping ends with the assurance that he is actually getting
what he thinks he is getting. Perhaps it is true that one cannot judge a book by
its cover, but that in effect is what the consumer should be able to do in resorting
to the labeling and packaging of the items he purchases. To secure this end stand
two federal agencies, the Food and Drug Administration and the Federal Trade
Commission, and related state law. But, it is currently felt in some quarters that
additional law is now needed to cope with the problems of contemporary marketing
practices. A "Truth in Packaging" Bill, recently introduced before Congress,5 is
aimed at requiring stricter labeling and packaging standards in the consumer
commodity field, which mainly includes so-called "kitchen and bathroom" items.
A. Historical Setting and General Principles of the Federal Law
It was not always thus. The doctrine of caveat emptor - "let the buyer
beware" -was the prevailing doctrine until late in the 1800s. But as a result of
the agitation over adulterated food in the early part of this century,6 the maxim
began to wane. Governmental intervention appeared in the form of the Federal
Food and Drug Act of 1906.' As usually happens, however, the passage of time
revealed the inadequacies of this legislation in view of changing conditions. Un-
doubtedly contributing to the several shortcomings of the act was the fact that
it was the initial enactment in this area. Consequently, in 1938s Congress repealed
the Federal Food and Drug Act, replacing it with the significantly stronger Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, still in force and aided by recent amendments. 9
Devices and cosmetics were brought within the scope of the new act. That this
law manifested the recognition of the times that the consumer also deserved a
"New Deal" was clearly indicated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in United States v.
Dotterweich:'0 "The purposes of [the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act] thus
touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of
modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection." Thus: "The 'high pur-
5 S. 387, 88th Cong., ist Sess. (1963).
6 The outstanding, though inadvertent, example of this was Upton Sinclair's novel,
The Jungle. Originally designed to provide Socialist propaganda, the book had the curious
effect of calling attention to revolting meat-packing-house practices instead. Sinclair later
remarked that he had aimed at the public's heart, but by accident had hit it in the stomach.
See Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation. 1 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
3 (1933).
7 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
8 This was a good year for consumers: Congress passed both the Wheeler-Lea Amend-
ment and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in 1938, during the same session.
9 Drug Amendments of 1962, 76 Stat. 780 (1962); Food Additives Amendment of
1958, 72 Stat. 1784 (1950), discussed infra.
10 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943).
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pose' of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ... is to protect consumers.""1
The act has, in large measure, achieved that lofty purpose. Liberal construction
of it, in order to protect the public effectively, is the rule. 2
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914'13 made unlawful "unfair methods
of competition in commerce."" The act as a whole, and section 5 in particular,
contained general prohibitions much along the same lines as the Sherman 5 and
Clayton 8 Acts but was significantly broader than the latter statutes. Mr. Justice
Douglas, in FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co.y, described its scope
in these words:
The "unfair methods of competition," which are condemned by §5(a)
of the Act, are not confined to those that were illegal at common law or
that were condemned by the Sherman Act .... It is . . . clear that the
Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement and bolster
the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act . .. to stop in their incipiency acts
and practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts, as well
as to condemn as "unfair methods of competition" existing violations of
them.18
Under the original act the basis for the Commission's jurisdiction was injury
to the competitor. However, this proved to be too narrow a view, especially insofar
as the ultimate consumer was concerned. In rendering its decision in FTC v.
Raladam Co.,'9 the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized competition
and minimized the factor of public interest.20 The case was severely criticized,
with the main line of attack indicating that the Raladam approach in reality left
the consumer virtually unprotected by a weakening, if not actual nullification, of
the express powers delegated to the Commission for the protection of the public.2'
However, three years after the Raladam decision the Court evidenced a
changed approach in FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro.22 in which it recognized that
the Commission did possess jurisdiction in unfair trading cases, irrespective of
whether the interests of the public or those of merely a particular class of com-
petitors demanded that the complained-of practice be eliminated. This holding
received Congressional approval in 1938 when it passed the Wheeler-Lea Amend-
ment 23 which granted the Federal Trade Commission authority to challenge unfair
practices on the basis of whether the proceeding was in the public interest, rather
than solely on the restricted basis of whether the practice in question involved
injury to competition. 24 The upshot of this change worked by the Wheeler-Lea
Amendment was that the Commission was enabled to concern itself with protection
of the consumer in a more direct fashion, whereas previously it could only protect
him indirectly via protection of the competitor.
11 Strey v. Devine's, Inc., 217 F.2d 187, 190 (7th Cir. 1954).
12 United States v. Bodine Produce Co., 206 F. Supp. 201 (D. Ariz. 1962).
13 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1958).
14 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
15 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
16 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
17 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
18 Id. at 394-95.
19 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
20 Among other cases prior to 1938 holding that injury to competitors is the determina-
tive criterion are Berkey & Gay Furniture Co. v. FTC, 42 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1930) (insuffi-
cient injury); Lighthouse Rug Co. v. FTC, 35 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1929) (sufficient injury).
21 See DERENBERO, TRADE MARK PROTECTION & UNFAIR TRADING 172, 173 (1936).
22 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
23 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
24 In Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1946), it was said:
"[S]ince the [Wheeler-Lea] amendment . . . . the Commission has had jurisdiction of all
cases in commerce affecting the public interest whether or not competition is involved;
hence it is no longer necessary to show competition, if there is an act or practice in com-
merce inimical to the public interest."
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The principal weapon utilized by the FTC in enforcing the provisions of the
act is the cease-and-desist order. Its primary purpose is, in a sense, unique since
it is unlike most of the usual remedies afforded by the courts: "Orders of the Federal
Trade Commission are not intended to impose criminal punishment or exact com-
pensatory damages for past acts, but to prevent illegal practices in the future."2
Thus, since the Commission is bent on preventing what could happen before it
actually does, rather than remedying the wrong after it occurs through punishment
of the wrongdoer, no damage to the public, in the ordinary sense of the word, need
be shown.
28
Some 53 years ago, between the passage of the original Federal Food and
Drug Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, the following widely-quoted
statement by Judge Coxe in Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co 2 7 aptly revealed
the tendency of the times toward consumer protection:
The law is not made for the protection of experts, but for the public
-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and
the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are
governed by appearances and general impressions.28
Not only was it thus felt that it would be best for the public to have protection
of this sort, but it was also demonstrated that the group covered would be all-
inclusive.
In protecting the "vast multitude," primary consideration is given to the
effect that the various methods of labeling, packaging and advertising have
in inducing the consumer to consummate a purchase. The peculiar circum-
stances and facts which may surround a particular unfair practice, from the
standpoint of the marketer, are of relatively slight, if any, importance. Thus,
a seller's lack of knowledge of the falsity of a representation is no defense to a
charge of deception,2 9 nor is his good faith.30 Moreover, actual deception of the
consumer is not essential before a violation of section 5 can be found.31 A showing
of intent to deceive is likewise not necessary. 2 Rather, the test which is generally
applied is whether or not the representation has a capacity or tendency to deceive.2
Furthermore, an ambiguous representation is unfair where one meaning is
false;2 4 and the literal truth of a representation is no excuse where a false impres-
sion is created. 5 Apparently, about the only representations that are not susceptible
of being construed as violative of the act are those which contain the expression
25 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
26 National Harness Mfrs.' Ass'n v. FTC, 268 Fed. 705 (6th Cir. 1920).
27 178 Fed. 73 (2d Cir. 1910).
28 Id. at 75. Cf. United States v. 88 Cases Containing Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187
F.2d 967, 971 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied 342 U.S. 861 (1951): "[Tihe normal inference
is that the legislature contemplated the reaction of the ordinary person who is neither savant
nor dolt, who lacks special competency with reference to the matter at hand but has and
exercises a normal measure of the layman's common sense and judgment." (Emphasis added.)
29 Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1941).
30 Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960).
31 Fell v. FTC, 285 Fd.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960); American Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. FTC,
255 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958); Northern Feather Works v.
FTC, 234 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1956).
32 Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1941); Indiana Quartered Oak
Co. v. FTC, 26 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1928).
33 Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1959); Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d
584 (9th Cir. 1957); Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1946);
Etablissements Rigaud, Inc. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1942). Typical of the judicial
statements made with regard to the test to be applied is that of Chief Judge Gardner in
American Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 255 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 358 U.S.
875 (1958): "The fact that there was no evidence that anyone had in fact been deceived
was not conclusive. The test was whether such advertisements were likely to deceive."
34 United States v. 95 Barrels of Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438 (1924).
35 P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950).
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of an honest opinion 6 and those of which it can legitimately be said are nothing
more than harmless "puffing." 3
In many respects, the FDA and the FTC each deal with quite similar problems.
Since both agencies have the common objective of preventing deception of the
public through the misrepresentation of food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, both
have frequently been in simultaneous pursuit of the same practice. Through the
misbranding provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,38 the FDA
is concerned chiefly with the promotion of truthful and informative labeling.
Through section 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,3 9 added by the Wheeler-
Lea Amendment of 1938,40 the FTC is given authority to deal with false advertise-
ments, other than labeling,4 1 of food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics. Although the
jurisdictional lines appear thus to be clear, a problem is presented where material
serves as both labeling and advertising in a given instance.42 In that situation,
the FDA and the FTC have concurrent jurisdiction and efforts on the parts of
both were being needlessly duplicated in many cases. To obviate this difficulty
a working agreement between the two agencies was announced on June 9, 1954 in
order to provide for better liaison, thereby cutting down on duplicate litigation
except in those instances where two proceedings are considered to be to the interest
of the public.4" Generally, it was decided that the FDA is to be concerned with
labeling alone and the FTC shall have jurisdiction over advertising.
B. Labeling
1. Under the Federal Trade Commission Act
What can be said as to the relative importance of labeling in the marketing
process? As a suggested answer to this question, it was recently said in Korber
Hats, Inc. v. FTC44 that, as between labeling and advertising,
[T]here is good reason to insist upon a higher degree of veracity in [labeling].
It may well be argued that consumers accept labeling statements literally
while perhaps viewing with a more jaundiced eye the vaunted claims of the
advertising media.45
If this is true, then labeling is an area of the marketing process which logically
demands close scrutiny.
The Korber Hats case involved the labeling of hemp hats as "Milan," "Genuine
Milan," and "Genuine Imported Milan." There was evidence that such terms
on the tags in the crown or imprinted on the sweatbands connoted that the hats
were made of wheat straw, and were consequently considered luxury items because
they were lightweight, had a desirable feel, and possessed exceptional shape-retention
36 Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640 (3d 'Cir. 1941).
37 " 'Puffing' refers, generally, to an expression of opinion not made as a representation
of fact." Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945). In Kidder Oil Co. v.
FTC, 117 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1941), such words on labels and advertising material as
"amazing distance" and "perfect" in connection with the expounded advantages of petitioner's
oil additive were held to be expressions having different meanings to different persons, and
hence mere "puffing," since they were deemed to be largely matters of personal opinion and
were not calculated to deceive.
38 Section 403, 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1958); Section 502, 52 Stat.
1050 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1958); Section 602, 52 Stat. 1054 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 362
(1958).
39 Section 12, 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
40 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
41 See Section 15(a)(1), 52 Stat. 116 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (1958).
42 This was the case in Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, rehearing denied 335
U.S. 900 (1948), in which the Supreme 'Court said that although control over false adver-
tising is in the FTC, Congress did not intend that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
would not control that advertising which performs a labeling function.
43 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Com-
mittee an the Judiciary Pursuant to S. Res. 258, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 827 (1962).
44 311 F.2d 358 (1st Cir. 1962).
45 Id. at 361.
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qualities. Although the Commission's cease-and-desist order was set aside because
its scope was too broad, the court found that there was substantial evidence that
a prospective purchaser might be misled by the label into thinking he was obtaining
a Milan hat and that this possibility was sufficient to subject petitioner to a pro-
ceeding charging a violation of section 5(a) (1). There was further testimony
that a customer would most probably be unable to tell whether a given hat was
a Milan by viewing and handling it.
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 46 is the heart of that statute
by which techniques of labeling are kept pure. Under that section, the FTC has
a wide range of powers. Since the Wheeler-Lea Amendment,47 the principal limita-
tion upon the Commission's determination whether or not to initiate proceedings
is that the conduct complained of must be prejudicial to the public interest.
48
Even though this restriction is the most prominent, the Commission itself never-
theless has broad discretion in deciding in the first instance whether or not a
proceeding is in the public interest.49 This is forcefully evidenced by the language
of section 5(b) of the act:
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any ...
person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair
method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in com-
merce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it
• . . would be to the interest of the public, it shall issue . . . a com-
plaint ... 50
Section 5, however, is not the sole source of the agency's control over labeling.
The Textile Fiber Products Identification Act,
51 the Fur Products Labeling Act 2
and the Wool Products Labeling Ac 5 set forth a comprehensive body of rules
for the labeling of the respective products of each law's concern. These acts are
intended to protect the manufacturer and distributor, as well as the ultimate
consumer against misbranding.
Under the current state of affairs, the consumer no longer need take the
offensive to guard himself against purchasing deception with his goods. The bur-
den has instead been shifted to the seller, for "there is no duty resting upon a
citizen to suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts business. Laws are
made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious."' ' 4 Consequently, the marketer
is charged with the obligation of seeing to it that, in the consumer-inducement
process, truthfulness will reign supreme; that the purchaser will receive precisely
what the representation purports he will receive and what it justifiably leads him
to believe he will, in fact, receive. So overriding is this consideration that it has
been extended to cover the situation where the consumer is shown to have been
benefitted by having been induced to purchase because of the deception.55 In
applying the capacity-to-deceive test, rather than the actual-deception criterion,
the only truly important factor is whether or not the purchaser was induced to
buy because of the misrepresentation. If he was, section 5 of the act has been
violated and it is of no significance that he did not lose actual value or quality
by reason of being so induced.,"
46 Section 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 Stat. 115 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1958).
47 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
48 See VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1958).
49 DOCTOR W. B. CALDWELL, Inc. v. FTC, 111 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1940).
50 Section 5(b), 52 Stat. 112 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
51 72 Stat. 1717 (1958), 15 U.S.C. §§ 70(a)-(k) (1958).
52 65 Stat. 175 (1951) 15 U.S.C. §§ 69 (a)-(j) (1958).
53 54 Stat. 1128 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 68 (a)-(j) (1958).
54 FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937).
55 National Silver Co. v. FTC, 88 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1937).
56 Ibid. In FTC v. Real Products Corp., 90 F.2d 617, 619 (2d Cir. 1937), it was said:
"Nor is it necessary that the product misrepresented be inferior or harmful to the public.
The deceptive misrepresentation suffices."
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Of particular interest in this connection is a trio of recent cases involving
the sale of previously-used motor oil. In Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC,57 the company
employed a process whereby impurities were removed from used oil causing it to
be of high viscosity and good quality -in fact, comparable to oil which had never
been used before. This oil was marketed in cans which bore the words "Re-
processed Oil" in large, plain type. Although the company was engaged in inter-
state commerce, most of its sales were in North Carolina where all that was required
by way of disclosure on the containers was the phrase "Reprocessed Oil." Despite
this, and the fact that the petitioner's oil was comparable to virgin oil, the court
affirmed the FTC's cease-and-desist order, holding that under the federal law this
label did not sufficiently inform the public of the nature of the product and hence
had a tendency to deceive. Although the Commission did not feel that the indi-
vidual word "reprocessed" was deceptive of itself, the court agreed with the FTC
that there should be a type of additional disclosure over and above that required
by North Carolina law. In a similar case, Mohawk Refining Co. v. FTC,8 there
was a complete failure to disclose the prior use of the oil in both advertising and
on the containers. In affirming the FTC's order the court relied principally on
evidenced adduced to the effect that the public preferred to purchase-and those
in the trade preferred to distribute and sell-oil which had been refined from
virgin crude rather than that which had been re-refined from crankcase drainings.5 9
The court held it to be of no significance that the latter type of oil was as good as
the former. Apparently, the rationale established by these cases is that the consumer
ought actually get what he is being led to believe he is getting regardless of the
fact that there is no qualitative difference between two items.60 The third case,61
much along the same lines as the Mohawk decision, reinforced this rationale and
added another principle: that adequate disclosure must be made for the consumer
to indicate his preference fully apprised of all the facts, even though that preference
is the outgrowth of "ill-founded sentiment, belief, or caprice."6 2
The law under the Federal Trade Commission Act covers a multitude of
labeling sins. For example, there are numerous decisions involving the type of labeling
which is required to accurately indicate the country of origin of the product. Such
cases can be generally divided into two categories: those requiring affirmative
disclosure and those concerning actual disclosure which has the capacity to mislead.
In the former, an FTC cease-and-desist order which requires that the country of
origin be disclosed both as to the product complained of and as to other similar
products is a customary one which is consistently enforced by the courts.63 In the
latter situation, where labeling practices falsely indicate foreign origin of a product
64
under circumstances where such a product is preferred over a domestic one, the
courts have not hesitated to enforce cease-and-desist orders.65 Illustrative of a
typical "foreign origin" case is L. Heller & Son, Inc. v. FTC, although here the
preference was domestic origin rather than foreign.66 There the petitioners removed
from imitation pearls the tags which indicated that they were of foreign origin.
57 262 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1959).
58 263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 361 U.S. 814 (1959).
59 The idea that, in certain cases, the public prefers a particular item for one reason
or another, has been recognized in cases involving other products. See, e.g., Etablissements
Rigaud, Inc. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 590 (2d 'Cir. 1942) (perfume).
60 State courts have likewise recognized this rule and its rationale. See Paraco, Inc. v.
Department of Agriculture, 118 Cal. App. 2d 348, 257 P.2d 981 (1953), a case involving
reclaimed oil.
61 Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 361 U.S. 818 (1959).
62 Id. at 248.
63 American Tack Co. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam).
64 Such practices would include the use of foreign words and addresses on the label, as
well as English words which might connote foreign origin. See Etablissement Rigaud, Inc.
v. FTC, 125 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1942).
65 Etablissements Rigaud, Inc. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1942).
66 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951).
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The pearls were then fabricated into necklaces and sold without disclosure of that
foreign origin. This was held to be a violation of the act on the grounds that
it is deceptive to fail to affirmatively disclose material facts which, if known, would
influence the consumer's decision whether or not to buy.
Misrepresentation of the composition or ingredients of a product, either by
direct statement or by implication on the label, is likewise an unfair practice and
is violative of section 5. 67 Where tolerances have been established, as in pillow
labeling, deviations beyond those tolerances are likewise found offensive.68 The
simulation of a competing product through the use of packages which closely
resemble the competitor's in size, shape, color, and printed matter constitutes an
unfair practice on the theory that the resultant confusion caused among buyers
is not to be tolerated.6 9 And, where through use of the same devices, a seller
simulates a widely-known product formerly manufactured by him but which in
fact is an entirely different item and then advertises and sells it at a price sig-
nificantly lower than that of the former product, such method is misleading to the
public, unfair to competitors, and is hence a violation of section 5.70
At a time when the FTC had only jurisdiction over unfair methods of compe-
tition in interstate commerce, a seller who labeled its imitation grape concentrate
as "Good-Grape" was deemed to be engaged in unfair competition because this
label falsely implied that the drink was wholly or partly composed of natural grape
juice.7 1 Because of the jurisdictional limitation, the court based its decision on
the fact that this practice was unfair to both petitioner's competitors who sold
genuine grape juice, and to its competitors who sold imitations but truthfully labeled
them. The court also noted that a buyer would make, at most, only a casual
examination of the character of the beverage before purchasing it since it cost
but five cents. This observation appears to have been an indication, albeit slight,
that the consumer too was part of the picture and that consequently his interests
should also be considered.
In Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC,7 2 the petitioner, in marketing
radios which were manufactured for it, affixed name plates thereto bearing the
inscription "Remington." Since this was the name of, or part of the name of,
several companies which were long-established and were favorably known by the
public at the time, the court enforced the FTC's cease-and-desist order reasoning
that the petitioner must have engaged in this practice because it recognized that
the name "Remington" had certain valuable qualities of an intangible nature
which would increase sales and thereby give petitioner an advantage over its
competition.
From this cross section, it can be seen that a wide variety of deceptive labeling
practices come within the prohibitions of the act. The FTC, for its part, has
demonstrated by a long record of attacks that it is a formidable foe of such practices.
Nevertheless, administrative red tape is often responsible for a certain weakening
of the effectiveness of enforcement of the act through the cease-and-desist order.
As the FTC's docket of cases becomes more and more crowded, the time which
elapses between complaint and final disposition grows longer, with the practices
continuing all the while. Perhaps giving the FTC power to issue temporary restrain-
ing orders pending the outcome of cases would be helpful, but thus far Congress
has not seen fit to grant the Commission such authority where deceptive labeling
and packaging are concerned. Further, the consequences may be too drastic
67 Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 11 F.2d 47 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 273 U.S. 717
(1926).
68 Northern Feather Works v. FTC, 234 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1956).
69 FTC v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 277 U.S. 598 (1928).
70 Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 Fed. 744 (2d Cir. 1922).
71 FTC v. Good-Grape Co., 45 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1930).
72 122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941).
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where a producer has innocently wrapped his product in a label or package which
may or may not have a tendency to deceive.
2. Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
The word "Label," in Food and Drug law, merits specific definition in section
201 (k) : ". . . a display of written, printed, or graphic matter upon the immediate
container of any article; . . ." And in section 201 (in), "labeling" is defined as
".. . all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article
or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article. '74 Mislead-
ing and deceptive labeling practices under the act all come within its misbranding
provisions. Foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics are "misbranded" if, among other
things, their "labeling is false or misleading in any particular."
75
There are a great many cases involving misbranding of these four items. Such
misbranding is especially damaging to the public simply because, by the very nature
of food, drugs, devices and cosmetics, untold irreparable harm to the physical
and mental health of the citizenry can easily result from dishonest labeling prac-
tices. This is particularly so where drugs are involved. III -health seems to breed
attempts to find the so-called quick "cure-all" in convenient, easy-to-take form. The
irresponsible reap a financial harvest in exploiting such weaknesses of the sick.
There have, over the years, existed purported remedies for just about any-
thing that could be mentioned. An example of such can be found in United States
v. 114 Dozen Packages.76 The words on the label in question were novel: "Mrs.
Moffat's Shoo Fly Powders for Drunkenness." In finding that the drug was mis-
branded the court held that use of the phrase, "for drunkenness" was equivalent
to a representation that it was a "cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention1
7 7 of
drunkenness. There was expert testimony that the only constituent of the powders
was not helpful in the curirrg of drunkenness, and that the recommended dosage
was dangerous to health. Undoubtedly, there were many who were taken in by
the bland assertion on the label much to their subsequent disappointment.
That certain words or combinations thereof can constitute a representation
that a drug will cure, alleviate, or prevent ailments was also recognized under the
original Federal Food and Drug Act. In Bradley v. United States, 7  the court
found that a mineral water was misbranded where the label on the containers
indicated that it was "recommended in the treatment of" nine different ailments.
This statement, said the court, implied that the water had a curative or therapeutic
quality and was so held out to consumers. Bradley's contention that water is not
ordinarily a drug in the true sense of the word was summarily disposed of by the
court's reply that he could not be heard to say that now, where he had held it
out to the public in the manner described.
Cigarettes have likewise been deemed to be a "drug," where leaflets accom-
panying the cartons suggested that the product was effective in preventing respira-
tory ailments. The rule announced in Bradley was adopted in the case of United
States v. 46 Cartons Containing Fairfax Cigarettes.79 A similar, more recent case
concerned "Trim Reducing-Aid" cigarettes.80 Following Fairfax Cigarettes, this
case held that the cigarettes were a "drug" because they contained combustible
73 Section 201(k) 52 Stat. 1041 (1938) 21 U.S.C. § 321(k) (1958).
74 Section 201(m), 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (1958).
75 Section 403(a), 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (1958) (food); Section
502(a), 52 Stat. 1050 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1958) (drugs and devices); Section
602(a), 52 Stat. 1054 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1958) (cosmetics).
76 40 F. Supp. 208 (W.D.N.Y. 1941).
77 Section 201(g) (2), 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(2) (1958).
78 264 Fed. 79 (5th Cir. 1920).
79 113 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1953).
80 United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847
(D.N.J. 1959).
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tartaric acid intended to affect a bodily function."" They were deemed to be
misbranded on the basis of evidence that the tartaric acid contained therein was
not effective in curbing the appetite. Further, where a seller orally represented
to a purchaser that certain drugs were for the treatment of specified conditions,
the drugs were misbranded when their labels failed to disclose that they were for
the treatment of those conditions.8 2 In all these cases it is not necessary to show"
intent before a violation can be found.
83
Another requirement of the act with which a drug label must comply, under
penalty of being adjudged misbranded, is that concerning adequate directions for
use.8 4 This requirement is not met where the label makes no reference to an affliction
for which the drug is represented as an appropriate treatment by such promotion
as advertising. 5 The requirement applies likewise to devices, 6 and, they are not
exempted from this provision merely because they can only be used by licensed
practitioners.8 7
The word "device" as used in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
appears to be a catchall term.8 8 In United States v. 23 Articles,9 a phonograph
record designed for use in alleviating insomnia was held to be a "device," since
it was intended to affect a bodily function 0 - sleeping. Statements on the album
jacket emphasized the "uncanny" and "phenomenal" ability of the recorded voice
to induce sleep through the power of suggestion, even though that voice was not
personally present. The evidence, however, demonstrated that the recording could
not do all which was purported. In setting aside the decree of the district court
dismissing the libel of condemnation, the court of appeals declared that the device
was misbranded because it conveyed the impression that it was at least an adequate
substitute for medication, if not a virtual cure-all for insomnia.
Where these self-styled "amazing discoveries" are involved, it is evident that
the general attitude of the courts in condemning them lay in the recognition that
the real danger is that 'by using them consumers are apt to postpone needed medical
treatment to a point beyond which results could be disastrous.91 Thus, it is of no
consequence that the device itself is harmless.9 2 The vain psychological hopes
engendered by these products are powerful and must be corralled. This same rationale
is carried over to the occasional case where the consumer is actually satisfied with
an ineffective device believing that he has benefitted from its use.93 Despite both
the fact that the buyer wishes to keep the gadget and that it is not inherently
dangerous, the Ninth Circuit has reasoned that his rights and desires must be
subordinated to the duty of the government to seize and condemn the article under
the circumstances of false and misleading labeling. 94
81 See Section 201 (g) (3), 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(3) (1958).
82 United States v. Cruez, 144 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Ill. 1956).
83 United States v. 11 1/4Dozen Packages, 40 F. Supp. 208 (W. D.N.Y. 1941).
84 Section 502(f)(1), 52 Stat. 1051 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1) (1958).
85 United States v. 38 Dozen Bottles Labeled in Part Tryptacin, 114 F. Supp. 461 (D.
Minn. 1953.)
86 Section 502(f),1), 52 Stat. 1051 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1) (1958). See Drown
v. United States, 198 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 920 (1953).
87 United States v. Ellis Research Laboratories, Inc., 300 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied 370 U.S. 918 (1962).
88 Section 201(h), 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1958), defines "device"
as meaning "instruments, apparatus, and contrivances, including their components, parts,
and accessories. .. "
89 192 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1951).
90 See § 201(h)(2), 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), 21 U.S:C. § 321(h)(2) (1958).
91 United States v. 23 Articles, 192 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1951).
92 Drown v. United States, 198 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 920
(1953).




The lack of cosmetic cases under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in this
area is interesting. The one case found to concern itself with the misbranding of
cosmetics9" under the act does so incidentally. In fact, the case was brought by
the FTC, acting under section 5 of its act. In Houbigant v. FTC," the Second
Circuit sustained an order "requiring the petitioners to desist (1) from using upon
their products the words 'Paris' or 'Paris, France' or other terms indicative of
foreign origin, and (2) from using the terms 'Houbigant,' 'Cheramy' or any other
French or foreign words as trade names for toilet preparations compounded in
the United States, without also stating that such products were compounded in the
United States." 97 It was there stated that the FTC was not precluded from exercising
jurisdiction over the labeling of perfumes by the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
While cases under the act involving foods are many and varied, one of partic-
ular interest is United States v. 651 Cases of Chocolate Chil-Zert.9s Therein, the
product in question, "Chocolate Chil-Zert," was an ice-creamlike substance. The
label stated in a prominent fashion that it was "not an ice cream." The Chil-Zert
was nevertheless deemed to be misbranded, because the label in such a case must
bear the word "imitation," followed immediately by the name of the imitated food,
as explicitly required by section 403(c) of the act.99 The court noted that the
claimant could not be permitted to choose the means by which the public was
to be informed that his product was not in fact the one imitated.
Although the court in the Chil-Zert case had no choice but to adhere to the
plain wording of section 403(c), the government has requested the courts to go
far even where such a strict statutory provision was not in issue. They have not
always been willing to do so. For example, in a 1962 decision,100 a label describing
candy as "nut caramels" was held not to be false or misleading although the only
nuts in the candy were peanuts. In other words, a peanut is a "nut" to the average
consumer despite the fact that technically it is a "legume." The libel of condemna-
tion was dismissed.
In section 401101 of the federal law, authority is given the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare to "promulgate regulations fixing and establishing for any
food, . . . a reasonable definition and standard of identity, a reasonable standard
of quality, and/or reasonable standards of fill of containers. . . ." The Secretary
may exercise this power whenever his judgment dictates that "such action will
promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers... ." It has been
held that the purpose of this section is to substitute standards of identity of foods,
sold under common names, for informative labeling to assure the consumer that
he is getting what he reasonably expects to receive." 2
Labeling is not restricted to that information which is disclosed on the article
itself, or on its container, or in matter attached thereto, for "It is not necessary
that mislabeling, or misbranding within the meaning of the [Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic] Act, shall actually be on the container, but . . . may accompany it,
or, reach the user in some other manner." 103 Labeling thus extends to false and
misleading literature which is an essential supplement to the labels that are attached
to the package, even though the literature and the articles were separately shipped
95 Section 602, 52 Stat. 1054 (1938), 21 U.S.c. § 362 (1958).
96 139 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 763 (1944).
97 Ibid.
98 114 F. Supp. 430 (N.D.N.Y. 1953).
99 Section 403(c), 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 343(c) (1958).
100 United States v. 46 Cases of Welch's Nut Caramels, 204 F. Supp. 321 (D.R.I. 1962).
101 52 Stat. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.S. § 341 (1958).
102 Fed. Security Admr v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943).
103 United States v. Hoxsey Cancer Clinic, 94 F. Supp. 464, 467-68 (N.D.. Tex. 1950),
rev'd 198 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 928, petition for rehearing denied
345 U.S. 914 (1953).
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in interstate commerce and at different times.104 This rule appears sound, for if this
were not the law persons could easily circumvent the act by substituting pamphlets
for labels with the former containing the misleading information.
In misbranding cases under the act, the chief weapon in the FDA's enforce-
ment arsenal is seizure and condemnation of the article in question. 05 The act
further provides0 0 that it is a misdemeanor to engage in acts prohibited by section
301.107 Finally, the district courts are given authority to issue injunctions restraining
violations of section 301, except for subsections (h) through (j). These remedies
seem to be adequate to effectuate the purposes of the law. But it must be noted
that effectiveness of enforcement of either the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act or the Federal Trade Commission Act, regardless of the excellence of the
measures provided, may be seriously impeded by administrative delay. It is paradox-
ical that the same agencies which were originally created to help relieve crowded
court dockets now have huge backlogs of cases themselves. Furthermore, effective-
ness is also hampered because there is a lack of personnel for the enforcement
process.
108
Relatively recent laws deal with labeling on a different front, viz., the function
it performs after the consumer has made his purchase. Included among these laws
are the Drug Amendments of 1962.109 Enacted October 10, 1962, they are the
latest federal legislation pertaining to consumer protection in this area.
The amendments contain public safeguards regarding the safety, purity and
identity of drugs, as well as provisions for tighter manufacturing controls. Before
a new drug can be placed on the market, it must be approved by the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare. Under this law, the Secretary is empowered to
withdraw approval of a drug or refuse to approve a new drug if he finds a lack
of substantial evidence to support its effectiveness. This effectiveness criterion is
one of the broadening new features of the amendments; whereas safety was the
sole test under the 1938 act, today safety plus effectiveness must be established.
Also, the "Secretary may designate an official name for any drug if he determines
that such action is necessary or desirable in the interest of usefulness and simplic-
ity."110 This name is to be the only official name of the drug to be used in any
official compendium. The only qualification to this authority is that no official name
may be established so as to infringe a valid trademark. Another objective of the
amendments is to make information on drugs more readily accessible to both
physicians and the general public. Implementing this objective on a broader level,
the proposed "Truth in Packaging" Bill would permit the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare and the FTC to promulgate regulations to:
require (consistent with the requirements imposed by or pursuant to the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, as amended) that sufficient informa-
tion with respect to the ingredients and composition of any consumer com-
modity (other than information concerning proprietary trade secrets) be
placed on a prominent position upon packages containing that commodity
and upon labels affixed thereto."'
Notable among the new drug provisions is that contained in the amendment
to section 502(e) of the act, requiring, inter alia, that advertisements of prescription
drugs disclose the established name of the drug in prominent print, the drug's
formula, and information pertaining to side effects, contraindications, and effective-
104 Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948), rehearing denied 335 U.S. 900 (1948).
To same effect: United States v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355 (1948). See also United States v.
Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
105 Section 304, 52 Stat. 1044 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1958).
106 Section 303(a), 52 Stat. 1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (1958).
107 Section 301, 52 Stat. 1042 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1958).
108 1962 Consumer Protection Message at 3.
109 76 Stat. 780 (1962), amending 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1958).
110 Id. at 782, adding a new section, § 508(a) to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act.
111 S. 387, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3A(d) (1) (A) (6) (1963).
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ness pursuant to regulations issued by the Secretary.112 Furthermore, such advertise-
ments are not to be subject to sections 12 through 17 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. Thus for the first time, the FDA is granted direct authority over
advertising as such, as the FTC's jurisdiction over the limited field of prescription
drug advertising is clearly pre-empted. It must now be wondered if this grant of
authority to the FDA has provided the opening wedge from which ultimately the
entire field of advertising of food, drugs, devices and cosmetics will be taken away
from the FTC.1 13 Certainly, the packaging bill continues to draw the line by
limiting the FTC's regulatory power to "all other commodities" than foods, drugs
or cosmetics.
1 14
Another recent labeling law is the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling
Act,115 enacted July 12, 1960. The purpose of this statute is to "provide nationally
uniform requirements for adequate cautionary labeling of packages of hazardous
substances which are sold in interstate commerce and are intended or suitable for
household use.""' 6 The act seems to be primarily geared toward the protection of
children, and includes such common household items as waxes, varnishes, cleaners,
polishes, and products in aerosol containers."
'
The concern of the law as to labeling is that the product standing behind the
label is properly identified. The discussion now turns to packaging, a somewhat
broader concept. A package is the container or wrapping which encloses the product
for protection and display; and it usually carries the label. But attention has been
focused on the size of the package in relation to its contents.
C. Packaging
1. Under the Federal Trade Commission Act
In the "good old days" before the advent of the chain store and the large
supermarket, the proprietors and employees of the individual retail establishments
were the ones who, in large part, were responsible for inducing the consumer to buy.
Since in many cases a personal relationship developed between them because of
repeated transactions over a period of time, the advice and recommendations of
the seller were gospel and were to be relied upon as a matter of course. However,
the marketing process has become increasingly impersonal so that now the inanimate
package is, in many instances, the actual salesman, and, it may be added, a highly
effective one. The consumer's consequent inability to cross-examine this salesman
offers strong temptation to packagers. Many artifices can be worked through cleverly
creative implementation of packaging methods. Such schemes are as much to be
condemned under the Federal Trade Commission Act as are deceptive labeling
practices.
The evils of deceptive packaging revolve about the central concept that, via
this technique, the consumer is misled in most cases into believing that he is getting
a greater quantity of product than he ends up actually receiving."" For example,
in Trade Laboratories, Inc.,"9 pasteboard cartons containing the tube or container
of respondent's product had a size and capacity much greater than what was
actually needed to house that product. Because the consumer could not see inside
the carton, and since he did not have the opportunity to examine the contents
prior to purchase, the FTC issued a cease-and-desist order on the grounds that
the public was being deceived and competitors were being damaged. Thus, it was
112 76 Stat. 780 (1962), amending 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1958).
113 For the legislative history of the Amendments, see 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2884.
114 S. 387, 88th Cong., lst Sess. § 3A(d) (1) (B) (1963).
115 74 Stat. 372 (1960), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-73 (Supp. III 1962).
116 H.R. REP. No. 1861, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960).
117 For the legislative history of the Act, see 1960 U.S. CODE & AD. NEws 2833.
118 Marlborough Laboratories, Inc., 32 FTC 1014 (1941).
119 25 FTC 937 (1937).
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felt that the disappointment of the consumer and the probable fact that he was
persuaded to spend his money because of a reasonable belief that he was obtaining
a larger quantity, could not be left unremedied. 20
The Marlborough Laboratories case, 2' involving ordinary-sized tubes of shaving
cream and toothpaste being packaged in significantly larger cartons, is almost iden-
tical to Trade Laboratories with the exception that the term "slack-filling" is used.
Another example of the FTC's attack on slack-filling is found in Burry Biscuit
Corp., 22 where respondent placed the phrase, "Average 90 Crackers," in con-
spicuous type on the cardboard containers of its "Bisc-O-Bits." The Commission
issued a cease-and-desist order upon findings that there were, on the average,
substantially less than ninety crackers and that the containers were significantly
larger in size than that required to house the ten ounces of product. This same
approach was recently taken in U.S. Packaging Corp.,123 where the respondents,
by consent order, were prohibited from packaging their artificial snow in oversized
pressurized containers and then advertising that, because these containers were
larger than those of competitors', a larger amount of snow would be produced.
A presently pending case, involving deceptive packaging under FTC jurisdiction
and one which seems to be typical of the practices which the Commission is in
pursuit of currently, is that of The Papercraft Corp. 4 In an initial decision, the
Examiner Schrup ruled that the respondent, a manufacturer and seller of gift
wrappings had violated section 5 of the act. It was contended that the company
packaged its assortment of rolls of wrapping paper in such a way that purchasers
could not readily observe that certain of the papers were not as wide as the box
in which they were contained. Two different types of display boxes were complained
of: certain packages contained almost four inches of concealed empty end space-
two inches at either end-and held either four or six rolls all of uniform length;
the other type of package was designed in a manner partially covering the extended
tubes of narrow width papers in an assortment. On each style display box was
printed the actual measurements of the papers therein contained. However, the
examiner saw a distinction; he found the first type deceptive and the second not.
The reasoning is that the misleading first impression created by the oversized
boxes containing gift wrapping papers of uniform width was not dispelled by
actual measurements printed on the exterior; but where the boxes contained an
assortment, which is clearly disclosed on the front cover, there is no deception
caused by the external dimensions of the package. If the customer desires an
assortment of sizes, necessity dictates that the box fit the largest size. It is evident
that the approach taken by the Commission against the first type of packaging is
based upon the theory that consumers, notwithstanding numbers on a package which
truthfully reveal precisely what they are receiving, are in fact governed by appear-
ances conveyed by the package or container itself. Therefore, technically correct
labeling will not exonerate one who has deceptively packaged his product. 2 5
In this area of deceptive packaging under FTC jurisdiction, there is a dearth
of reported decisions. The reason for this was explained in a letter'26 from Mr.
Daniel J. Murphy, Director of the FTC's Bureau of Deceptive Practices, in which
it is stated that while much deception involves "slack-filling," respondents ordinarily
agree to discontinue complained-of practices in this area either by consent order
120 In a case prior to the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, Baltimore Paint & Color Works,
Inc., 9 FTC 242 (1925), the old criterion of injury to competition was applied where
there was less than a half gallon and a gallon of paint in standard cans of those sizes.
121 32 FTC 1014 (1941).
122 33 FTC 89 (1941).
123 53 FTC 1174 (1957).
124 Papercraft Corp., No. 8489, FTC Initial Decision, Apr. 17, 1963.
125 See United States v. 116 Boxes Arden Assorted Candy Drops, 80 F. Supp. 911 (D.
Mass. 1948).
126 Letter From Daniel J. Murphy, Director, Bureau of Deceptive Practices, Federal
Commission, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Nov. 2, 1962, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
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or by stipulation.12 7 It would seem that this phenomenon is due to the likelihood
that by the time the FTC's machinery gets moving in a given case, the profits have
already been made. In that event, the respondent certainly has nothing to lose by
submitting to a consent order or a stipulation, especially since agreement to either
does not constitute an admission that the respondent has violated the law. This
administrative delay is probably the most serious threat to effective enforcement
of the act where packaging is concerned.
In view of the fact that today's typical supermarket carries in excess of 6,000
separate items'128 - with the quantity growing every day - it would seem that the
FTC's war against deceptive packaging is just beginning.
2. Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
There are specific provisions under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
which deal primarily with deceptive packaging' 29 While food, drugs and cosmetics
are all thus covered, the few decisions which have dealt with the subject have
been food cases under section 403(d). That section provides: "A food shall be
deemed to be misbranded . . . if its container is so made, formed, or filled as
to be m isleading. ... 1 so
Only four reported judicial decisions to date have been concerned with that
aspect of the section known as "slack-filling." For various reasons the government
has lost all four. The first of these was United States v. 738 Cases Containing
jiffy-Lou Vanilla Flavor Pudding,'1' in which the powder ingredient of the pudding
occupied approximately 55% of the volume of the outer box. The libel was
dismissed on the basis that the size of the box was recognized by the general public
as being the standard size for this and similar products and that the proof did
not show that the box was so made, formed, or filled as to be misleading.
Several months later, the First Circuit followed this same approach." 2 The
court refused to lay down a hard-and-fast rule as to what constituted slack-filling
observing that the boxes and cartons containing the seized candy were similar
in size, description, and contents to those of other manufacturers in the trade.
Even though the candy occupied only about 45% of the entire volume of the
carton the court affirmed the decree dismissing the libel.
The third case, United States v. 116 Boxes of Arden Assorted Candy Drops,'
also involved a confection. In dismissing the libel, the court noted that modern
machine-filling of such boxes was responsible for the 33% average of air space
which resulted after settling but that the consumer must expect and accept "some
slack or air space,"" 4 because of the economies and sanitariness of such filling.
The recent decision of United States v. 174 Cases of Delson Thin Mints,
1 5
followed the principle laid down in the Arden decision. But, significantly, this
case introduced the standard that a package, although its form or filling deceives
the ordinary purchaser as to the quantity of contents, is not misbranded under
the act if the form and filling are justified by considerations of safety and reason-
127 By the consent order process, a person or company is given the opportunity to
settle a proposed complaint without trial and an adjudication that he has violated the law;
but a formal complaint is filed. By the stipulation process, the person or company agrees
not to engage in a practice informally challenged by the FTC; no formal complaint is filed.
128 1962 Consumer Protection Message, at 2.
129 Section 403(d), 52 Stat. 1047 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 343(d) (1958) (food); Section
502(i)(1), 52 Stat. 1051 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 352(i)(1) (1958) (drugs); Section 602(d),
52 Stat. 1054 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1958) (cosmetics). For the historical background
of the problems presented, see 38 U. DET. L.J. 664 (1961).
130 21 U.S.C. § 343(d) (1958).
131 71 F. Supp. 279 (D. Ariz. 1946).
132 United States v. Cataldo, 157 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1946).
133 80 F. Supp. 911 (D. Mass. 1948).
134 Id. at 913.
135 287 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1961).
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ableness in light of available alternative safety features. The mint candies in ques-
tion occupied only 44% of the total volume due to the presence of hollow card-
board dividers and end pieces. Even though uncontradicted evidence was presented
by the government to the effect that consumers expected to find a considerably
greater number of mints, the court concluded that the container would be justified
if its efficacy outweighed its deceptive quality, provided that alternative available
and efficacious means, if any, were not less deceptive than those actually employed.
Thus, a "least deceptive container" would be permissible. The case was remanded
for a finding of further facts, and thereupon, the libel was again dismissed. 138 On
the second appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed per curiam.1
3 7
From these holdings, it can be seen that the fact that package or container
is only partially filled is certainly not conclusive of its violating the act. However,
if a container is found to be violative, the fact that the weight of the contents is
correctly stated thereon will not absolve the packager. 38
The suggestion has been made that the incensed consumer, upon discovering
that a package is slack-filled, does not pause to consider how unrealistic it is to
believe that a packager desires the use of oversized containers. Rather, the feeling
is that packagers wish to cut down on the use of packaging materials wherever
possible because, by doing so, the small profits per package are thereby increased.
Furthermore, cushioning devices such as were present in the Delson case and which
account for air space in the packages of some products are provided so that the
consumer does not receive broken, unacceptable articles. Also, pilferage in self-
service stores is so widespread that many stores refuse to handle packages which
are small enough to be easily concealed in pocket or purse. 39
A glance at these decisions reveals that the government has trod a rough road
in attempting to clamp down on alleged slack-filling. If it can be fairly established
that today's consumers are in fact persuaded to buy because of the size of the
package 40 rather than because of such factors as price or quantity stated thereon,
the obvious result is that slack-filling practices will become a most formidable evil.
Particularly is this so when it is considered that the selling function of the package
has been so emphasized that its role as a source of public information has become
obscured.' 4' It would follow, then, that either a stricter provision is needed in the
act or that a changed attitude on the part of the courts is necessary. In view of
the decision in the Delson Thin Mints case, it is difficult to conceive how the
government will ever win a case under the present wording of section 403(d).
Perhaps, recognizing the success that the FTC has had in this area with cases
before its own tribunal, the "Truth in Packaging" Bill seeks to grant both the
FDA and FTC power to establish regulations to "prevent the distribution of that
commodity for retail sale in packages of sizes, shapes, or dimensional proportions
which may deceive retail purchasers as to the net quantity of the contents thereof
(in terms of weight, measure, or count) ."42
Finally, the 1958 Food Additives Amendment 43 to the Federal Food, Drug
136 United States v. 174 Cases of Delson Thin Mints, 195 F. Supp. 326 (D. N.J. 1961).
137 United States v. 174 Cases of Delson Thin Mints, 302 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1962).
138 United States v. 116 Boxes Arden Assorted Candy Drops, 80 F. Supp. 911 (D. Mass.
1948).
139 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary Pursuant to S. Res. 52, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 146 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on Packaging and Labeling Practices, Part 1].
140 That this is the reason people buy is suggested in Larrick, Some Comments on Packaging,
17 Food DRuo Cosm. L.J. 442 (1962). The contrary has been judicially found to be a fact,
but this occurred over 17 years ago. United States v. 738 Cases Containing Jiffy-Lou Vanilla
Flavor Pudding, 71 F. Supp. 179 (D. Ariz. 1946).
141 Ibid.
142 S. 387, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3A(e)(2) (1963).
143 72 Stat. 1784 (1958). For the legislative history of the amendment, see 1958 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. Nnws 5300.
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and Cosmetic Act is relevant insofar as packaging requirements under the Act are
concerned. The amendment prohibits the use in food of additives whose safety
has not been established through adequate testing. By virtue of the amendment,
packaging materials which may reasonably be expected to become a component
of food as a migratory substance from a container or otherwise affect the character-
istics of the food are now specifically included in the definition of food additives.
44
The effect of this is that, for the first time, packaging materials are covered by a
regulatory plan intended to insure their safety to the consumer.
1 45
D. State Law
Controls over labeling and packaging practices do not, of course, stop with
those regulations set down by the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act. The states, too, have a very real interest in protecting
their citizens from the evils engendered by the various practices proscribed by these
two federal statutes. Since federal law can have no application where the manu-
facturing and market processes are wholly intrastate, the several states must have
their own legislation in this area so as to perpetuate the good health and well-
being of their people.
In the broad area of trade regulation, there are no state laws which are closely
modeled after the Federal Trade Commission Act. 46 Many states, however, have
statutes of a general nature which are aimed at achieving objectives similar to
those of the federal act, such as the prevention of unfair competition and false
and misleading advertising.
California, for example, provides that the Attorney General or any district
attorney may bring an action to enjoin "Any person performing or proposing to
perform an act of unfair competition within [the] State."' 4' "Unfair competition"
is defined to include "unfair or fraudulent business practice and unfair, untrue or
misleading advertising .....' 1
48
A most important development in state regulation of advertising has been the
adoption of the Printers' Ink Model Statute. This was originally drafted in 1911
for Printers' Ink, the advertising trade journal; and, over the years, it has been
widely accepted by the states.249 The part pertinent to this discussion, declares,
in the words of the New York Legislature:
Any person, firm, corporation or association, or agent or employee
thereof who, with intent to sell or in any wise dispose of merchandise,
... directly or indirectly, to the public for sale or distribution, or with
intent to increase the consumption thereof, or to induce the public in any
manner to enter into any obligation relating thereto, . . . publishes,
disseminates, circulates, or places before the public, or causes, directly or
indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before
the public, in this state, in . .. label, or tag, . . . an advertisement,
announcement or statement of any sort . . . which advertisement contains
any assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive
or misleading, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.' 50
It is noted that this statute does not demand proof of the intent to deceive. Some
states, 15 however, have injected the element of scienter into their statutes. The
over-all effort is certainly praiseworthy, yet enforcement has not been successful.
"The criminal nature of the sanction, the inclusion of the requirements of intent,
144 Section 201(s), 72 Stat. 1784 (1958), 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (Supp. III 1962).
145 See Larrick, Some Comments on Packaging, 17 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 442 (1962),
and Kuniholm, Are Empty Containers Food?, 15 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 637 (1960).
146 ELKOURI, TRADE REGULATION 241 (1957).
147 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3369(2).
148 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369(3). See also CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE § 17500 for definition
of false or misleading statements.
149 Handler, The Regulaion of Advertising, 56 COLUM L. R. 1018, 1058 (1956); SIMON,
THE LAW FOR ADVERTISING AND MARKETING 266 (1956).
150 N.Y. PEN. LAWS § 421.
151 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.06 (Supp. 1961).
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materiality, and other restrictive elements, and the failure to provide administra-
tive machinery for enforcement as the federal government has done, have severely
limited the effectiveness of these statutes in suppressing false or misleading adver-
tising."'1
5
In the food and drug area, most of the states have enacted the Uniform State
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Bill which closely resembles the present federal law.
1 53
Other states still pattern their food and drug laws on the 1906 federal enactment.
54
Uniformity would certainly be desirable, but there is a larger problem which
afflicts the states. "This is the problem of raising the administration of the state
food, drug and cosmetic laws generally, to the high level consistent with the public
welfare and health protection, from every standpoint of its organization and
equipment and appropriations. . . .'-Is In a word, the lack of money, personnel
and facilities is the primary reason for unsatisfactory enforcement. 5
Although such state laws are designed to reach the intrastate transaction,
into whose domain federal law does not extend, problems are created where inter-
state commerce is also involved and is affected. Since it is not the intention here
to treat the numerous laws on a state-by-state basis, attention will be directed to
the never-ending dilemma of coexisting federal and state law.
There may be occasions where both federal and state laws are applicable
to a particular label or package. The problem arises where the state imposes higher
requirements than the national law. The determinative criterion which has been
consistently applied is whether or not the state requirement is such that it directly
conflicts with the federal law.' 57 Where there is such a conflict, even though it is
recognized that the state has the right to insist upon a particular requirement, its
provision must yield to the federal statute. 58
Even where there is no provision in the federal law with which a state require-
ment could conflict, there is a trend in the direction of invalidating the state law
anyway, because it is felt that the federal government has the exclusive authority
to protect the labeling pattern right down to the actual sale.' 59 Thus, it seems that
the govermnent has almost completely occupied the labeling field, evidently on
the theory that the federal labeling pattern is both detailed and complete. 60
E. "Truth in Packaging" Bill
President Kennedy's remarks in his consumer protection message to Congress
on March 15, 1962 were obviously intended to prompt anew revitalized concern
for the mounting dilemmas faced by today's average consumer in his constant
exposure to ever-changing marketing techniques.
One response to the President's pleas came from Michigan Senator Phillip
A. Hart, who introduced his "Truth in Packaging" Bill'6' on September 24, 1962,
152 Handler, supra note 149, 1064-65.
153 E.g., CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 66-22-1 (Permanent Supp. 1960).
154 E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. §§ 32-1961 (Drugs) and 36-901 (Food) (1956).
155 Dunn, Uniformity of State Food and Drug Laws-Informal Remarks, 14 FOOD DRUG
Cosra. L.J. 187, 188 (1959).
156 Randall, Factors Affecting the States' Adoption of Food-Additives Law as Well as Other
Recent Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 14 FooD DRUG Cosme. L.J.
172 (1959).
157 This principle was enunciated as early as 1912 by Justice Hughes in Savage v. Jones,
225 U.S. 501; 525 (1912): "[W]hen the local police regulation has real relation to the suitable
protection of the people of the State, and is reasonable in its requirements, it is not invalid
because it may incidentally affect interstate commerce, provided it does not conflict with
legislation enacted by 'Congress pursuant to its constitutional authority."
158 See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).
159 United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1943); United States v. Pinocchio Brand Oil,
289 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 831 (1961). See further Note, The Inter-
state Ingredient of Section 304 (a) -Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 37 NoTRE DAME
LAWYER 408 (1962), reprinted in 17 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 380 (1962).
160 'Conner, A National Labeling Pattern, 6 FOoD DRUG Cosa. L.J. 20 (1951".
161 S. 3745, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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near the close of the 87th Congress. The original bill has since been revised 62 and
was reintroduced before the Senate on January 21, 1963, about which time Con-
gressman Emanuel Celler of New York presented a companion bill'6 3 in the House
of Representatives.
The "Truth in Packaging" Bill is proposed as an amendment to the Clayton
Act of 1914, and, in the words of Senator Hart, it
[I]s designed to restore rational buying to the market place and to remove
... the gantlet of psychological traps, successive confusions and outright
deceptions that today's consumer must run whenever he passes down a
supermarket aisle.164
In extensive hearings carried on over a nine-month span prior to introduction
of the bill, Senator Hart and his colleagues discovered, among other things, that
it is the package that today largely performs the selling function at the point of
sale. The hearings further revealed that many manufacturers were being compelled
by competitive demands to employ unethical packaging and labeling techniques
simply because everyone else was doing so - all to the consumer's ultimate dis-
advantage. By establishing standards for the packaging and labeling of consumer
commodities, the bill purports to first benefit the consumer and secondly to provide
some measure of security for the manufacturer who will realize that he and his
competitors will both be required to adhere to the same set of standards.
Regarding the consumer, Senator Hart points out that one of the keystones
to the favorable operation of our competitive economy is that the consumer must
be able to make an informed, rational choice as to the items he buys. To enable.
him to effectively do this certain basic information must be presented on the
packages and labels of consumer goods. Through the "Truth in Packaging" Bill,
Senator Hart hopes to reduce the desire of manufacturers to compete in nonprice
areas, such as are packaging and labeling, and to restore price and quality as the
more meaningful factors in competition. 165
This proposal goes considerably beyond existing federal control. Specifically,
it attacks unfair and deceptive methods of labeling and packaging by authorizing
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (for food, drugs and cosmetics)
and the Federal Trade Commission (for all other commodities) to immediately
promulgate regulations to which the labeling and packaging of consumer com-
modities must conform.166 The more notable of these regulations would: (1)
require that the net quantity of contents statement appear on the front panel of
packages of goods covered by the bill and on their labels; 167 (2) require that
minimum standards be established with regard to the location and prominence
of such statement which also includes matters involving type faces and sizes;' 6
(3) prohibit the use of qualifying words or phrases in connection with the net
quantity of contents statement. 1 69 Thus, such interesting terms as the "big two-
ounce size" and the "giant-size full pound" would be things of the past; and (4)
prohibit any illustrations or pictorial matter on packages which may deceive pur-
chasers as to the contents thereof.
17 0
Furthermore, the FDA and the FTC would be given discretion to issue addi-
tional regulations on a product-by-product basis where necessary to establish or
preserve fair competition or to prevent consumer deception. These supplemental
regulations would:
162 S. 387, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
163 H.R. 2382, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
164 108 CoNG. REc. 19265-66 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1962).
165 Id. at 19266-67.
166 S. 387, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3A (d) (1) (1963).
167 Id. at § 3A (c)(1).
168 Id. at § 3A (c)(2).
169 Id. at § 3A (c)(3).
170 Id. at § 3A (c)(6).
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(1) establish reasonable weights or quantities, or fractions or multiples
thereof, in which that commodity shall be distributed for retail sale;
(2) prevent the distribution of that commodity for retail sale in
packages of sizes, shapes, or dimensional proportions which may deceive
retail purchasers as to the weight, quantity, or number of the contents
thereof (in terms of weight, measure, or count);
(3) establish and define standards of designations of size (other than
statements of net quantity of contents) which may be used to characterize
quantitatively the contents of packages containing that commodity;
(4) establish and define the weight, quantity, or number of any com-
modity (in terms of weights measure, or count) which shall constitute a
serving, if that commodity is distributed to retail purchasers in a package
or with a label which bears a representation as to the number of servings
provided by the net quantity of contents contained in that package or to
which that label is affixed;
(5) establish and define standards for the quantitative designation
of the contents of packages containing any consumer commodity of a kind
the net quantity of contents of which cannot meaningfully be designated
in terms of weight, measure, or count; and
(6) require that (consistent with requirements imposed by or pur-
suant to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, as amended) suffi-
cient information with respect to the ingredients and composition of any
consumer commodity (other than information concerning proprietary trade
secrets) be placed in a prominent position upon packages containing that
commodity and upon labels affixed thereto.
1 7 '
The rules promulgated under this discretionary power must be based upon
consultation with other governmental agencies having special competence in the
area involved and with persons or companies who may be affected by the pro-
posals. Notice of intention to promulgate such regulations must appear in the
Federal Register to assure all interested parties an opportunity to be heard. Further,
the regulations are subject to modification when changes in marketing methods
or techniques make it necessary.1
7 2
Violations of FDA regulations issued pursuant to the bill would be subject
to the penalties provided by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,'73 while
violations of FTC regulations would subject violators to cease-and-desist orders
under the Federal Trade Commission Act.' 7 4 The injunctive relief afforded to
private litigants under section 16 of the Clayton Act'7 5 is also available. 7 6 More-
over, there is provision for a criminal penalty in a limited situation. The promul-
gating authority is authorized to make a written request to any producer or dis-
tributor for a correct sample of any label or package which he is using or intends
to use. Any party who, with intent to avoid compliance of the law, fails to forward
the requested samples shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both.
77
"Consumer Commodities" are the products covered by the bill. The definition
of this term, 7 s according to Senator Hart, largely limits it to so-called "kitchen
and bathroom" items, which are the vast majority of goods sold in modern super-
markets. Further, it is submitted that the bill's jurisdiction clause offers an oppor-
tunity to further expand the concept of interstate commerce. It states that whole-
salers and retailers are exempt from this command, "except to the extent that such
persons (1) are engaged in the packaging or labeling of such commodities, or
(2) determine by any means the nature, form, or content of packages in which
such commodities are contained or labels affixed to such commodities."'
79
171 Id. at § 3A (e).
172 Id. at § 3A (f).
173 Id. at § 3A (h)(1).
174 Id. at § 3A (h)(2).
175 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
176 S. 387, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3A (h)(3) (1963).
177 Id. at § 3A (g).
178 Id. at § 3A (k)(1).
179 Id. at § 3A (b). (Emphasis added.)
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Senator Hart explains the purposes to be achieved by the bill:
Our aim is threefold: First, that the spirit and substance of the
antitrust laws be extended to the relatively new form of nonprice compe-
tition represented by packaging. Second, that the American manufacturer
be freed from the unfair trade practices that have grown up in this area
beyond the reach of present law. Third, that the American consumer can
know what she is buying and paying for.18 0
Despite this lofty objective, the Senator and his bill have not gone uncriticized.
Some members of Congress already have charged that the proposed legislation,
if enacted, will mean less freedom and higher prices.'' Leading the assault is Senate
Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois who argues that consumers can
be adequately protected by more effective enforcement of existing laws.18 2 Joining
Dirksen in opposition to the bill is Republican Senator Roman L. Hruska of
Nebraska, who maintains that the bill is "a mislabeling in itself"''1 3 because its
purpose does not coincide with the plan to have it amend the Clayton Act.
One of the most interesting arguments for rejecting the bill was set forth by
Mr. Ernest Dichter, President of Institute for Motivational Research, Inc. He
contends:
The point is that packages and labels can best sell merchandise only once
or twice. Once he detects an inferior product or spots a fraudulent adver-
tising claim, the consumer will reject that product regardless of how
attractive the package or label may be. Most intelligent companies have
learned that what they are really spending their advertising dollar on is
the creation of a solid brand image.
A brand image is like a signature on a check. No matter how elegant
the signature may be, if the check bounces you are not going to do business
with that person again.' 8 4
Nevertheless, the bill seems praiseworthy to the extent that it appears to
solve the peculiar problems posed by practices presently used in connection with
the unique institution that is the modem supermarket. It would thus be expected
that passage of the bill would make such practices skeletons in the closet of the
past. "Our economy is based on freedom of choice. Let us give the consumer a
chance to make that choice a good one."'""
III. CONSUMER CREDIT AND DISCLOSURE STATUTES
The drugstore and supermarket are not the only sources of deceptive selling
and confused buying. The department store, the appliance house and the used car
lot, down the street or at the other end of the shopping plaza, can present the
consumer with misrepresentation and bewilderment of a different sort - how much
does the product cost? Here an individual is bombarded by such inducements as
"no money down," "easy credit terms," "up to 18 months to pay," and "pennies
a day." The Sixth Circuit some time ago succinctly stated the problem:
The average individual does not make, and often is incapable of making,
minute calculations to determine the cost of property purchased on the
deferred payment plan. Mechanization, industrialization, and urbanization
have transformed the structure of our society and raised to the proportions
of a major social problem, the protection of the installment purchaser
against his own ignorance and the pressure of his need.'
8 6
"The variety and complexity of finance ... arrangements and the charges for
them are such as almost to defy comprehension."'' The retailer, it would appear,
180 109 CONG. REC. 604 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1963).
181 Chicago Sun-Times, Mar. 7, 1963, p. 9, col. 1.
182 Ibid.
183 Id. at col. 2.
184 Hearings on Packaging and Labeling Practices, Part 1, at 175.
185 108 CONG. REc. 19267 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1962).
186 Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941).
187 Statement of Theodore Yntema, vice-president in charge of finance, Ford Motor Co.,
testifying before the Senate Hearings on Automobile Financing, as quoted in Hearings Before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 1740, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
404 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Hearings on Truth in Lending].
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can find many techniques to camouflage the actual cost of buying on time. To
prevent this abuse, the major device employed in all regulatory statutes is based,
at least in part, on the philosophy of disclosure.188 The reasons for disclosure laws
seem quite sensible: the man in the marketplace ought to know what his purchase
will cost him. Accordingly, disclosure will place the consumer in a better position
to determine whether his financial resources are sufficient to meet "18 easy monthly
payments." Further, the knowledge of the true costs of competing and comparable
merchandise will permit the purchaser to make an economically wise choice in his
selection. Lastly, equipped with an awareness of actual credit costs, the consumer
is able to determine the relative advantages of accepting the financial arrangement
offered by the vendor or borrowing the amount of the purchase price from another
source.
A final qualification-credit disclosure-will be discussed only insofar as statutes
deal with the information relevant to costs which must be made known at the time
of initial purchase in a vendor credit189 transaction. These provisions may be
found in many types of legislative enactments, as, for example, retail installment
sales acts, motor vehicle financing acts, conditional sales contracts acts, and motor
vehicle codes. However, here disclosure will be broadly considered. No distinction
will be made as to the types of legislation in which these provisions appear. All
legislation embodying credit and cost disclosure provisions are categorically referred
to as disclosure statutes.
A. Historical Growth of Disclosure Statutes
The earliest attempt in the United States to insure disclosure of financial
charges was probably under the Russell Sage Foundation's Uniform Small Loan
Law, which included a provision that at the time of making the loan the borrower
was to be given a clear statement of the exact terms of the loan.' 90 This principle
has been followed to the present day and forms the basis for disclosure statutes in
the retail sale of consumer goods.
Following the early loan law, various efforts to bring about full disclosure in
the installment sales field were made at both the federal and state levels. In 1933,
unsuccessful efforts to agree on uniform trade practices were made under the
National Industrial Recovery Act.- But, in that same year, the principle of dis-
closure gained important stature when Congress passed the Security Act of 1933.192
President Roosevelt, in a speech before Congress, underscored the policy behind the
"Truth in Securities" Law: "This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor,
the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware.' It puts the burden of telling the whole
truth on the seller."' 93 With this impetus, Indiana pioneered the way for the states
by passing the Retail Instalment Sales Act in 1935.194 This was the first statute to
require the vendor to fully disclose all terms of purchase costs to the installment
buyer.'9"
All of the activity, however, did not shift to the state legislative arena. The
federal government made another attempt at control over consumer sales in the
188 Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 38
(1958).
189 Vendor credit is basically a transaction wherein the consumer buys directly from a
retail merchant on an installment plan, the payments being deferred in payment of a finance
charge. When the consumer goes to a source other than the vendor and borrow funds to pay
for his purchase, paying interest for his loan, he is then relying upon lender credit.
190 Robinson & Nugent, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN BuSINESS 96 (1935); 16 U.
CHI. L. Rv. 609 (1949).
191 See 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 200 (1935).
192 48 Stat. 81 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1958).
193 Speech made to Congress by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 29, 1933.
194 Ind. Acts 1935, ch. 231 [now IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-901 to -934 (1961 Replacement)].
195 For an excellent discussion of the historical background of retail installment sales
statutes, see 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 137 (1958).
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form of Regulation W.1 1 Under a presidential order, Regulation W was first
issued on September 1, 1941 as a defense measure.197 Its basic purpose was to place
a ceiling over prices of consumer goods. Noteworthy, however, were the provisions
which required specific disclosure of all credit terms in the sale of durable consumer
goods which cost $5,000 or less. Regulation W was allowed to expire in 1952.19 s
When the Uniform Commercial Code was first proposed, the drafters con-
sidered incorporating credit disclosure requirements within its provisions. Section
9-205 of the Proposed Final Draft contained extensive disclosure requirements, not
unlike those now found in most state statutes. 99 But, on January 14, 1951, the
Council voted to delete this section, and the executive session of the Editorial Board
agreed.200 However, this is not to say the problem is unworthy of study and atten-
tion -"Since it is the policy of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws not to
draft statutes of a highly regulatory nature at least when regulation is in the
experimental stages, this Part does not attempt to meet abuses which may exist." 20 '
Today, neither the Uniform Commercial Code nor the Uniform Sales Act contains
disclosure provisions.
During this same period, widespread dealer abuses in the sale of motor vehicles
led the Federal Trade Commission to hold a series of extensive hearings. Here,
the gap between the regulations provided by a few states and the general need
for such regulation, came to the attention of the Commission. As a result of the
investigation on February 6, 1951, the Commission adopted the Trade Practice
Rules governing automobile financing.2 2 Based on Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, these rules were designed to eliminate and prevent deceptive
practices in the installment sales of automobiles. Although the FTC did not attempt
to define the precise application of the Trade Practice Rules, the rules are neces-
sarily limited to transactions in interstate commerce because of the constitutional
and statutory restrictions on the Commission's jurisdiction.20 3 Thus, the reach of
the regulations has not offered effective protection for installment buyers because
of the intrastate character of most automobile purchases. From the standpoint of
consumer protection, the chief effect of the rules appears to have been the indorse-
ment which they gave to the enactment of state regulatory rules.
A related influence spurring state activity was the notoriety of deceptive dealer
practices in the sale of motor vehicles. The "Findings and Declarations of Policy"
found in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act typifies the need then
recognized for such legislation: "An exhaustive study ... discloses nefarious, un-
scrupulous and improper practices in the financing of the sale of motor vehicles...
which are unjustifiably detrimental to the consumer and inimical to the public
welfare." 204 The act concludes that these pernicious practices "have existed to
such an extent that regulation of the installment selling of motor vehicles is
necessary to the adequate protection of the public interest. '20 5 The ice having been
broken with the widespread enactment of disclosure statutes in the sale of motor
196 See 63 HAv. L. R1v. 874 (1950).
197 Exec. Order No. 8843, Aug. 9, 1941, 3 Code Fed. Regs. ch. 2 (Gum. Supp. 1943).
198 12 C.F.R. § 222.6(c) (1949), revoked 14 Fed. Reg. 3742 (1949) reinstated 32A C.F.R.
ch. XV. §6(2) (c) (1951), suspended, 17 Fed. Reg. 4256 (1952).
199 Uniform Commercial Code, Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950, 742-44. See also §7-
611(l).
200 6 Bus. LAw. 119 (1951).
201 Uniform Commercial Code, May 1949 Draft, § 7-601, Comment. (Emphasis added.)
At the time of the proposed section thirteen states had retail installment acts requiring dis-
closure. 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 27, 37-38 (1951).
202 16 Fed. Reg. 1059 (1951).
203 See FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 342 (1949), holding that FTC jurisdiction does not
extend to intrastate commerce.
204 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 602 (Cum. Supp. 1961). The act "was enacted for the protec-
tion of the purchaser of automobiles ... " Roxy Auto Co. v. Moore, 180 Pa. Super. 603, 122
A.2d 87, 88 (1956).
205 Id. at § 602.
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vehicles, legislatures in the last decade have been quick to expand coverage by
passing statutes which require disclosure in the sale of other consumer goods as
well.
The period between 1957 and 1963 has seen a flurry of new legislation.
208
Presently, 42 states have statutes requiring disclosure either in the sale of motor
vehicles, all other consumer goods, or both.2 0 7 Many states also have disclosure
requirements in connection with revolving credit plans and add-on contracts.20
On the federal level, the "Truth in Lending" Bill, after difficult going in committee
for the past three years, has been reintroduced by Senator Douglas.209 One of the
provisions of this bill presently causing the greatest stir among retailer groups is
section 4(b), which sets forth disclosure requirements for revolving or open-credit
plans.
It is apparent that disclosure has become an accepted fact of life in the field
of installment sales. Therefore, the remainder of this section will be directed toward
an analysis of how the principle is applied and how such application may be
effectively improved.
B. What Goods Are Covered
To reiterate, the fundamental principle of disclosure is to inform the uninformed
of the full cost of merchandise offered for sale under financing plans. Thus it would
seem elementary that the disclosure statutes should be equally applicable to the
sale of all consumer purchases, irrespective of the kind of the goods bought, the
nature of their use, their cost, or the security interest which the seller retains in
them. But this proposition is not at all descriptive of the existing disclosure statutes.
1. Coverage According to Kind of Goods
A look at the disclosure statutes reveals that the most variant item as to
coverage is the treatment of consumer protection on the basis of the kind of goods
which are involved in the sale. The broad categorization is twofold: those statutes
which require disclosure in the sale of motor vehicles and those termed "all-goods"
statutes which provide for disclosure in the sale of consumer goods other than
motor vehicles. Forty-two states currently have disclosure statutes of one type or
another. A numerical breakdown of these statutes10 would reveal that: (1) thirty-
nine states require disclosure in motor vehicle sales; (2) sixteen states require dis-
closure only in connection with the sale of iotor vehicles; (3) twenty-eight states
have separate statutes relating to the sales of motor vehicles; (4) eleven states have
both motor vehicle acts and all-goods statutes; (5) twenty-six states have statutes
of the all-goods variety; and (6) twelve of the states having all-goods statutes
include motor vehicles within their coverage.
On the federal level, the Trade Practice Rules of the FTC regulate only motor
vehicle sales, though the proposed "Truth in Lending" Bill would extend the federal
regulation to all consumer goods. Since the definition of "credit" in this bill is
all-inclusive, 2 1 Senator Douglas has indicated that there would be a substitution
206 See 13 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 99 (1959); Id. at 136; 14 IaRS. FIN. L.Q. RaP. 153
(1960); 16 PERs. FIN. L.Q. REP. 129 (1962).
207 See chart infra and accompanying notes lc and 2c.
208 Disclosure under a revolving credit plan involves furnishing the purchaser with a
monthly statement of his purchases, unpaid balance, and the finance charge on that balance.
See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 520.35 (1962).
209 20 Cong. Rec. 1905 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1963) (S. 750).
210 For a state-wide listing of these statutes, along with their full citation, see chart infra and
accompanying notes 1c and 2c.
211 "'Credit' means any loan, mortgage, deed of trust, advance, or discount; any condi-
tional sales contract; any contract to sell, or sale, or contract of sale of property or services,
either for present or future delivery, under which part or all of the price is payable subsequent
to the making of such sale or contract. . . ." S. 750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(2) (1963).
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of the Federal Reserve Board, which is charged with enforcing the bill, for the
FTC in the regulation of motor vehicle sales.
12
As demonstrated by the mere number of statutes, legislative recognition of the
need for disclosure has been readily granted the purchasers of motor vehicles. A look
behind the motor vehicle statutes, to the reasons for this disparity based on the
kind of goods purchased, will provide a valuable yardstick of determination for
future legislative activity. Undoubtedly the greater cost of motor vehicles, as com-
pared with the other purchases of the consumer, was an influencing factor. Of
historical significance is the fact that when the application of the disclosure principle
to consumer purchases was still in its embryonic stage, installment buying was itself
still limited. Motor vehicles were costly. It was natural, therefore, that installment
plan buying first made its mark upon our contemporary economy in that field.
Motor vehicle dealers were therefore in a position to refine subtle screens to deceive
consumers, unmindful of the intricacies of this new easy-money mode of buying.
The schemes were varied but included such practices as lumping the insurance cost
with the finance charge to give the appearance of low credit charge and advertising
automobiles for $100 down and $10 a month, without indicating the interest or
carrying charges. But with the continued popularity of installment buying 13 the
abuses soon were uncovered. The earlier notoriety of these abuses no doubt is the
key reason for the wider recognition of the need for an informed consumer in the
automobile market.
Though these factors show a historical explanation of the limitation of dis-
closure principles to motor vehicle sales, they do not justify its continuance. The
costs of goods are high. As the deferred payment plan becomes more and more
an integral part of every consumer's economic existence,214 the justification for a
disparity of consumer credit protection on the basis of the kind of goods purchased
becomes incomprehensible.
2. Coverage According to Use of Goods
In a small number of states the consumer is not entitled to the protection of
the disclosure statutes if his purchase of goods is made for a commercial use.2 15
Typical of the statutory language excluding commercial purchases from coverage
is that of the Delaware statute, which defines "goods" as "tangible chattels bought
for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes, as distinguished from
commercial or agricultural purposes." '16 The proposed "Truth in Lending" Bill pro-
vides no blanket exclusion of commercial transactions, 21 7 but "credit transactions
involving extensions of credit to business firms '21 8 may be excepted from the act.
Practical policy arguments would strongly favor the exclusion of the great bulk of
daily commercial transactions. If such transactions were not excluded the state
would be called upon to police the activities of firms well able to protect them-
selves. Staffed with competent buyers and statisticians, there is little likelihood that
a large enterprise will be uninformed as to the true costs of its purchases.
212 Letter from Senator Paul H. Douglas to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Mar. 15, 1963 on
file in Notre Dame Law Library.
213 See generally, United States Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Con-
sumer Instalment Credit, pt. 1, vol. I, c. 8 (1957) (hereinafter cited as Federal Reserve System
Bulletin).
214 See generally, Id. at ch. 6.
215 ALASKA STAT. § 45.10.220(2) (1962); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1802.1; DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 4301 (Cum. Supp. 1962); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 520.31 (1) (1962); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121Y2, § 223 (Smith-Hurd 1960); Ky. REv. STAT., Acts 1962, S 97, § 1(1) (Cum. Issue
1962); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAWS §§ 401, 64-a; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1902(a) (Cum. Supp.
1962); WASH. S 415, 38th Sess. (Feb. 12, 1963). The Idaho statute is not applicable to sales
of household goods and furniture, musical instruments, motor vehicles, farm implements, and
machinery. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-805 (1948).
216 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4301 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
217 S. 750, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. § 3(2) (1963).
218 Id. at § 5(a).
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However, if all commercial purchases were exempted, protection of the law
would be denied to the Main Street shopkeepers, salesmen, and others like them,
in the purchase of supplies and equipment essential to earning their livelihood.
219
It is necessary to weigh both the practicability of burdening the state with protecting
the large private enterprise in its commercial purchases and the need of the small
businessman in his buying transactions. Perhaps the best solution is to extend the
coverage of these statutes to all goods, regardless of their use, and impose dollar
limits upon the cost of the goods covered.
3. Coverage According to Cost of Goods
In a handful of states the protection given consumers is limited to goods of a
prescribed cost. Disclosure of the terms of sale is required only in sales of a specified
cost. Such dollar limits are found in both the all-goods and motor vehicle statutes.
With little exception, these statutes place a ceiling upon the cost of the goods
covered. 220 In some states, 221 however, a floor is placed under the cost and all goods
over that amount are covered by the statute. Minimum limits can be found only in
all-goods statutes.
To evaluate the protection rendered the consumer in one of these states, as
compared with the purchaser in a state whose statute has no dollar limits, it is
again necessary to consider the basic principle of disclosure. Under statutes having
no dollar limits, all purchases fall within their coverage. Enacted to provide the
consumer with knowledge of the full cost of his purchase, it is certain that more
comprehensive protection is afforded -by these disclosure statutes. But practical
considerations weigh heavily. Under no-limits statutes enforcement agencies have
an almost infinite number of sales transactions to police, ranging all the way from
a disgruntled purchaser of a lawn mower to the unhappy buyer of a 58-foot yacht.
Enforcement in those states might well be less effective because of this unwieldy
burden. Thus, it would seem that more vigorous protection could be given the
consumer in those states limiting the scope of their acts. This is especially true
of limitations in the all-goods statutes. The only hindrance to stringent enforcement
under motor vehicle statutes with no dollar limits is the inclusion of commercial
purchases of vehicles.
The question that is really crucial would seem to be that of determining
what dollar limits are best. By setting a minimum limitation states may eliminate
many spurious complaints. Some statutes222 seem to have been prompted by the
notion that purchases of under $75 or $100 are of too little value to be of concern
to the state. From the practical standpoint of enforcement, it is probably true that
placing upon the state the responsibility of protecting the consumer in these small
purchases would result in many more complaints than could be effectively handled.
But this might well defeat the fundamental purpose of the disclosure statutes by
not protecting the average wage-earning consumer where he most needs protection
-his weekly and daily encounters with vendor credit. It is not inconceivable
that the greater number of abuses take place at this level of consumer purchases,
for, not only are the greater number of the consumers in this bracket likely to be
less-educated, wage earners, but also they are less likely to take pencil in hand
and compute the actual cost of an item which they purchase where the amount
involved is so small. It might well be, then, that this is the fertile soil in which
the unscrupulous tradesman toils his craft. Maximum dollar limits, on the other
219 See 19 RocKc MT. L. REv. 135 (1947).
220 Conn. ($6000); Fla. motor vehicle statute ($7500) ; Ind. ($9999); Ky. motor vehicle
statute ($5000); La. ($7500); Md. ($2000); Miss. ($7500); Mo. ($7500); N.H. motor
vehicle statute ($7500); N.J. ($7500); N.Y. conditional sales contract statute ($3000); Utah
($7500).
221 Del. all-goods statute $75 (unless a security interest is retained); Idaho ($100).
222 Ibid.
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hand, seem desirable. Such limits eliminate many of the large interbusiness purchases
from the coverage of the act even where there is no blanket exclusion of commer-
cial transactions. Placing a limit of $7,500223 upon the cost of goods and motor
vehicles appears reasonable. In an all-goods statute such a limitation certainly
should include most items which a consumer and small business will buy on the
installment plan, while drawing the line where the larger commercial transactions
are likely to begin. In the motor vehicle statutes, a $7,500 figure is adequate to
protect today's average car buyer, while excluding from the terms of the act the
commercial purchases of motor vehicles. Certainly the dollar amount can be re-
evaluated from time to time in light of economic conditions. In this regard, the
experience of Indiana should serve as a guide for other states. Initially setting the
dollar limit at $1,500 when the statute was enacted in 1935,224 the Legislature has
progressively raised it through the years, increasing it to $2,500 in 1947,22.5 $5,000
in 1955,226 and its present limit of $9,999 in 1961.227
4. Coverage According to Interest in Goods Which Seller Retains
In the majority of the states228 the consumer is unprotected by disclosure
statutes unless the seller retains a security interest in the goods sold. This interest
may be retained either by way of a conditional sales contract,2 '2 9 purchase money
chattel mortgage,2 3 0 or bailment lease. The limitation may have been motivated
by the desire to delegate to the enforcement agencies a manageable number of
transactions. However, in denying protection to the consumer who buys goods of
nominal value or perishable nature where no security interest is retained, 23 1 a
good part of the disclosure theory is ignored. If statutes are to secure information
for the consumer, they should secure that information in all of his purchases, not
just those in which the seller considers the goods of such value as to formally retain
a security interest. Realizing this, several state statutes and the "Truth in Lending"
Bill require that no security interest need be retained in order for the disclosure
provisions to apply.
C. What Must Be Disclosed
The Fourth Circuit has noted: "Because of the misleading or ambiguous
manner of stating the finance rate and other charges in the usual installment con-
tract few installment buyers are aware of the rate or charges which they are actually
paying." 2 2 Disclosure statutes seek to eliminate this problem by demanding that
the seller set forth separately each of the items comprising the total cost of the goods
purchased. Specific statutory language to this regard is essential. Failing to require
such a separate itemization, the Washington motor vehicle statute2 33 has led dealers
to employ "hazy itemizing- grouping costs together under general heads and
not specific itemization" 2 4 and concealment of specific contract terms by ambiguous
or catch phrasing.
22
223 This is the generally agreed upon ceiling in those states setting dollar limits. See supra
note 220.
224 Ind. Acts 1935, ch. 231, § 1 [now IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-901 (1961 Replacement)].
225 Ind. Acts 1947, ch. 238, § 1 [now IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-901 (1961 Replacement)].
226 Ind. Acts 1955, ch. 16, § 1 [now IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-901 (1961 Replacement)].
227 Ind. Acts 1961, ch. 324, § 1 [now IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-901 (1961 Replacement)].
228 Among the minority group of states not requiring such an interest to be retained under
all-goods statutes, are Cal., Del., Fla., N.H., Ohio, and Tenn.
229 See e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-806 (Cum. Supp. 1961).
230 See e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-8-15 (1953 Replacement).
231 See RocKY MT. L. REV. 135 (1947), and 63 HARV. L. REV. 874 (1950).
232 United States v. Bland, 159 F. Supp. 395, 396 (D. Md. 1958).
233 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46-70-130 (1962).
234 Letter From Roger A. Jones, Motor Vehicle Administrator, Washington, to the Notre
Dame Lawyer, Feb. 28, 1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
235 Ibid.
LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
The New Jersey all-goods statute" 8 exemplifies the manner in which various
items must be specifically disclosed:
Every retail installment contract shall set forth the following separate
items:
(a) The cash price of the goods which are the subject matter of the
retail installment contract;
(b) The down payment made by the retail buyer, indicating whether
made in cash or in goods or partly in cash and partly in goods. The amount
of the payment in cash and in goods shall be shown separately. A descrip-
tion of the goods, if any, sufficient for identification, shall be shown;
(c) The unpaid cash balance ...;
(d) The amount of, if any, if a separate charge is made therefore, in-
cluded for insurance and other benefits, specifying the coverages and benefits;
(e) The amount of official fees;
(f) The principal balance;
(g) The amount of the time price differential;
(h) The time balance... owed by the retail buyer to the retail seller,
the number of installments required, the amount of each installment expressed
in dollars and the due date or period thereof;
(i) The time sales price....
The disclosure provisions found in the motor vehicle statutes are of substantially the
same language and content.237 The Trade Practice Rules of the FTC are basically
the same, and the "Truth in Lending" Bill, with slight variation, is also similar.
1. How is Disclosure Made
Before discussing the terms which must be disclosed, a preliminary requirement
deserves consideration: how is disclosure of the terms made.
Basic of course to the whole theory of disclosure is that the contract, or an
itemization of the costs, be put into writing. All the disclosure statutes, including
the FTC Trade Practice Rules and the "Truth in Lending" Bill, require such a
writing. This seems merely to be in recognition of the assumption that the con-
sumer would not long remember these individual costs if orally stated. To assure
the consumer's observance of the itemized costs many statutes23 8 take even greater
precautionary measures by requiring that both buyer and seller sign the agreement
or contract.
Of equal importance is the requisite that the executed writing be delivered
to the buyer. To secure information before obligation, delivery should be made
before the consummation of the purchase. It is unfortunate because in many
instances even though delivery of the writing must be made, disclosure is defeated
by placing the cart before the horse - requiring delivery of the writing after the
contract of sale is executed. In summary, the statutes can be categorized as follows:
(1) about half of the disclosure statutes require delivery at the time of contract
execution; 239 (2) a great number of the statutes require that the seller deliver or
mail a copy of the contract to the buyer. If there is no delivery of the motor vehicle
or goods, then, until such delivery is made, the buyer can rescind;2 40 (3) some
statutes permit delivery prior to or concurrent with the execution of the contract2e 4
if requested; otherwise delivery is to be made within 10 days after execution;
242
(4) in other states, a seller must mail or deliver the executed writing before the
236 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-27 (Cum. Supp. 1961).
237 See e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-6(2) (1953); IowA CODE ANN. § 322.3(6)
(Cum. Supp. 1962); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8075-13(b) (Cum. Supp. 1960).
238 See e.g., ME. Rzv. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, § 254(I) (A) (Cum. Supp. 1961); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 168.71(a)(1) (1960); NEv. REv. STAT. § 97.020(1) (1957).
239 Ala.; Cal. (motor vehicle statute) ; Colo. ; Conn.; Idaho; Ind.; Iowa; Ky. (motor vehicle
statute); Mich.; Minn.; Neb.; Nev.; N.H. (all-goods statute); N.J.; N.M. (all-goods statute);
Ohio; Pa.; S.D.; Utah; Vt.
240 Ariz.; Del. (motor vehicle statute); Fla. (motor vehicle statute); Hawaii; Ill.; Kan.;
Ky. (all-goods statute); La.; Me.; Md.; Miss.; Mo.; Mont.; N.H. (motor vehicle statute);
N.M. (motor vehicle statute); N.Y.; N.D.; Ore.
241 Mass. (motor vehicle statute).
242 Va.; Wis.
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day the first payment is due;24 3 (5) in two states the seller has the option of
delivering the instrument when executed or afterwards, but until the buyer receives
a copy of it he is not obligated to pay more than the cash price;244 (6) in one state
the delivery must be made prior to, or about the time of, the delivery of the motor
vehicle;24 5 and, (7) the FTC Trade Practice Rules and the "Truth in Lending" Bill
demand that the seller furnish the buyer with an itemization before consummation
of the sale.
It would seem that each of these categories, with the exception of the last, is
in patent conflict with the basic concept of disclosure. They do nothing more than
the public-spirited citizen who phones the fire department after his neighbor's home
has been razed to a heap of ashes. They provide remedies for an uninformed
purchaser, such as allowing him to rescind, and relieving him of the obligation to
pay the finance charge, but do little to inform him before he commits himself to
that purchase. The only requirement consonant with the principle of full disclosure
is that of the FTC and the proposed federal "Truth in Lending" Bill which provide
for a complete itemization of all costs prior to the time the sale is consummated.
2. Cash Price and Down Payment
All disclosure statutes require the cash price to be stated. Most statutes permit
the seller to include in the cash price figure the charges for accessories, delivery,
installation, repair or other services upon the goods.24" In some states, however,
a separate statement of these charges must be made.
247
Under substantially all of the disclosure statutes248 the consumer will receive
an itemization which sets forth the amount of the down payment or turn-in credit.
This amount usually must be accompanied by a description of such trade-in or
part payment. The statement of the amount of the unpaid balance of the cash
price is customarily required. 249  An occasional statute,2 50 however, requires no
disclosure of the unpaid balance. Providing for a separate statement of the unpaid
balance imposes very little additional clerical burden on the retail dealer. Since
it provides the consumer with a complete record of the credit transaction it is a
desirable feature of the disclosure statutes.
3. Statement of the Insurance
In the typical installment sale the seller will procure insurance protection for
the goods sold. The expense of this coverage constitutes part of the buyer's cost.
All 2-5l statutes, therefore, specifically state that the cost of the insurance must be
set forth. A common provision, especially in the motor vehicle acts, demands that
the seller not only reveal the cost of the insurance but also that he indicate the
coverage which it provides.
252
243 Fla. (all-goods statute); Mass. (all-goods statute) ; Tenn.
244 Cal. (all-goods statute); Del. (all-goods statute).
245 N.C.
246 See chart infra and accompanying notes Ic and 2c for listing of states and full citation of
statutes.
247 The only states in which a separate statement of these charges is required are Md. and
N.Y. (all-goods statute). The Ala. all-goods statute requires a separate statement of each item
comprising the cash price. See chart infra and accompanying notes for a complete listing of the
states and a full citation of the statutes.
248 See chart infra.
249 Ibid.
250 Alaska (motor vehicle statute); Idaho; N.H. (all-goods statute); N.C.; Tex.; Va.; Wis.,
FTC Trade Practice Rules. See chart infra and accompanying notes lc and 2c for a complete
listing and full statutory citations.
251 The New Hampshire all-goods statute is a general "disclosure" law, specifically intended
to require the dealer to disclose the finance charge. However, since the purpose of the statute
is disclosure, inferentially at least, it requires a separate statement of the insurance cost, even
though the statute does not specify that such a statement must be made.
252 The most comprehensive statute in this regard is KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-507(f)
(Supp. 1961).
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Disclosure of insurance costs is vital. Although this is recognized by statutory
provision, the statutes vary in an important aspect. There is a parting of ways
as to the method and precision of stating this cost and the time when the exact
cost should be disclosed:25 3 (1) the majority require that a separate statement of
the insurance cost be included in the itemization delivered to the consumer;
25 4
(2) in Pennsylvania, and under the FTC's Trade Practice Rules, if the precise
cost of the insurance is unavailable at the time the contract is signed, an estimated
amount, ascertained from a chart or recognized rate manual, may be set forth in
the contract. Further, the contract must state that the cost of the insurance is
estimated and contain a notice to the buyer that the difference between the estimated
cost and the actual cost, including the finance charges on such amount, will be
adjusted at the time of final payment. A statement of the amount of the adjustment
has to be furnished the buyer simultaneously with the delivery of the insurance
policy; (3) in Michigan, if the precise cost of the insurance is not available at
the time the contract is signed, an estimated amount, ascertained from the current
applicable manual of a recognized standard insurance rating bureau may be set
forth in the contract; (4) in other statesF55 the insurance cost may be lumped with
the amount of the finance charge. The seller is then under a duty to send the
buyer the exact cost of both within a specified number of days; and, (5) in Wis-
consin, the Commissioner of Banking may permit the motor vehicle dealer to
combine the insurance cost and finance charge in one statement under such rules
and regulations as the Commissioner may from time to time prescribe.
It is noted that the majority approach allows neither an estimation of the
cost nor lumping. This clearly seems to be in the best interest of an informed
consumer, notwithstanding the oftimes difficult task of determining the exact
insurance cost which such statutes impose upon the seller. However, dealers have
recurrently claimed that because they are frequently unable to ascertain the exact
amount of the insurance at the time of sale, they should be entitled to estimate its
cost. The Proposed Final Draft of the UCC (Spring 1950) attempted to satisfy
those making such claims. It permitted the insurance to be stated as an approxi-
mated cost if the buyer was notified within 30 days of its exact cost.256 Writing
in support of the statement of the insurance cost as an estimated amount, J. Francis
Ireton, secretary of the American Bar Association, argued that because of the multi-
farious models of vehicles and therefore many class rates it is almost impossible
to know, at the time of sale, the exact cost of insurance. 257 There is merit in this
argument. It would seem that Pennsylvania, the FTC, and Michigan have struck
a harmonious chord. Under their statutes an estimate of the insurance cost may
be recited, based upon recognized charts or manuals. The buyer is then to be
notified of the exact cost shortly thereafter. Adjustments are permitted in case
of an overstatement of the estimate. Since the estimate is based on a recognized
standard, adherence to the principle of disclosure is still present. If it can be
assumed that insurance costs among dealers would not be substantially different
from those in the standard rate chart, then it could not be said that the consumer
was uninformed for he would have to pay a similar premium elsewhere. The cost
of insurance would not then be a decisive factor in his choice of goods. However,
253 For a complete listing of the states see chart infra. Full citations to the statutes may be
found in the notes ic and 2c accompanying the chart.
254 Alaska; Ariz.; Cal.; Colo. (all-goods statute); Conn.; Del.; Fla.; Hawaii; Idaho; Ill.
(sale of all goods other than motor vehicles); Iowa; Kan.; Ky.; La.; Me.; Md.; Mass.; Minn.;
Miss.; Mo.; Mont.; Neb.; Nev.; N.H. (motor vehicle statute); N.J.; New York (all-goods
statute); N.C.; N.D.; Ore.; S.D.; Tenn.; Tex.; Utah; Vt.; Va.; F.T.C. Trade Practice Rules;
Federal Truth in Lending Bill.
255 Colo. motor vehicle statute (30 days) ; Ill. motor vehicle sales only (20 days) ; Ind. (25
days) ; N.Y. conditional sales contracts statute (25 days) ; Ohio (25 days).
256 Uniform Commercial Code, Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950, § 9-205(2).
257 Letter From J. Francis Ireton to Judge Herbert F. Goodrich, Apr. 24, 1950, in 6 Bus.
LAw. 119, 135 (1951). See also, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 27, 37, 38(191).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
if the costs of insurance are variable, objections may be raised as to the wisdom
of permitting the seller to estimate the cost of insurance, for then the consumer
would not be able to compare costs of competing goods. These objections would
be especially valid under statutes permitting the consumer the choice of buying
his insurance directly from the dealer or from his own broker.
Different considerations are involved when one measures the utility and effects
of lumping the insurance cost with the finance charge. The objective of disclosure
seems defeated under those statutes permitting the seller to divulge only a single
combined markup that lumps together the cost of insuring the goods with the
finance charge. The separate figures must be known to the dealer in order for him
to ascertain the lumped sum, so it seems no undue burden to require him to
disclose those figures individually. Lumping of these costs enables the unscrupulous
dealer to convince buyers that "costly" insurance coverage constitutes the bulk of
the lumped markup. Thus consumers regard installment buying as costing little
more than a purchase for cash. Shielded by consumer ignorance, the dealer may
then exact exorbitant charges with small fear of timely detection. Of course, if
lumping were considered as an evil only insofar as retail sellers are concerned,
then itemization would be useless, for buyers could compare lumped charges as
easily as itemized charges. Commenting upon the separation offered in the Pro-
posed Final Draft of the UCC (Spring 1950) ,25 Mr. Ireton saw the situation in
the same light, arguing that the "separation of the finance charge and insurance
charge is a wholly unnecessary burden on industry, without compensating benefits
to the public."'2 5  But lumping, when considered in the broader area of the
competitive race for the consumer's credit, prevents comparison of vendor and
lender credit costs. Accordingly, the statutes requiring a separate statement of
these costs are unquestionably more sound than those in which lumping is per-
mitted. The FTC concurs in this conclusion. States whose motor vehicle disclosure
statutes permit lumping are not considered to be adequately effective by the FTC
and therefore these states are not excepted from the regulation of the Trade
Practice Rules.
260
4. Official Fees and Principal Balance
Most of the disclosure laws require a separate statement of the official fees,
such as registration and filing fees, and other charges paid by the dealer in con-
nection with the sale.261 If these fees and charges must be paid in conjunction
with a sale, and constitute a part of the buyer's cost, it is consistent with the
theory of disclosure that they be separately stated.
The principal balance, which is the unpaid balance of the cash price plus
the cost of insurance and official fees, generally must be disclosed. 262 This provi-
sion, though not entirely essential, is important insofar as it enables the consumer
to follow the mechanics of the transaction through each successive step in the
calculations.
5. Finance Charge
All statutes require the disclosure of the finance charge.26' The charge
imposed is often referred to as the time price differential, representing the excess
of the time price over the cash price which the consumer agrees to pay for the
privilege of buying on the deferred payment plan. But revealing only the figures,
258 See supra note 256.
259 Letter From J. Francis Ireton, op. cit. supra note 257.
260 ". . . legislation permitting the lumping of finance, insurance, and other charges and a
non-disclosure as to the amount of each to the purchaser before consummation of purchase ...
would be regarded by the Commission as inadequate ... " 5 PERS. FiN. L. Q. REP. 35, 37
(1951).




other than the finance charge, which the seller relied upon in arriving at the time
sales price is not sufficient. A California court has maintained that:
The very purpose of the code section would be defeated and nullified if
the buyer was required to determine the time price differential by a mathe-
matical process arrived at from an analysis of the seller's figures. The law
requires that this item must be recited in the contract and not left to a
mathematical compilation by the buyer.264
In the greater number of the statutes the finance charge need only be set
forth as an amount, expressed in dollars and cents.26 s Variations of the dollar
amount statement are to be found in eight state statutes,26 which permit the seller
to state the finance charge as a rate. This accords with the earnest claims which
have been made that the finance charge should be expressed both as a dollar
amount and as a rate of interest per annum, or rate of interest per month on a
declining balance.26 Although the statutes in these eight states give the seller the
option of stating the finance charge as a dollar amount or rate, Section 4(a) (7)
of the "Truth in Lending" Bill requires that, in addition to the statement of the
dollar amount, the writing set forth "the percentage that the finance charge bears
to the total amount to be financed expressed as a simple annual rate on the average
outstanding unpaid balance of the obligation.1
26
Formulations of finance charges in terms of rates are urged because they
would enable the buyer to judge better the cost of competing means of financing
his purchase. Thus the proponents of the Douglas Bill favor disclosure of this
charge in the form of both a dollar amount and a rate. Their contention is that
with such disclosure the consumer is then equipped with a yardstick with which
to compare costs.26 9 The opponents of the bill, on the other hand, point to the
burden such a computation would put upon retailers and their clerks.2 7 0 As pointed
out, on the state level the claims for a rate statement have received very little
response from the legislatures. It has been suggested that this is because of the fear
of cluttering up the installment contract.27 Further, there may be the fear that
such an enactment will lead to the adoption of the dollar amount method in the
solicitation of lender credit agencies.17 2 Herein lies the greatest virtue of the Douglas
Bill. By requiring all credit agencies, both lender and vendor, to solicit consumer
patronage according to a uniform method of charge statement, the consumer
will have a truly enlightened choice in selecting from among competing sources
of credit.
Although the amount of the finance charge is not of primary concern to the
disclosure principle, there remains one final control over finance charges which
bears need of mention. Since bona fide installment sales are free of the usury laws.2 73
many states have prescribed dollar limits on the amount of the finance charge.
274 If
the thrust of disclosure statutes is to protect the unwary buyer from all abusive
264 Adams v. Caruso Enterprises, 134 Cal. App. 2d 403, 285 P.2d 1022, 1026 (1955);
accord, Foster v. Masters Pontiac Co., 158 Cal. App. 2d 481, 322 P.2d 592 (1958).
265 See chart infra and accompanying notes Ic and 2c.
266 Alaska (all-goods statute); Fla. (all-goods statute); Hawaii; Ill.; N.H.; (all-goods
statute); N.Y. (all-goods statute, and conditional sales contract statute); N.D.; Ohio. Full cita-
tions of these statutes are included in the notes ic and 2c accompanying the chart infra.
267 See, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 189 (1935); 19 RocxY MT. L. Rxv. 135 (1947); 44
CORNELL L.Q. 38 (1958).
268 S. 750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (7) (1963).
269 See, Testimony of Edward Gudeman, Under Secretary of Commerce, 1962 Hearings on
"Truth in Lending," at 19-23.
270 Id., Wallace F. Bennett, Senator from Utah, at 15, 17, and 46.
271 44 CORNELL L.Q. 38 (1958).
272 Ibid.
273 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 148 (1935); 114 Nw. U.L. REV. 137, 167-68 (1958); Van
Asperen v. Darlings Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 93 N.W.2d 690 (1958).
274 See e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121-2-4 (1960 Perm. Supp.); HAwAIr Rv. LAws
§ 201A-31 (Supp. 1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-41 (Cum. Supp. 1961); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 218.01(6) (b) (1957).
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practices of the unscrupulous tradesman, then this is a welcomed development in
the law.
6. Time Balance and Time Sales Price
With small exception, 75 all disclosure statutes require a statement of the
amount of the time balance, that is, the amount of the principal balance plus -the
finance charge. Also, substantially all the statutes declare that the itemized writing
set forth the number, amount, and date of each installment payment.276 The
"Truth in Lending" Bill is notably absent from this group.
As to the requirement of stating the installment sales price, also known as
the time sales price, the statutes split ranks. A statement of this figure, which repre-
sents the sum of the down payment and the time balance, is demanded by only
a handful of statutes.2 7 7 As with the Douglas Bill, this item need not be stated
under statutes permitting the statement of the finance charge in terms of a rate.278
D. Enforcement
The disclosure statutes all2 7 9 seem to exhibit a legislative agreement that
some penalty provision is necessary for the effective enforcement of the disclosure
provisions, perhaps because of the experience of California, where an act without
any penalty provision was passed. 2 0 In Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 28 1 the
court held that the proper inference to be drawn from the omission of a penalty
section was that a contract not complying with the disclosure provisions would be
unenforceable. Although there is general appreciation of the need for some penalty,
a distinct split exists as to what types of penalty provisions are the most effective.
1. Licenses
A common means of ensuring compliance with the disclosure laws is requiring
retail sales dealers to be licensed. In many states such a requisite can be found.
28 2
But, the tripartite nature of most installment sales transactions has prompted many
states to require only sales finance companies, engaged in the business of purchasing
the contracts of retail installment sellers to be licensed.28 3 This ". . . tends strongly
to insure that compliance with the statutes is being done by the licensees, and the
retail sellers from whom they purchase retail instalment contracts. '28 4 Several
states require that both retail installment dealers and sales finance companies be
licensed.28 5 Although in these states compliance may also be sought by the imposi-
tion of a civil or criminal penalty,2s8 the thrust of this method of control is in the
vested power of the state to suspend or revoke these licenses. Most statutes provide
275 The time balance need not be stated in the N.H. and N.M. all-goods statutes, nor in the
Truth in Lending Bill. See chart infra and accompanying notes Ic and 2c for complete listing of
states and statute citations.
276 The schedule is not required to be stated under the Alaska, Neb., and Va. motor vehicle
statutes, nor the N.H. all-goods statute and "Truth in Lending" Bill.
277 See chart infra and accompanying notes 1c and 2c.
278 See e.g., N.D. Rnv. CODE§ 51-13-02(5) (1960).
279 The Nev. statute is the only notable exception. NEv. REv. STAT. § 97.060 (1957) pro-
vides for a civil action against a seller who exceeds the prescribed time differential limits or
acceleration provisions, but provides no penalty for a violation of the disclosure provisions. See
chart infra for other states.
280 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2982(e) (1954) (now violations are provided for in CAL. CIv. CODE
§§ 2983, 2984).
281 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949).
282 See chart infra and accompanying note 3c.
283 Ibid.
284 Letter From Reinhard J. Bardeck, Deputy Bank Commissioner, Connecticut to the Notre
Darme Lawyer, Feb. 27, 1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
285 See chart infra and accompanying note 3c.
286 Ibid.
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for the suspension or revocation of the license only if the violation of the disclosure
provisions is intentional.V 17
Under all of the statutes a violation on the part of the licensee may be brought
to the attention of the enforcement agency by the consumers. To determine
whether the licensee is complying with the disclosure provisions, statutes permit
the state to conduct investigations of their books, records, and accounts. If only
the finance company is required to be licensed, the statutes usually provide that the
state may also investigate the records of the retail sellers from whom it purchases
its retail installment sales contracts upon registration of complaint. When the
burden of reporting the violation is upon the retail buyer he must file a written
complaint. The state banking commissioner, typically the official charged with
enforcement, is then empowered to conduct an investigation. This is followed by
a formal hearing, which could result in the license suspension or revocation. Rather
than putting the full burden of disclosing violators upon the consumer, under most
statutes the states retain the right of a general investigatory power, having free
access to all pertinent records of the licensee at any time.28 8 Typically these statutes
are interpreted as providing for periodic examinations. The cost of such examina-
tions is often charged to the licensee.2 9 If only finance companies are required
to be licensed, the state may not examine the records of sellers in the absence of a
registered complaint. Under many of the licensing provisions this general investi-
gatory power over licensees may be exercised only if there exists a reasonable
belief that the licensee is violating the disclosure statute.290 It would seem that
this provision permits investigation only upon complaint, though it need not be in
writing. Thus, investigations here too are made to depend upon the consumer.
Most statutes enable the state agency to conduct investigations either upon its own
initiative, or upon the written complaint of a retail buyer.2 91 Those statutes which
grant general investigatory powers to the state, even without reason to suspect a
violation, are clearly the more effective. If a written complaint is the primary
motivating force behind the state's investigatory power it seems unlikely that the
state will be called upon to enforce its disclosure statute very often, for "if
people have to write letters they postpone filing complaints it seems."
2 2
In the absence of licensing provisions, it has been suggested that enforcement
of the statutes by criminal prosecutions to imprison the violator, and/or to recover
an authorized fine, is apt to fail, if for no other reason than that the prosecuting
officials are usually too overburdened with prosecutions of other crimes to be
much concerned with seemingly technical statutory violations in consumer credit
transactions.
293
287 Ariz.; Del.; Fla. (motor vehicle statute); Ind.; Kan.; La.; Me.; Md.; Minn.; Miss.;
Mont.; Neb.; N.H.; N.J.; N.M.; N.Y.; N.C.; S.D.; Vt.; Va.; Wis.
288 Conn. (free access); Del. (power to investigate at any time); Fla. motor vehicle statute
(investigations at intermittent periods); Ind. (may investigate at any time); Kan. (power to
make such investigations as are deemed necessary); Mass. (whenever in the public interest);
Mich. (any time during regular business hours); Miss. (investigations at intermittent periods);
Mont. (power to make such investigations as are deemed necessary); Neb. (power to make such
investigations as are deemed necessary); N.M. (power to make such investigations as are deemed
necessary); N.Y. (power to make such investigations as are deemed necessary); Penn. (investi-
gate at any time); Wis. (licensor may inspect).
289 See e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-505(a) (Supp. 1961); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 8075-
10 (Cum. Supp. 1960); NEB. REv. STAT. § 45-312(13) (1960 Reissue).
290 Ariz. (reasonable belief of violation); Fla. all-goods statute (inspect records to deter-
mine compliance); La. (reasonable belief of violation); Me. (reasonable cause); N.H. (for any
reasonable cause); N.J. (if reasonable cause to believe violation); S.D. (reasonable belief of
violation); Vt. (reasonable belief of violation).
291 A few states seem to permit investigation only upon the complaint of the retail buyer:
Colo.; Iowa; Md.; Minn..; N.C.; Va.; Wash.
292 Letter From Joseph V. Riley, Supervisor, Division of Small Loans and Consumer Credit,
Indiana, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Feb. 26, 1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
293 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 137 (1958).
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2. Criminal Penalties
Another generally accepted approach to the enforcement of the disclosure
provisions is the imposition of criminal penalties. These are often included even
in statutes providing for the suspension or revocation of licenses.294 Including both
of these provisions is essential to states where it is the sales finance company which
must be licensed. Without direct recourse to the dealer, provided by the criminal
penalties, the only party to suffer would be the finance company, thus leaving
the violator unscathed. The penalty provisions require either the imposition of
a fine up to a specified amount (usually $500 or less), or imprisonment of a maxi-
mum period (usually six months or less), or both. 295 To be liable under these
provisions the violation must usually be intentional.29 Many statutes classify viola-
tions of the disclosure provisions as misdemeanors.
297
Looking to the federal controls one finds more stringent penalties. When
a violation of the FTC Trade Practice Rules is found, a cease-and-desist order
will issue which, if not obeyed, will subject the violator to a civil penalty of not
more than $5,000 for each transgression 298 Each separate violation is considered
a separate offense. Under the "Truth in Lending" Bill a willful violator would
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.2 99
Relying solely upon criminal sanctions, or criminal sanctions in conjunction
with civil remedies for the buyer, for the enforcement of disclosure statutes seems
to be of questionable wisdom. A vast majority of consumers are poorly equipped
to avoid the infliction of a wrong or obtain its redress even though unethical sellers
act in defiance of the law. Even the in terrorem effect of these provisions is lost
if the dealers can rely on their silent partner - consumer ignorance - to keep their
misdeeds from the eyes of the law. In the final analysis, therefore, licensing regula-
tions coupled with the power of periodic investigations seem to offer the best solu-
tion to the enforcement problem.
3. Civil Remedies
In addition to the remedial actions by states through the imposition of license
suspension and revocation and/or the imposition of criminal penalties,30 many
states grant the consumer a direct remedy. This is done by allowing the recovery
of charges paid by the buyer, or by barring the seller's recovery of any time price
differential, delinquency or collection charges, or both. 01 Here again distinctions
are made between violations which are intentional and those which are not.
°0 2
On the federal level, the FTC Trade Practice Rules offer little direct consola-
tion to the consumer who has dealt with a dealer violating the regulations, because
of case holdings that the Federal Trade Commission Act grants injured consumers
no private cause of action against violators.
303
But the proposed "Truth in Lending" Bill would give greater direct remedies
to the consumer. Section 7(a) provides that a willful violator will be liable to
the consumer "in the amount of $100, or in an amount equal to twice the finance
294 See chart infra.
295 Ibid.
296 See e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 121Y2, § 243 Smith-Hurd (1960); Mo. STAT. ANN. §
408.370(1) (Gum. Supp. 1962); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-56 (Cum. Supp. 1961).
297 See e.g., Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-295(A) (Gum. Supp. 1962); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 4347 (Gum. Supp. 1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANNA ch. 59, § 258(I) (Gum. Supp.
(1961).
298 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45(1) (1958).
299 S. 750, 88th Cong., lst Sess. § 7(c) (1963).
300 A bill soon to be introduced in the Minnesota legislature would declare violations of
the statutes to be public nuisances.
301 See chart infra and accompanying notes.
302 See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-99 (1960); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 74-
611(b) (1947 Replacement); N.D. REV. CODE § 51-13-07 (1960).
303 Samson Crane Co. v. Union National Sales, 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949).
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charge . . . whichever is greater, except that such liability shall not exceed
$2000 . .. "304 This section of the bill concludes by stating that "the creditor
shall be liable for reasonable attorney's fees and court costs as determined by the
court."
3 05
These provisions would put sharpened teeth into the consumer's remedies.
However, the persistent problem of litigation apathy over small amounts and the
need of effective promulgation of statutory protection still prevail. On the other
hand, requiring the fine to be paid to the buyer might well lead to a flood of
spurious claimants willing to wage legal battle where the stakes of victory are
set so high.
The Douglas Bill attempts to give some protection to the erring seller. Section
7(a) provides that "no person shall be entitled to recover such penalty solely as
the result of the erroneous computation of any percentage . . . if the percentage
required . . . to be disclosed . . . was in fact greater than the percentage required
... to be disclosed."30 6 If, however, the percentage disclosed is smaller than that
actually due, though the computation was erroneously made, the creditor is still
penalized. The harshness of this penalty might well lead sellers to overstate these
percentages as a matter of routine for their self-protection, thus defeating the very
purpose of this "truth" bill.
4. Corrections
Finally, many states 0 7 permit a seller to correct his violation. If he is notified
in writing by the buyer and makes a correction within a specified number of days s08
he is exempted from both 9 civil and criminal penalties. Permitting corrections
to relieve the violator of his liability under the statute is certainly a compromising
measure, intended to protect the retail sellers against the imposition of penalties
for unintended errors. The provision, however, defeats the purpose of the
disclosure statutes. This conclusion has been recognized in Florida, where the all-
goods statute permits the correction of violations.3 10 It has been said of this statute:
Penalties for violations are inadequate, and from a practical point of
view nonexistent. The law is deprived of force by the provision that no pen-
alty may be imposed unless the seller has failed to correct a violation within
30 days after having been notified by the purchaser or the Administrator of
his failure to comply with provisions of the act.31-
In effect, therefore, these provisions would seem to be instructing the seller to
comply with the disclosure requirements if he desires to do so for, even if his
violation is discovered he is still left with sufficient time to absolve himself from
all liability.
E. Effectiveness
The foregoing discussion is clear evidence that the need for disclosure statutes
has attained widespread recognition. Today attention should be focused on the
effectiveness of the disclosure statute.
304 S. 750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1963).
305 Ibid.
306 Ibid.
307 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1812.8, and 2984; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4349 (Cum. Supp.
1962); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 520.39(4) (1962); HAwArr RaV. LAWS § 201A-21 (Supp. 1961);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121/2, § 243 (Smith-Hurd 1960); Ky. REv. STAT., Acts 1962, S. 97, §
6(3) (Cum. Issue 1962); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.370(3) (Cum. Supp. 1962); N.Y. PERS.
PROP, LAws §§ 414(3), and 307(3); OE. Rv. STAT. § 83.990(3) (1961 Replacement);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1907(d) (Cum. Supp. 1962).
308 Cal. (30 days); Del. (10 days); Fla. (30 days); Hawaii (10 days); Ill. (10 days); Ky.
(10 days); Mo. (10 days); N.Y. (10 days); Ore. (10 days); Tenn. (30 days).
309 The Illinois statute exempts the violators only from any criminal penalties.
310 Supra note 307.
311 Letter From N. E. Miller, Jr., Executive Assistant, Office of the Comptroller, Florida,
to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Mar. 5, 1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
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1. How Effective is the Present Method of Stating the Finance Charge
Disclosure statutes serve a dual purpose. On the one hand, they are intended
to inform the consumer of the cost of his purchase in order that he might make a
selection from among goods of comparable quality before making his purchase.
On the other, these statutes should enable the consumer to compare the cost of
the credit offered him by the vendor with that offered by competing credit
agencies. Any attempt to adequately consider the effectiveness of the statement
of the finance charge must proceed with both of these aims in mind.
Presently the finance charge must be stated as a dollar amount under the
existing type of disclosure statutes. 312 Clearly, this enables the consumer to make
a comparison of the costs of other comparable goods before obligating himself to
make his purchase. However, it fails to provide the consumer with any common
denominator with which to compare other available sources of credit. The state-
ment of the charge as a rate, if employed by all credit agencies, would furnish this
common denominator. Perhaps pregnant in the history of disclosure statutes
is the rationale of the method of stating the finance charge in terms of a
dollar and cents amount, rather than as a rate. The finance charge has traditionally
been thought of as part of the cost of goods purchased on the deferred payments
plan,3 1' in contradistinction to the cost of a loan. The latter, known as interest,
is considered as an increment of the monies borrowed. To meaningfully express
this increment, the interest has been stated as the percentage representing the
proportion which the increment bears to the principal borrowed. But the finance
charge, contrariwise, has been viewed as a cost rather than an increment. From
the seller's position it represents the clerical expense which he incurs in granting
the consumer the privilege of extending his payments over a period of time."'
4
Consequently legislatures, when first enacting disclosure statutes, reached the
conclusion that since the finance charge is an item of cost, it should then -be
expressed as all other items of cost- as a dollar amount."s 5 Agreement upon
this form of statement was probably also influenced by the circumstances sur-
rounding the early recognition of the need for disclosure statutes.3 6 Unscrupulous
dealers were employing devious means to conceal the full cost of the finance
charge. It was no doubt felt that the consumer ought to know exactly how much
he was paying the dealer for each item comprising the final sales price. Attention
was directed to pointing up to the consumer the portion of the purchase price
attributable to his buying on credit rather than for cash. Stating the finance charge
as a dollar amount was plainly satisfactory to achieve that purpose. But when
attention is shifted from the more limited purpose of disclosure-a meaningful
evaluation of the credit charge for a particular transaction by itself -to the
broader purpose of providing an effective comparison of competing credit prices
offered by different credit extenders, this form of statement is clearly inadequate.
It could be said in support of the dollar amount statement that the consumer
is primarily interested in how his purchase will affect his pocketbook. He wants
to know how much, in dollars and cents, his purchase will cost him. This is un-
312 See supra note 265 and accompanying text. See also, supra note 266 and accompanying
text for the eight states which permit the statement to be in the form of a dollar amount or
percentage rate.
313 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 148 (1935).
314 See e.g., CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 42-83(1) (1960). "'Finance charge' means the
amount in excess of the cash price of the goods agreed upon by the retail seller and the retail
buyer, to be paid by the retail buyer for the privilege of purchasing the goods under the retail
instalment contract or instalment loan contract."
315 This analysis finds support in the fact that the first statutes in this area - the Indiana
all-goods act, the Wisconsin motor vehicle statute, and the F.T.C. rules - all required only a
dollar amount statement. See chart infra.
316 See supra notes 202 and 204 for a discussion of how the nefarious practices of dealers
in concealing the cost of an installment purchase led to the enactment of the disclosure
statutes.
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controverted, but it avoids entirely the question of the merits of this form of
statement as a yardstick of measurement when the consumer attempts to evaluate
competing credit costs. With so many different methods of computing the amount
of the finance charge available, 17 it is of little wonder that that even with this
disclosure the perplexed consumer would still be in a quandary when he attempted
to 'determine the most attractive source of credit. The dollar amount statement is
valuable insofar as it informs the consumer as to the cost of the privilege of paying
in installments rather than for cash. It eases the comparison of costs with other
goods. The dollar amount statement should be retained for these purposes. But with
manifold variations in the method of statement among competing credit agencies, a
common basis for comparing alternative credit sources must also be provided.
Requiring a dollar amount statement, supplemented by a statement of the charge
in terms of a percentage that is figured on a common base period, equally applicable
to all credit suppliers, would seem to satisfy this need. 1 s This form of statement
would "facilitate instant and easy evaluation and comparison of finance charges
by all borrowers and buyers on credit." '19
This in a nutshell is what the Douglas Bill purports to do. Section 4(a) requires
that the seller disclose "the finance charge expressed in terms of dollars and
cents"320 and "the percentage that the finance charge bears to the total amount
to be financed expressed as a simple annual rate on the average outstanding unpaid
balance of the obligation."
3 2'
2. How Effectively Have the Disclosure Statutes Been Enforced
In practically every state of the Union today33 2 the consumer is protected in
most of his installment purchases by disclosure statutes of varying degrees of compre-
hensiveness. One indicium of how effective these statutes have been in gaining the
sellers' full disclosure may be the number of complaints about deceptive practices that
have been made since their enactment. A sampling of the states as to the number
of complaints brought within the past year has shown that few complaints have
been registered.2 3 However, reliance cannot be posited solely on the small number
of complaints as testimony of the effectiveness of disclosure statutes. There remains
the hard fact that consumers are often unaware of their rights and, even when
aware of these rights, are often unwilling to complain because of the minor amounts
involved. Realizing this, most states do not leave enforcement solely to the will
or whim of the consumer, but, instead, require licenses and provide for state-




A seller might continue to employ deceptive practices, shielded by consumer
317 See 2 LAw & CONT-MP. PROB. 188, 188-89 (1935) where the author lists eight broad
classifications of methods of computing the charge, based on his survey of 60 stores.
318 Five states - Minn., N.M., N.D., S.D., and Wis. - require as a matter of law that
the finance charges on small loans be stated in terms of annual rates as well as monthly rates.
See, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 56.14 (Cum. Supp. 1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-17-44 (Supp.
1961); N.D. Rzv. COD- § 13-03-15 (Cum. Supp. 1961); S.D. CODE § 6.04B25 (Supp. 1960);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 214.13 (1957).
319 Testimony of Edward Gudeman, Under Secretary of Commerce, 1962 Hearings on
Truth in Lending, at 20.
320 S. 750, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. § 4(6) (1963).
321 Ibid. at § 4(7). A provision comparable to this can be found in the bill introduced in
the Wisconsin assembly and proposal soon to be introduced in the Minnesota legislature. See
infra note 345 and accompanying text.
322 See chart infra.
323 Conn. all goods ("few in number"); Conn. motor vehicles ("none"); Del. ("none");
Idaho ("none"); Kan. ("275, of which /4 had no real foundation"); Mich. ("reduced to a
minimum"); Mont. ("very limited number"); N.H. ("none"); N.J. ("800"); N.M. ("very
few"); N.Y. ("2,968 complaints and inquiries"); N.C. ("fewer than before"); N.D. ("none").;
Pa. ("75 legitimate complaints"); S.D. ("none"); Tenn. ("no complaints"); Utah ("vdry
few"). Letters From State Banking Officials to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Feb. 25 to Mar. 15,
1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
324 See chart infra.
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ignorance or apathy,325 but will not long avoid detection by state investigations.
The importance of licensing provisions, with correlative investigatory powers, has
been generally recognized. The Director of the Consumer Credit Bureau of Penn-
sylvania is of the opinion that "while full disclosure is most important when con-
sidering remedial legislation it is not the entire answer and ...strict examination
follow-up in addition thereto is the true test for good effective administration."
32 6
This opinion is bolstered by the concurring views expressed by officials of several
other states with disclosure statutes. The Deputy Bank Commissioner of Connecticut,
for instance, credits the effectiveness of the full disclosure statute to the "Authority
of the Bank Commissioner to examine the books and account records of Sales
Finance Companies."' 27 The need for licensing provisions is recognized even in
Florida where the all-goods statute has no such provisions. Pointing to this as one
of the deficiencies of the law, the Executive Assistant to the Comptroller has written
that "No provision is made for the licensing of purchasers of installment contracts,
or for the periodic examination of the books and records of the installment seller
or the contract holder. We consider licensing and supervision of the latter essential
to good enforcement."' 28 Besides periodic examinations, the Michigan Deputy
Commissioner of Banking would add: "Another deterrent is surprise examina-
tions."3 29
Licensing provisions would undoubtedly seem to be the most thorough assur-
ance that dealers are making installment sales in full compliance with disclosure
statutes. Until consumer ignorance is replaced by consumer enlightenment, and a
willingness to report violators displaces consumer languishness, then enforcement
through licensing remains the only effective alternative.
3. Area of Federal Regulations-FTC Trade Practice Rules
An inherent weakness of federal regulation in this area is the limit placed on
the jurisdiction of the enforcing agency. Under its governing statute,330 the FTC's
jurisdiction extends only to transactions in "interstate commerce."331 But before
exercising its regulatory powers, even over interstate transactions, the Commission
first looks to the state legislation.33 2 Only where the state motor vehicle disclosure
statute is not adequately effective, or where none exists, will automobile installment
sales come under FTC surveillance.32 3 Even where no effective statutes provide
adequate disclosure, however, the jurisdiction of the FTC is greatly limited. Under
the Federal Trade Commission Act the Commission is powerless over intrastate
activities even though they "affect" interstate commerce2 2 4 Although "commerce"
325 Commenting on the absence of licensing provisions in the Ohio statute the First Deputy
Superintendent of Banks states that "It is possible that the major weakness of this law in Ohio
is the fact that no enforcement facilities were included therein." Letter From A. F. Myers,
First Deputy Superintendent, Division of Banks, Ohio, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Feb. 28,
1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
326 Letter From J. M. Robb, Director of Consumer Credit Bureau, Department of Banking,
Pennsylvania, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Feb. 26, 1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
327 Letter From Reinhard J. Bardeck, Deputy Bank Commissioner, Connecticut, to the
Notre Dame Lawyer, Feb. 27, 1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
328 Letter From N. E. Miller, Jr., Executive Assistant, Office of the 'Comptroller, Florida,
to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Mar. 5, 1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
329 Letter From Win. L. Roy, Deputy Commissioner, Banking Department, Michigan, to
the Notre Dame Lawyer, Feb. 28, 1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
330 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45 (1958).
331 See Chas. A. Brewer & Sons v. Federal Trade Commission, 158 F.2d 74 (6th Cir.
1946).
332 Letter From Wm. A. Ayres, Acting Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, to
Personal Finance Law Quarterly Report, in 5 PaRs. FIN. L.Q. REP. 35, 36 (1951).
333 Id. "While the Federal Trade Commission intends to leave local consumer protection
to states with equivalent disclosure laws, automobile instalment sales in other states will be
under the Commissioner's surveillance." Letter From Jas. M. Mead, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission, to Yale Law Journal, Nov. 6, 1951, in 61 YALE L.J. 718, 725 (1952).
334 FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
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may be present either by reason of the interstate movement of an automobile or
the interstate movement of the papers and monies constituting the financial ar-
rangements, 33 5 the FTC's comparatively slight control over local practices may
still permit a host of abuses to flourish.3 36 Even when a transaction is considered
to be "in" interstate commerce, ".... the Commission's scant enforcement staff can-
not stalk a horde of violations.55 s  So, as indicated early, the most notable effect
of these rules has been the impetus given motor vehicles disclosure statutes on the
state level.
F. Present Legislative Activity
Disclosure statutes have made remarkable gains during the last half decade.
This support is continuing, as evidenced by current activity for the enactment of
such legislation on both the state and federal levels.
1. State Legislative Activity
Activity on the state level bears witness to the fact that legislatures are paying
heed to suggestions that the coverage of disclosure statutes ought to be expanded to
include all consumer goods. A bill has been enacted in the current session of the
Washington legislature3  and one has been introduced in Oregon.33 9 Bills have
been introduced in both houses of the Arizona legislature.340 Further, a bill pat-
terned after the Douglas Bill has been introduced in the Wisconsin assembly,3 41
and arrangements are now being made to introduce a similar bill in the Minnesota
legislature.342 If passed,3 43 these bills would extend the coverage of disclosure
statutes in states which presently require disclosure only in motor vehicle install-
ment sales.3 44 Worthy of note in the Wisconsin bill and the Minnesota proposal,
patterned after the Douglas Bill,343 is the requirement that the written statement
set forth the percentage that the finance charge bears to the amount to be financed,
expressed as a simple annual percentage rate on the anticipated average outstanding
unpaid balance of the obligation.34 6
2. Federal Legislative Activity
The spotlight of federal legislative activity is centered on the "Truth in Lending"
Bill. Finding that "economic stabilization is threatened by untimely use of credit
335 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); Ford Motor
Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1941). See also FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683
(1947).
336 In spite of this lack of control, Texas passed a statute shortly after the adoption of the
FTC rules which provides that the seller is permitted to make disclosures in accordance with
these rules. Tnx. Rav. Cim. STAT. ANN. art. 5074a (1951).
337 Letter From Jas. M. Mead, supra note 333.
338 S. 415, 38th Sess. (Feb. 12, 1963).
339 S. 122, 52nd Leg. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 1, 1963).
340 H.B. 243, § 44-870, 26th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Feb. 28, 1963); S. 255, § 44-356, 26th
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1963).
341 H.B. 330, A., § 115-25(3) Ass. (Feb. 27, 1963).
342 A Bill for an Act to Require Truth in Lending; Providing Penalties, Minn. (1963).
343 Passage of the Minnesota proposal is highly unlikely. Letter From Joseph P. Summers,
Special Assistant, Attorney General, Consumer Protection Unit, Minnesota, to the Notre Dame
Lawyer, Feb. 28, 1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
344 ARiz. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 44-287 (Cum. Supp. 1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168.71(5)
(b) (1960); ORE. Rav. STAT. § 83-520(3) (1961 Replacement); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218-01
(6) (b) (Cum. Supp. 1962).
345 Last year a bill was introduced in the Michigan legislature, also patterned after the
"Truth in Lending" Bill, which required a statement of the finance charge both in a dollar
amount and a percentage expressed in terms of simple annual interest. S. 1148, 71st Leg., Reg.
Sess. Feb. 5, 1962. This bill was not reported out of committee. No bill of this nature has
been introduced in the 1963 Session. Letter From David R. Bishop, Office of the Director,
Legislative Service Bureau, Michigan, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Mar. 11, 1963, on file in
Notre Dame Law Library.
346 Supra notes 341 and 342.
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for the acquisition of property and services" and that this "results frequently from
a lack of awareness of the cost thereof to the user," it is the stated purpose of this
bill "to assure a full disclosure of such cost with a view to preventing the un-
informed use of credit to the detriment of the national economy." 347
However, the scope and jurisdiction of federal controls under the proposed
law are far from clear. Section 3 (1) designates the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System as the enforcement agency.3 45 This is apparently an attempt
to avoid the "interstate" limitations placed upon the jurisdiction of the FTC under
the commerce clause, by placing this act under the money clause of the Constitution.
Justification for this may be found in the bill's declaration that its purpose is
"economic stabilization." 349 However, the Board of Governors has not been espe-
cially receptive to this purported delegation.350 President Kennedy has even stated:
"Inasmuch as the specific credit practices which such a bill would be designed to
correct are closely related to and often combined with other types of misleading
trade practices which the Federal Trade Commission is already regulating, I
recommend that enforcement of the new authority be assigned to the Commis-
sion."351 If the Board enforced the act under the money clause, then there would
be little question of the government's power to probe all credit transactions on
every level of activity.352 But if the FTC were to replace the Board, then, if the
bill was to attain its goal, it would have to be amended so that the Commission's
jurisdiction would not be restricted to acts and practices in "commerce" as that
term is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act. If the Commission's juris-
diction were not expanded, then not only would the FTC be helpless in the area
of local transactions, but also it would be unable to regulate the disclosure operations
of banks.3 53 This, of course, would defeat one of the primary purposes of the bill -
the aim of a uniform method of stating the finance charge in order to provide the
consumer with a yardstick of comparison among competing credit sources.
The heart of the lending bill lies in section 4 - "Disclosure of Finance Charges."
The first part of this section provides that the creditor must set forth in writing
to each person to whom credit is extended, prior to the consummation of the trans-
action, the following information: first, the cash price or delivered price of the
property or service to be purchased; second, the amount, if any, to be credited
as down payment and/or trade-in; third, the difference between the amounts set
forth above - the amount of the purchase price to be financed; fourth, the charges,
individually itemized, which are paid or to be paid by any borrower in connection
with the transaction which are not incident to the extension of credit; fifth, the
total amount to be financed; sixth, the finance charge expressed in terms of dollars
and cents; finally, the percentage that this total finance charge bears to the total
amount to be financed expressed as a simple annual rate on the average outstanding
unpaid balance of the obligation. Senator Douglas has explained that the last two
points are:
indispensable measures of the price of credit. The first tells you how much
more in dollars and cents you have to pay if you buy on credit rather than
for cash. Secondly, the bill requires that the price of credit be reduced to a
common denominator - a common standard or yardstick - in terms of an
347 S. 750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1963).
348 Id. at § 3(1).
349 This delegation would apparently be constitutional and it would permit regulation even
of local credit operations. See Letter From Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral to Senator A. Willis Robertson, Aug. 22, 1962, in 1962 Hearings on Truth in Lending, at
112-15 (1962).
350 See, Statement by William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve System, in 1962 Hearings on Truth in Lending, at 32-34.
351 1962 Consumer Protection Message, at 8.
352 See Katzenbach supra note 349.
353 Testimony of Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, in 1962 Hear-
ings on Truth in Lending, at 148-49, and 151-53.
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annual percentage rate on the amount actually owed, which enables every
consumer to shop around and compare various credit offers.354
The second part of section 4 exempts revolving or open-end credit plans from
the above and sets forth its own requirements. These are credit plans "under which
the total amount of credit to be utilized, the dollar amount of the finance charge
to be assessed, and the amounts and times of repayment are not specified at the
time an agreement to extend credit pursuant to such plan is entered into." 55 Such
plans are offered by large mail order houses, local department stores and other
retailers. These business firms would find it impractical to meet the demands of
part one, because "the customer is granted wide discretion in both the times and
amounts of repayment."3 5 Instead, the creditor must here furnish the purchaser
with the credit cost both at the time of sale and at the end of each monthly period.
Opposing the bill, Senator Wallace F. Bennett of Utah contends that it "will
be impossible in many types of consumer credit transactions to know in advance
what either the actual dollar charge or the simple annual interest will be."3'5 7 To
support his argument he points to the difficulty imposed by "the requirement that
the sales clerk compute the simple annual rate to be charged on any transaction
before making a credit sale."3 5
Under section 5(a)35 9 of the bill, certain acts of Congress would be excepted
from the regulations of the bill. Senator Douglas has indicated that the bill would
replace the Trade Practice Rules of the FTC.
3 60
Section 6(a) asserts that only state laws inconsistent with the act will be
construed so as to be annulled, thereby exempting any creditor from compliance
with such statutes.3 61 Again, it is not clear whether the enforcement agency would
consider inconsistent the state statutes which permit the lumping of the finance
charge and insurance cost. One would surmise that the Board would follow the
position of the FTC and hold these statutes inconsistent, and thus of no effect.
Section 6(b) would permit the Board to except any "transactions which it
determines are effectively regulated under the laws of any State so as to require
the disclosure by the creditor of the same information as is required under section 4
of this act.' 3 62 The simple annual rate on the average unpaid balance required
to be disclosed by section 4(a) (7) is not required to be set forth by any of the
state disclosure statutes.
Having been returned to committee once again, the future of the bill seems
uncertain. Senator Bennett seems to think that "the passage of time favors the
opponents of the bill."'3 63 Continued difficulty looms in the future of the bill
according to Senator Williams of New Jersey, a member of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency.3 64 On the other hand, Senator Douglas is
convinced that sooner or later the Congress will enact the truth in lending
bill. After all, we have enacted in the past the fur products labeling act, a
354 Statement of Paul H. Douglas, Senator from Illinois, 1962 Hearings on Truth in Lend-
ing, at 14-15.
355 S. 750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b) (1963).
356 1962 Hearings on Truth in Lending, at 13.
357 Letter From Senator Wallace F. Bennett to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Feb. 28, 1963,
on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
358 Statements of Wallace F. Bennett, Senator from Utah, 1962 Hearings on Truth in
Lending, at 15. This contention has been countered by the proponents of the bill who claim
that the need for complicated computations would be eliminated by the use of rate books. See
supra note 319 at 30.
359 S. 750, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. § 51a (1963).
360 Letter From Senator Paul H. Douglas to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Mar. 15, 1963, on file
in Notre Dame Law Library.
361 S. 750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a) (1963).
362 Id. at § 6(b).
363 Supra note 357.
364 Letter From Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Feb. 25,
1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
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wool products labeling act, a textile labeling act, and an automobile price dis-
closure act as well as food and drug disclosure laws and the truth in securi-
ties legislation. 365
Perhaps the fate of the bill has been forecast accurately by Senator Case of New
Jersey, who believes "that it or some other similar legislation will ultimately be
passed by the Senate."366 This prediction evokes the thought that ultimately one
must come to grips with an important consideration in the evaluation of this bill.
Whether the "Truth in Lending" Bill succeeds or fails in its bids for passage during
this session of Congress, it has advanced the basic principle of disclosure, thus
paving the way, even in the event of its nonpassage, for future legislation on both
the state and federal levels. The example of Wisconsin and Minnesota may be
an indication of the role which history will credit this bill for playing in the
advancement of disclosure statutes.
67
IV. GUARANTEES AND WARRANTIES
Another important area in which the consumer may be misled is that con-
cerning guarantees and warranties. The terms are frequently used interchangeably,
but a distinction must be made. The term "guarantee," as used here, is understood
as a collateral agreement (often a conditional one) against some default or event
in the future, while "warranty" is taken as a statement of fact respecting the quality
or character of goods sold, made by the seller to induce the sale, and relied on by
the buyer. The former is usually embodied in a writing attached to the product
by the manufacturer; the latter, however, may be expressed orally or in writing
by the seller or implied by law. Perhaps, the representations of guarantees and
warranties are a more subtle form of inducement. Very often the consumer is not
consciously concerned with their terms until his product has failed.
Nevertheless, terms such as "Lifetime Guarantee" and "Unconditionally Guar-
anteed" play their part in urging a: sale. Recently, Chrysler Corporation issued a
"Five Full Years or 50,000 miles" guarantee on its 1963 automobiles, when only a few
years ago the standard automobile guarantee was "12 months or 10,000 miles."
Chrysler, seeking to establish the image of dependability for its cars, clearly spells out
the terms of the new guarantee:
Your authorized Imperial Dealer's Warranty against defects in material
and workmanship in 1963 cars has been expanded to include parts replace-
ment or repair for 5 years or 50,000 miles, whichever comes first, on the
engine block, head and internal parts; transmission case and internal parts;
torque converter, drive shaft, universal joints (excluding dust covers), rear
axle and differential, and rear wheel bearings, provided the vehicle has been
serviced at reasonable intervals according to the Chrysler Certified Car Care
schedules. Factory-approved remanufactured parts may be used for re-
placement.3 68
Important also are the representations of the retailer himself.
The great difficulty, however, arises when the consumer is faced with the
reality that what has been represented to him is not what the actual guarantee
or warranty secures for him. The latter determine whether the consumer is getting
what he thought he was getting.
Often the bold-faced phrase "Unconditionally Guaranteed," appearing on the
front of the product's package, is conditioned by terms near the bottom or on the
back of the package. The buyer's clue is an inconspicuous asterisk. To meet the
365 Letter From Senator Paul H. Douglas to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Feb. 14, 1963, on file
in Notre Dame Law Library.
366 Letter From Senator Clifford P. Case to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Feb. 18, 1963, on file
in Notre Dame Law Library.
367 As a matter of fact Senator Douglas has expressed the hope that this bill "would encour-
age the States to promptly enact legislation identical in substance so that State agencies may
take over supervision enforcement of these disclosure provisions." Letter From Senator Paul
H. Douglas to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Mar. 15, 1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
368 Chrysler Corporation's Imperial Dealer's Warranty on file in the Notre Dame Law
Library.
LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
problem, the FTC has issued cease-and-desist orders where advertising relating to
guaranties fails to adequately state what the guaranty is. Further, in April, 1960,
the agency adopted Guides, enumerating "the major principles applicable to the
advertising of guarantees... 2,3"
In the area of warranties, the written terms act as a disclaimer or limitation
on all that was represented to the consumer to induce his purchase. A most common
form of disclaimer reads: "There are no other warranties, express or implied, other
than those expressly stated herein." The law here arises from three main sources:
the common law of sales, the Uniform Sales Act,3 7 0 and the Uniform Commercial
Code.3 7 1 One or more of these sources has a direct effect on every court's determina-
tion of what protection will be given a consumer when he seeks redress on the basis
of an alleged breach of warranty.
Note that the viewpoint here changes somewhat. The FTC acts preventatively,
attempting to fully inform the credulous. Warranty law, on the other hand, is
remedial. It operates ad hoc, although the possibility of a lawsuit offers some
deterrence.
A. Unfair Practices in the Representations of Guarantees
1. FTC Action in Pre-Guide Era
Acting again under the jurisdictional grant of section 5 of its act, the FTC
has sought to prevent the use of deceptive representations concerning the nature
of guarantees which manufacturers attach to their products. The chief abuse is the
failure to fully state what the guarantee is. The holding out of consumer goods
as "Unconditionally Guaranteed," "Guaranteed for Life," or "All Parts Guaranteed"
has been held to be an unfair trade practice, when the products were not in fact
so guaranteed but carried only a limited and highly restrictive guarantee.
The leading case of Parker Pen Co. v. FTC31 serves well to demonstrate the
Commission's activity in this area. In advertising its product, Parker Pen depicted
a pen in the hands of such persons as brides, graduates and court reporters. A small
blue diamond always appeared on the cylinder of the pen and in the adjacent area
of the ad a large blue diamond keyed attention on the phrase "Guaranteed for Life
by Parker's Blue Diamond." However, in a less prominent place, usually at the
bottom of the promotion, and in smaller and lighter print, there appeared the
following qualification, preceded by yet another little diamond: "Pens marked
with the Blue Diamond are guaranteed for the life of the owner against everything
except loss or intentional damage, subject only to a service charge of 35¢ for postage,
insurance and handling, providing the complete pen is returned for service."
373
The FTC ordered Parker to cease and desist from using the words "guaranteed
for life," "life contract guarantee" or any other words carrying a similar meaning
unless the manufacturer actually did make all repairs and replace parts, except in
cases of wilful damage, without any charge to the consumer. In the alternative,
the order allowed Parker Pen to represent that service on its pens was guaranteed
for life or other designated periods so long as the terms of that guarantee, including
369 25 Fed. Reg. 3772 (1960); note The Guides are merely cited at 16 C.F.R. § 13.1053.
370 The Uniform Sales Act (hereinafter cited and referred to in text as the Sales Act)
is presently in force in the following 23 states: Ala., Ariz., Calif., Colo., Del., Hawaii, Idaho,
Ind., Iowa, Me., Md., Minn., Neb., Nev., N.Y., N.D., Ore., S.D., Tenn., Utah,
Vt., Wash., Wisc., and D.C.
371 The Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter cited and referred to in text as the Code)
is presently in force in the following 15 states: Alas. (1-1-63), Ark. (1-1-62), Conn. (10-1-61),
Ga. (4-1-63), Ill. (7-1-62), Ky. (7-1-60), Mass. (10-1-58), N.H. (7-1-61), N.J. (1-1-63),
N.M. (1-1-62), Ohio (7-1-62), Okla. (1-1-63), Pa. (7-1-54), R.I. (1-2-62), Wyo. (1-2-62).
Three other states have adopted the Code but it has not yet gone into force: Mich.
(1-1-64), N.Y. (9-27-64) and Ore. (9-1-63).
372 159 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1946).
373 Id. at 510-511. (Emphasis added.)
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the charge made for the service, are clearly and conspicuously displayed in im-
mediate conjunction with the representation.
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Judge Evans rejected Parker's argument
that the large blue diamond appearing next to the short phrase of guarantee served
as an asterisk and directed the consumer's attention to the smaller blue diamond
and the qualified statement of guarantee. Instead, he agreed with the Commission
that the advertisement was misleading:
Ordinarily the word guarantee, or warranty, is incomplete unless it is
used in connection with other explanatory words. To say a pen or other sub-
ject is guaranteed is meaningless. What is the guarantee? The answer to this
question gives meaning to the word, "guaranteed." The same is true of the
words, "guaranteed for life" or "life guarantee."
374
The implication properly derived from the representation was that the buyer,
without more, was entitled to free repair or replacement if his pen did not function
correctly.
But the court found that the Commission had been "overmeticulous in denying
the petitioner all right to use the phrase 'Life Guarantee' or words of similar import,
except on the condition that it make no further charge for repairs."375 Therefore,
the Commission modified its original order to permit the Parker Pen Company to
continue using such phrases, even where a charge is imposed, subject to the condition
that the limitations and charges are placed close to the terms of inducement and in
print of the same size as the other regular printed matter in the advertisement. 3 7
Perhaps, the court itself was being somewhat picayune. The alternative provision
of the FTC's first order, which remains in the second, seems to say the same thing.
Apparently the point of the modification was to explicitly allow the employment
of the well-phrased inducement in a proper setting.
In a case before the agency's own tribunal, a hearing examiner found that
Free-Westinghouse sewing machines were misrepresented as carrying a "20 Year
Guarantee," the implication being that the entire machine was so guaranteed,
while only certain parts were covered. Examiner Lewis stated:
In the opinion of this examiner, in order to properly inform the public
that the guarantee was limited to parts, either the word "parts" should have
been inserted in the prominently used phrase "20 Year Guarantee," or the
separate phrase, "20 Year Parts Guarantee" should have been placed in close
proximity to the phrase "20 Year Guarantee" and in letters of substantially
the same size.
377
Finally, in one of the more recent cases to arise prior to the issuance of the
Guides,378 Clinton Watch Company was ordered to stop advertising that its watches
possessed an all-inclusive lifetime guarantee, when the slips accompanying their
sale revealed on the reverse side that a service charge would be made for all repairs.
The Seventh Circuit's Court of Appeals, citing its decision in Parker Pen, was
quick to conclude that "Advertising of a so-called 'lifetime guarantee' without
clear disclosure that a charge is made in conjunction therewith is an unfair and
deceptive trade practice."
379
These few cases, it is hoped, evince the aim of the FTC to secure full disclosure
of the actual terms of the guarantee in the banner representations thereof. Based
on these decisions and others like them, on April 26, 1960, the FTC adopted a set
of Guides enumerating the general principles applicable to the advertising of
guarantees.
2. The Guides
Here the reader will find much of the Guides set out in full. Examples of
374 Id. at 512.
375 Id. at 511.
376 Parker Pen Co., No. 4338, FTC Modified Final Order, Dec. 17, 1946.
377 Household Sewing Machine Co., 52 F.T.C. 250, 275 (1955).
378 The FTC's complaint was issued March 11, 1959.
379 'Clinton Watch Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 838, 840 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S.
952 (1961).
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actual FTC complaints, cases or orders, however, are provided to illustrate the
principles stated. These illustrations have not in every instance come from activity
under the Guides; some arise out of the pre-Guide era.
The following Guides have been adopted by the Commission to educate the
businessman and consumer, with the hope of voluntary compliance, and for the
use of the agency's staff in evaluating the advertising of guarantees:38 0
I. Guarantees in general. In general, any guarantee in advertising shall
clearly and conspicuously disclose:
(a) The nature and extent of the guarantee. This includes dis-
closure of:
(1) What product or part of the product is guaranteed,
For example, an automobile dealer was ordered to cease and desist advertising that
"all cars are guaranteed," when in most instances the Commission found that the
used cars were sold "as is" or the guarantee had limitations which were not fully
disclosed.38'
(2) What characteristics or properties of the designated product or
part thereof are covered by, or excluded from, the guarantee,
(3) What is the duration of the guarantee,
Where a bedding company was advertising a "King Koil 10 year Guarante&' on
its mattresses, deception was found in that the mattresses were fully guaranteed
for one year only and thereafter an adjustment charge which was not disclosed in
the ads had to be paid.
38 2
(4) What, if anything, anyone claiming under the guarantee must do
before the guarantor will fulfill his obligation under the guarantee, such as
return of the product and payment of service or labor charges; and
In March of 1962, Examiner Buttle determined that claims that watches were
"fully guaranteed" and "sold with a factory guarantee" were deceptive, because
the customer was not informed that the guarantee was limited and that he must
pay service charges and, in some instances, postage fees before the Savoy Watch
Company would honor its guarantee.
383
(b) The manner in which the guarantor will perform....
It it not enough for the guarantor to simply stand behind a product, he must specify
what he undertakes to perform-whether he will repair, replace, refund or do
something else.
(c) The identity of the guarantor....
In a case where the distributors of tableware represented in their magazine ads that
the manufacturer provided the guarantee, the evidence disclosed that the respondents
alone offered the guarantee.
[The] clear meaning of the advertisement is that the guarantor is the
International Silver Company, and the advertisement does not specifically
identify respondents, even as the sellers. There can be little doubt that a
guarantee by a nationally known manufacturer ... is likely to cause a sub-
stantial segment of the purchasing public to have greater confidence in the
merchandise involved than the same guarantee, however well performed, by
these respondents, and to purchase the merchandise on that basis. Such a mis-
representation is unfair both to consumers and to competitors.
38 4
II. Pro rata adjustment of guarantees. Many guarantees are adjusted
by the guarantor on a pro rata basis. The advertising of these guarantees
should clearly disclose this fact, the basis on which they will be prorated,
e.g., the time for which the guaranteed product has been used, and the
manner in which the guarantor will perform.
If these guarantees are to be adjusted on the basis of a price other than
that paid by the purchaser, this price should be clearly and conspicuously
disclosed.
Concerning the latter situation, it often happens that a product lists for a certain
380 25 Fed. Reg. 3772 (1960).
381 G & M, Inc., No. 7910, FTC Final Order, Feb. 8, 1961.
382 U.S. Bedding Co., No. 7332, FTC Consent Order, June 6, 1959.
383 Savoy Watch Co., Inc., No. 8080, FTC Initial Decision, Feb. 26, 1962.
384 Heavenly Creations, Inc., No. 8448, FTC Initial Decision, Jan. 11, 1963.
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price but is marked down half price with a guarantee for perhaps 12 months. If the
guarantor seeks to adjust on the basis of the list price, he must so state.
III. "Satisfaction or your money back" representations. "Satisfaction
or your money back," "10 day free trial," or similar representations will be
construed as a guarantee that the full purchase price will be refunded at the
option of the purchaser.
IV. * Lifetime guarantees. If the words "Life," "Lifetime," or the like,
are used in advertising to show the duration of a guarantee, and they relate
to any life other than that of the purchaser or original user, the life referred
to shall be clearly and conspicuously disclosed.
An extreme example of the problem that is covered by Guide IV would be a case
where a watch is advertised "Guaranteed for Life," with no further qualification.
When the watch stops running one week after the purchase, the buyer may be told
that the guarantee referred to the life of the article sold; since the watch no longer
operates, its "life" has ended and the guarantee is no longer in force.
V. Savings guarantees....
Some typical advertisements of this type are "Guaranteed to save you
50%,. "Guaranteed never to be undersold," "Guaranteed lowest price in
town."
These advertisements should include a clear and conspicuous disclosure
of what the guarantor will do if the savings are not realized, together with
any time or other limitations that he may impose.
VI. Guarantees under which the guarantor does not or cannot per-
form....
In a 1961 initial decision, it was held that claims by distributors of women's shoes
and wearing apparel that "you must be 100% satisfied as to fit and quality or
every penny will be refunded" and "you must be 100% satisfied or your money
back" were misleading, because the purchase price was seldom refunded on demand
except after the intervention of the Better Business Bureau on behalf of the
purchaser.3 8 5
VII. Guarantee as a misrepresentation. Guarantees are often employed
in such a manner as to constitute representations of material facts. If such is
the case, the guarantor not only undertakes to perform under the terms of the
guarantee, but also assumes responsibility under the law for the truth of the
representations made.
This last sentence of Guide VII serves as an introduction to the law of war-
ranties. Where the seller affirms a fact concerning the product he sells, he must
bear the responsibility "for the truth of the representations made."
B. Warranty Representation and Disclaimers
1. Express Warranties
The usual warranty occurs through the seller's representations which are
justifiably relied upon by the consumer.3 86 Again a distinction should be made.
Concern is not here given to fraudulent representations, antecedent to the sale.
The essential element there is scienter or conscious misstatement. Where there has
been fraudulent representation, it is universally recognized that the buyer may
rescind the sale and recover the damages he has suffered. A disclaimer will not
bar this action.
Illustrative of the usual warranty is the recent New York case of Statewide
Food Corp. v. Simpson, 8 7 where an action for breach of a retail installment contract
was brought by the seller corporation against the buyer. Plaintiff's president called
at the residence of defendant, Mrs. Simpson, and informed her that a Zenith
combination freezer-refrigerator unit sold by his corporation was equipped with
385 Transair, Inc., and Prudential Mfg. Inc., No. 8409, FTC Initial Decision, Oct. 18,
1961. This was adopted by the Commission in its Final Order of Apr. 5, 1962.
386 U.C.C. § 2-313; U.S.A. § 12, see e.g., Nashburn v. Thornton, 35 Tenn. App. 216
244 S.W.2d 179 (1952) and MacAndrews & Forbes Co. v. Mechanical Mfg. Co., 367 Il. 288,
11 N.E.2d 382 (1938).
387 231 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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fully automatic defrosting units and that the combination unit would fit into the
space occupied by her old refrigerator. Relying on these statements, defendant
signed the retail installment contract. But upon delivery, defendant discovered
both that the unit would not fit into the space occupied by her old refrigerator
and that the model delivered was not fully automatic. Defendant telephoned the
president, told him of these facts and demanded that the unit be picked up. He
refused. Since the refrigerator-freezer combination delivered did not meet either
of Mrs. Simpson's requirements, the court concluded that the plaintiff corpora-
tion had breached the express warranty orally made by its president, and defendant,
having offered to return the unit had effectively exercised her right to rescind
the sale.
In the great majority of cases, however, the courts are faced with the pre-
liminary problems of establishing (1) that an express representation has, in fact,
been made and (2) that the buyer has relied on it. In regard to the first, where
the seller makes statements concerning the character of his go6ds to induce
purchase, and these declarations become a basic part of the sale, he will gen-
erally be held to have expressly warranted those goods.388 But many times the
statements of a seller are merely "sales talk" or product "puffing" and this type of
representation will not usually create an express warranty.38 9 This is opinion as
opposed to a statement of fact. The determination of what is "sales talk" or
"puffing" is left by both the Sales Act and the Code to the courts; 8 0 but the Code,
unlike the Sales Act, contemplates a very narrow range in which the seller may
"puff."3 9 '1 Some of the more obvious examples are: "the greatest deal since the
wheel," "the best of the high class," "the one product that really has it," and "a
truly modem brand."
The second preliminary step, reliance on the part of the buyer, is an important
factor of express warranties only in the Sales Act and common law jurisdictions.39
The question- what constitutes justifiable reliance-is not easy to answer. How-
ever, an attempt is made in the official comments to the Code - the buyer may
rely on the statements of the seller when he himself is without complete information
and the seller is or purports to be better informed.393 Most cases of nonjustifiable
reliance are those where the buyer asks for the goods by a brand or patent name,
3 94
or is as well informed as the seller about the quality or kind of the goods.3 83 But
even under these circumstances the problem of when the buyer may rely on the
statements of the seller has been eliminated by the Code, for it specifically does away
with the "brand name" exception.3 96 Further, in those jurisdictions which have
adopted the Code, any affirmation of fact or any promise made by the seller to
the buyer may create an express warranty regardless of whether the buyer relied
on those statements or not.397
The Code takes yet another liberal step. It provides that an express warranty
may be created after the sale has taken place.398 However, in those jurisdictions
which have either adopted the Sales Act or apply the common law, creation of
388 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 202 (rev. ed. 1948).
389 U.C.C. § 2-313(2), Comment 8.
390 U.C.C. § 2-313(2); U.S.A. § 12.
391 In reference to § 2-313(2), Comment 8.
392 U.S.A. § 12. Definition of express warranties: "Any affirmation of fact or any promise
by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty... if the buyer purchases in reliance
thereon." See e.g., MacAndrews & Forbes Co. v. Mechanical Mfg. Co., 367 Ill. 288, 11 N.E.2d
382 (1938).
393 U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 8.
394 U.S.A. § 15(4) specifically states: "In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a sped-
fled article under its patent or other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for
any particular purpose."
395 Fleenor v. Erickson, 35 Wash. 2d 8913 215 P.2d 885 (1950).
396 U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3.
397 U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3.
398 U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 7.
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an express warranty after the sale is not possible because of the reliance requirement.
The importance of the extended protection given the consumer by the Code in this
area can readily be seen in the following fact situation. A Mr. Fleenor, desiring
to build a refrigerated locker plant in the basement of his grocery store, sought the
aid of a local lumber and hardware dealer who sold insulating material. The dealer
informed the consumer that he had no personal knowledge on how to install the
material but he would send an agent with the material when it was delivered to
help with the installation. The consumer then purchased the insulating material
from the dealer and, following the instructions of the representative who delivered
it, placed only one layer of the material on the concrete floor of the basement.
A short time after the locker plant was in operation, the ground beneath the base-
ment floor froze, causing the entire building to buckle. In a suit by the consumer
against the dealer for breach of warranty, Washington's Justice Donworth ruled
that statements made subsequent to a sale create no express warranties and are
not actionable in the absence of new consideration, thus affirming the general
doctrine that a buyer must rely on the seller's statements in making his purchase
before any express warranty is created.0 9 Had Mr. Fleenor made his purchase
in a Code jurisdiction the question would have been decided differently, because
reliance is immaterial and because the Code permits a contract to be altered without
the addition of new consideration.
40 0
Another important factor in the creation of express warranties is the knowledge
of the buyer concerning any defects in the goods purchased. Almost all courts,
in all jurisdictions, hold that representations made by the seller do not extend to
any defect of which the buyer has knowledge and understanding. 401
The consumer then, to qualify for the protection afforded him by the express
warranties of affirmation of fact or promises, must show first that such affirmation
was made; second, that the statement was not mere sales talk; and, finally, if the
transaction occurred in a Sales Act or common law jurisdiction, that he justifiably
relied thereon.
Two other innovations of the Code should here be mentioned - goods sold by
description and those sold by sample or model are classified as express warranties.
Prior to the adoption of the Sales Act, the majority of case law in this country held
that sales by description created express warranties.40 2 The reasoning was that a
description of goods is, in reality, a positive statement of fact concerning the goods.
40 3
However, Sales Act legislation overruled this, specifically providing that a sale by
description creates an implied warranty. 40 4 Now the Code has returned to the
older case law. 40 5 Secondly, the Code states: "Any sample or model which is made
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the
goods shall conform to the sample or model." 400
This difference in classification is material in those cases where the consumer
brings an action based on an alleged breach of warranty and is met by a disclaimer
clause applicable only to implied warranties. Under the Code, such disclaimers will




"Implied warranties are warranties imposed by law because of tacit represen-
399 Fleenor v. Erickson, 35 Wash. 2d 891, 215 P.2d 885 (1950).
400 U.C.C. § 2-209.
401 See e.g., Roseher v. Band Box Cleaners, 90 Ohio App. 71, 103 N.E.2d 404 (1951).
402 U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 1, e.g., El Zarape Tortilla Factory v. Plant Food Corp., 90
Cal. App.2d 336, 203 P.2d 13 (1949). Contra, Anderson v. Thomas, 184 Kan. 240, 336 P.2d
821 (1959) (§ 14 of the Uniform Sales Act is merely declaratory of the common law).
403 U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 5, e.g., El Zarape Tortilla Factory v. Plant Food Corp., 90
Cal. App.2d 336, 203 P.2d 13 (1949).
404 U.S.A. § 14.
405 U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(b).
406 U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(c).
407 Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1951).
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tations or broader considerations of policy.140 Therefore, they may exist outside
of and in spite of any contractual provisions made between the buyer and the seller.40 9
This does not mean that the old mairim of freedom of contract is no longer valid;
rather, it means that in some cases the law will infer from the nature of the sale,
unless a contrary position is clearly stated, that the parties intended to provide for
certain warranties.
410
(a) The Implied Warranty of Merchantability
Under the provisions of the Sales Act an implied warranty that the goods shall
be of merchantable quality may exist where and only where the goods are bought
by description from a seller who deals in such goods. 41' The Code, however, does
not limit the implied warranty of merchantability to sales by description. Instead,
it provides that where the seller is a merchant, a warranty, unless excluded or
modified, that the goods shall be merchantable, is implied in their sale.412 Both
the Sales Act and the Code imply this warranty only in those cases where the seller
ordinarily trades in the type of goods sold.41 3 but neither limit the warranty to
cases where the seller is also the manufacturer of the goods.
4 4
The term "merchantable quality" is not defined in the Sales Act. Courts dealing
with this question apply such tests as "the goods must be of fair medium quality"
or the merchandise must "conform to the standards of quality set by the usage of
the trade in question.1 415 Probably the most comprehensive definition of the term
is the Code's section 2-314(2) :
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and,
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and,
(c) are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used; and,
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all the units involved; and,
(e) are adequately contained, packaged and labeled as the agreement may
require; and,
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
While the Sales Act declares that goods which are purchased by their patent
or trade name carry no implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,41 6
there is some question as to whether the implied warranty that the goods be of
merchantable quality is nonetheless imposed. Though a consumer who purchased
a loaf of bread by its brand name was not shielded by the warranty of fitness, a
New York court concluded she was protected by an implied warranty that the goods
were of merchantable quality.
417
The Code eliminates the problem - a specific designation of the goods by the
buyer does not exclude the seller's obligation that the goods sold be fit for the
general purpose appropriate to such goods.418
Both the Sales Act and the Code have provisions that an examination of the
goods by the buyer may destroy any warranty as to defects which such inspection
408 VOLD, SALES § 84 (2d ed. 1959).
409 E.g., Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927); Lee v. Cohort, 57 S.D.
387, 232 N.W. 900 (1930). See also 1 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 195-197 (Rev. ed. 1948).
410 Ibid.
411 U.S.A. § 15(2).
412 U.C.C. § 2-314(1).
413 U.C.C. § 2-314(1); U.S.A. § 15(2).
414 U.S.A. § 15(2) "seller . . .whether he be grower, manufacturer or not . . U.C.C.
§ 2-314, Comment 2: "The absence from this section of the language used in the U.S.A. in
referring to the seller whether he be grower, manufacturer, or not does not restrict the appli-
cability of this section."
415 LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES 270.
416 U.S.A. § 15(4).
417 Ryan v. Progressive Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
418 U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 5.
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should reveal. 19 But the Sales Act leaves unanswered the question of whether an im-
plied warranty of merchantability exists where the buyer has been given the oppor-
tunity to inspect the goods but does not. At least one authority maintains that section
15(3) of the Sales Act, which states, in effect, that an examination of the goods
by the buyer precludes any implied warranties as to noticeable defects, extends only
to actual inspection by the buyer and does not cover a mere opportunity to inspect.
420
The Code, on the other hand, announces that no warranty is imposed against the
defects which an examination ought to have revealed, where the buyer has either
inspected the merchandise or refused to take advantage of the opportunity.421 The
Sales Act, here, appears to offer the consumer greater protection than the new
Code. But the latter's provision is qualified to the extent that if an offer of exam-
ination is accompanied by factual statements by the seller regarding the goods and
the buyer clearly indicates that he is relying on these statements rather than on his
examination, an express warranty is created.422  The result is that a warranty
that the goods are merchantable may be found to have been expressly incorporated
into the agreement even where the implied warranty of merchantability would
not be imposed. 423 Both the Sales Act and the Code extend the warranty of mer-
chantability to merchants as well as to the manufacturers of the goods.
424 It must
be noted, however, that neither the Sales Act, the Code, nor the common law
requires that a seller be a merchant for the creation of an express warranty.425 A
second point of note, under the common law it was generally held that no implied
warranties attached to the sale of secondhand goods.4 26 Yet, the Sales Act 427 and
the Code423 have, where adopted, overruled this and have either directly or indirectly
stated that implied warranties can be imposed on the sale of such goods.
In concluding this discussion of implied warranties of merchantability, it may
be well to reconsider a part of the Code's definition: "(2) goods to be merchantable
must be at least such as (f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made
on the container or label if any."42 9 The provision would appear to change a
warranty that is generally regarded by all jurisdictions as express by affirmation
of fact or promise into an implied warranty. Further, in light of the Code pro-
vision on express warranty, that any affirmation of fact or promise by the seller
creates an express warranty,430 it would seem that a contradiction exists. While
an explanation of this apparent contradiction is not given in the official comments
to the Code, it is suggested here that it was the intention of the framers to increase
rather than restrict the protection given to a consumer who relied on statements
made on the label or in advertising concerning the product. 431 Most courts are
more disposed to extend the coverage of an implied warranty to protect the ultimate
consumer because such a warranty is not based on any contractual relationship
between the parties.43 2 Courts, however, have had difficulty extending the protec-
tion of express warranties to an ultimate consumer who has had no contractual
relations with a dealer.43 3 Because it is the ultimate consumer who, having pur-
419 U.S.A. § 15(3); U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b).
420 VOLD, SALES § 90 (2d ed. 1959).
421 U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b).
422 U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (b), Comment 8.
423 U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (b), Comment 8 para. 2.
424 U.S.A. § 15(1); U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 4.
425 U.S.A. § 12, U.C.C. § 2-313.
426 Standard Brands Inc. v. Consolidated Badger Co-op, 89 F. Supp. 5 (E.D. Wis. 1950).
427 Standard Brands, supra note 426, noted that there was no exclusion of secondhand
goods from the implied warranty sections of the Act, and therefore that the term "goods" must
be understood to include all chattels.
428 U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 8.
429 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(f).
430 U.C.C. § 2-313.
431 But see, Note, Impact of U.C.C. on California Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 281, 311 (1961).
432 E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 205 Advance Cal. App. Reports 525, 23
Cal. Rpts. 282 (1962).
433 See .e.g., Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 135 C.A.2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (1955).
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chased from a retail dealer and not from the manufacturer, is most often injured
by mislabeled or falsely advertised goods, the practical effect of the Code's providing
an implied warranty in these cases is to enable the courts to find that the consumer
has an action against the manufacturer even though no privity of contract exists.43 4
(b) The Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
Where a consumer informs the seller of the particular purpose for which the
goods are required and he relies on the seller's selection of the goods, warranty
that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose is implied.43 5 Though the
wording of the applicable provision of the Code is slightly different than that used
in the Sales Act and found in the older common law, the protection afforded the
consumer is essentially similar.436
For the imposition of a particular purpose warranty, the Code, the Sales Act
and the common law require that the seller be informed of the buyer's particular
purpose and that the buyer actually rely on the seller's skill or judgment.437 As
to the requirement that the seller be informed of the buyer's particular purpose,
it is not necessary that the buyer actually tell the seller of his purpose, it is enough
that the seller has reason to know of this purpose.43  Both the Sales Act and the
Code demand actual reliance by the buyer.
439
Mere knowledge on the part of the seller that the buyer intends to make
a particular use of the goods does not necessarily establish a warranty that
the goods are adapted to such use. Under the Sales Act the buyer's justifiable
reliance on the seller's skill or judgment is alone important.440
The question of when the consumer's reliance is justifiable is regarded as a question
of fact to be determined by the particular circumstances of the sale.441
The Sales Act, however, states, in effect, that whenever a consumer purchases
goods by their patent or trade name without more, no warranty of fitness for any
particular purpose can be implied.442 But a fine distinction must be made, for it
is generally recognized that when the consumer tells the seller of his purpose and
the seller selects goods that have a trade or brand name the rule does not apply-4
4 3
The rationale is that the consumer has in fact relied on the seller's selection. The
Code eliminates altogether the "patent or trade name' exception and makes the
brand name request by the consumer merely one of the facts that must be con-
sidered in determining whether or not a particular purpose warranty exists.4 "
Where a consumer informs the seller of his particular purpose but is given
the opportunity to inspect the goods selected by the seller, it is generally held that
an actual inspection precludes justifiable reliance with regard to all defects which
are discoverable.4 45 Reliance by the consumer is not, however, precluded by the
434 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. supra note 432; Harmon v. Digliani, 148 Conn.
710, 174 A.2d 294 (1962).
435 U.S.A. § 15(1); U.C.C. § 2-315.
436 Compare U.S.A. § 15(1) with U.C.C. § 2-315.
437 U.S.A. § 15(1); U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 1.
438 U.S.A. § 15(1); U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 1.
439 "The buyer, of course, must actually be relying on the seller." U.C.C. § 2-315, Com-
ment 1.
440 1 WILLISTON, SALES pp. 609-610 (Rev. ed. 1948).
441 U.S.A. § 15(1): ". . . and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill
U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 1: "a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances."
442 U.S.A. § 15(4).
443 1 WILLISTON, SALES 616 (Rev. ed. 1948): "Ain implied warranty of fitness for the
buyer's particular purpose is not excluded if the buyer under § 15 subsection 4 of the Uniform
Sales Act, when he discloses his particular purpose to the seller, relies on the seller's skill and
judgment to furnish appropriate goods and the seller then selects goods which have a patent
or trade name."
444 U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 5.
445 U.S.A. § 15(3); U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (b); see e.g., Lindberg v. Coutches, 167 Cal.
App.2d 828, 334 P.2d 701 (1959) wherein court noted the general rule that if a defect is
apparent, the buyer who inspects buys on his own judgment but held that since the defect here
was not apparent the buyer's inspection did not preclude his reliance on the seller as regards
to such defect.
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fact that the seller is not the manufacturer or grower of the goods. The only
requirement is that the seller be a merchant with regard to the goods sold.446 A
problem arises when the seller possesses the requisite skill and knowledge concerning
the general purpose for which a commodity is used, but neither he nor the buyer
has knowledge of the merchandise in relation to the special circumstances for which
the buyer wishes to employ it. Where, then, the consumer is actually or construc-
tively informed that the seller cannot, with knowledge, select goods for his par-
ticular purpose he may not justifiably rely on any selection made by the seller. The
seller will be held to have warranted only that the goods are fit for the general
purpose for which they were made in contradiction to warranting that they are
fit for the particular purpose for which they were purchased.447
Both the Sales Act and the Code recognize that the warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose and the warranty of merchantability may coexist in any given
sale.44 1 In one case, seller's agent told the consumer that the boat in question would
fulfill his stated needs and would be ready to sail when delivered. On launching,
the boat sank. The court found that both the warranty of fitness for the general
purpose for which the article was made and the warranty of fitness for the con-
sumer's particular purpose existed in the sale and were breached.4 4 9 When both
warranties are, in fact, found to exist in the sale, it will generally be held that a
breach of the general purpose warranty constitutes also a breach of the particular
purpose warranty.
450
Finally, the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose does not guarantee
the consumer that he will be furnished goods that may be used by him with absolute
safety or are perfectly fitted to his intended use, rather, the courts insure him only
that he may demand such goods as are "reasonably fit" for his specific purpose.4 51
3. Disclaimer and Modification of Warranties
(a) In General
The precise problem faced by the courts when dealing with clauses in the
sales agreement which purport to disclaim or modify warranties is simply this:
May all of the obligations assumed by the seller in the form of express warranties
and imposed on the seller in the form of implied warranties be reduced to a mere
illusion by an oral or written disclaimer or modification of those warranties? In
examining this problem, the distinction pointed out by Professor Vold's "three-
pronged" analogy45 2 - the first representing express warranties, the second signify-
ing implied warranties which arise out of the seller's tacit representations, and the
last standing for those implied warranties which are imposed by law because of
broad policy considerations- is particularly appropriate. It is only when the
courts recognize that all warranties are not based on the contractual agreements
of the parties that they can properly limit the effect of clauses which purport to
disclaim all warranties, and can extend to the consumer the full protection afforded
him by the law of warranties."'
With regard to those clauses which purport to disclaim or modify all express
warranties not specifically retained in the agreement, there has been general judicial
recognition that because such warranties are based on contractual agreements they
may likewise be effectively disclaimed or modified by further contractual agreements.
The one limitation that is placed on such clauses is that the consumer be actually
446 U.S.A. § 15(1); U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 5.
447 VOLD, SALES 439 (2d ed. 1959).
448 U.S.A. § 15(1) & (2); U.C.C. § 2-317; e,g., Crotty v. Shartenberg's - New Haven, Inc.,
147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513 (1960).
449 Mack v. Coogan, 8 Chest Co. Rep. 233 (Pa. 1957).
450 Ibid.
451 U.S.A. § 15(1): "[IT]here is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit
for such purposes." (Emphasis added.)
452 VOLD, SALES § 84 (2d ed. 1959).
453 Ibid.
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or constructively aware of their existence. 45 4 In that it contains no provision dealing
with the disclaiming or modifying of express warranties, the Sales Act has been
interpreted to adopt this general rule.455 The Code, however, limits the rule with
the promulgation:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed
whenever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provi-
sions of this Article on parol and extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation
or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is un-
reasonable, 456
This section is intended to protect the consumer from all unexpected disclaimers
or modifications which are inconsistent with the express warranties previously
created. 457 It would seem also, that it directs those courts that have not yet done
so to look at the relative positions of the seller and consumer; to determine not
only that the consumer knew of the disclaimer but also that he was in the position
to accept or reject it; and finally, to deny effect to those disclaimers that the con-
sumer was forced to accept and are clearly inconsistent with the express warranties
previously existing in the sales.458 If this supposition becomes, in fact, the manner
in which the courts will scrutinize all disclaimers of express implied warranties,
then the spirit as well as the letter of warranty law will be used to protect the
consumer in his purchases.
General clauses which purport to disclaim all warranties not expressly included
in the written contract stand at the heart of the problem of consumer warranty
protection. They attempt to reach not only the omitted express warranties but
also those warranties that would normally be imposed by law on the sale in
question.45 9 When courts realize that implied warranties are imposed by law
quite apart from any contractual agreements of the parties, such general disclaimers
should be strictly construed to apply only to those express warranties not included
in the agreement and should have no operative effect on warranties imposed by
law.460 The Sales Act provides that all implied warranties may be disclaimed or
modified by express agreement.461 In applying this provision the courts are left
to determine, without the aid of specific standards, when the parties have in fact
agreed to the exclusion or modification in question. Decisions have varied exten-
sively in answering what constitutes an express agreement.46 2 Some courts hold
that a seller may destroy all his obligations under the sale by statements which are
no more than vague general clauses purporting to disclaim all warranties not
expressly included in the agreement.463 Other courts, however, have recognized
that the buyer often has no chance to bargain about these clauses and have ac-
cordingly limited their effectiveness.
464
In conformity with the policy of the courts that have sought to limit the effect
of general disclaimers, the Code, sets out specific standards which must be followed
before a disclaimer of implied warranties will be held effective. Section 2-316
states:
454 E.g., Kennedy v. Cornhusker Hybrid Co., 146 Neb. 230, 19 N.W.2d 51 (1945).
455 Ibid.
456 U.C.C. § 2-316(l).
457 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
458 Ibid.
459 Lee v. Cohrt, 57 S.D. 387, 232 N.W. 900 (1930); Hoe v. Sanburn, 21 N.Y. 552, 78
Am.Dec. 163 (1960).
460 E.g., Beckkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
461 U.S.A. § 71.
462 Compare Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) with
Kennedy v. Coruhusker Hybrid Co., 146 Neb. 230, 19 N.W.2d 51 (1945).
463 Kennedy v. Cornhusker Hybrid Co., 146 Neb. 230, 19 N.W.2d 51 (1945). Disclaimer
read: "We give no warranty, express or implied, as to the productiveness of the seeds or corn
we sell and we will not be in any way responsible for the crop."
464 Beckkevold v. Potts, supra note 460. Disclaimer read: "No warranties have been made
in reference to said motor vehicle by the seller to the buyer unless expressly written hereon at
the date of purchase."
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(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied war-
ranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention and in
case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied
warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Lan-
guage to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for
example, that "there are no warranties which extend beyond the face
hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsections (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other language
which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion
of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranties; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract examines the goods
or the sample as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there
is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought
in the circumstances to have revealed to him.465
Further, this section provides, as indicated earlier, that general statements of the
seller may effectively disclaim all warranties, but only when such statements are
consistent with previous statements made and are commonly understood to have
such effect. 46 6 With emphasis on the word "conspicuous," the fine print disclaimer,
the "bane of the American consumer," 46 7 is not to be given effect.46 8
The Code makes two other changes in the common law and Sales Act decisions
in this area. First, to disclaim the warranty of merchantability the seller must make
specific reference to the term "merchantability," and second, only a conspicuous
written disclaimer will be given effect in disclaiming the warranty of fitness. 46 9
Finally, it is not the intention of the new legislation to negate all warranties in
those cases where the buyer either inspects the goods or is given the opportunity to
do so. 47 0 Rather, in line with the general case law on the question, the extent
to which the buyer relied on the warranty rather than on the inspection and the
experience of the buyer and the nature of the defects, if any, are to be considered
by the courts. The over-all effect of this section, therefore, is to protect the con-
sumer from all uncomprehended, unexpected, unbargained for, and inconsistent
language.
471
(b) The Increasing Use of the "Standard Manufacturer's Warranty"
The problem of the widespread use of the "standard warranty" is succinctly
stated in the following quote:
Many manufacturers . . . have formed trade organizations and agreed to
the universal use of these limited warranty clauses. Many buyers have no
choice. If they desire to purchase an automobile, a radio, or a storage bat-
tery, they must accept the standard, uniform contract.
4 7 2
Where a manufacturer -has extensively advertised the merits of his product and
has made numerous representations to the consuming public for the purpose of
promoting its sale, may he, by the use of a standard limiting warranty clause,
effectively destroy those obligations that would normally attend the sale? Older
case law did not have this problem to contend with.473 The drafters of the Sales
Act, likewise not faced with this problem, set no standards for determining its
answer.4 7 4 Even the Code with its specific provision on the disclaiming or modifying
of warranties does not provide definitive answer. It is the courts that have, in the
465 U.C.C. § 2-316. (Emphasis added.)
466 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
467 Note, Impact of U.C.C. on California Law of Sales Warranties. 8 U.C.L.A. LAw REv.
281, 314.
468 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
469 U.C.C. § 2-316(2), Comment 5.
470 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8.
471 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
472 BOGFRT AND FINK, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25
ILL. L. Rav. 400, 413 (1930).
473 E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 205 Advance Cal. App. Reports 525, 23
Cal. Rpts. 282, 284, "The liability of a manufacturer predicated upon representations concern-
ing his product ... through labels or advertising materials . .. [is] an obligation attendant
upon a new era....
474 Ibid.
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main, offered the solution.4 7 5 While it can be said that the trend is toward a very
strict interpretation of these standard warranties, decisions continue to go both
ways. An examination of the policy considerations which support each side may
at least raise a doubt as to whether the cases are really in conflict.
On the one hand, we have those cases that place a very narrow interpretation
on the "standard warranty." In a recent California case, plaintiff purchased a
lathe from co-defendant, The Hayseed, a retail merchandising corporation. Prior
to the purchase he was shown a brochure issued by the other defendant, Yuba
Power Products, the manufacturer. This brochure contained various statements
concerning the lathe such as the type of work for which it could be used, its safety
features and others. But its safety features evidently left something to be desired.
Plaintiff was injured when a piece of wood which he was turning came loose, flew
off and fractured his skull. In sustaining a jury verdict for the plaintiff the review-
ing court said:
The liability of a manufacturer predicated upon representations concern-
ing his product made by him to the consuming public through labels or
advertising materials, is a comparatively recent development of the law; has
been referred to as based on a breach of express warranty under an exception
to the rule requiring the existence of privity between the parties . . .; has
been sustained in other decisions which, in an effort to conform to classic
concepts, have been based on conflicting and sometimes fantastic reasons...
but when considered by the law as a living thing, has been recognized as an
obligation attendant upon a new era, which dictates that the manufacturer
should be held responsible to the consuming public for representations mani-
festly made by him to them for the purpose of promoting the sale of his
product....
In any event, the obligation in question, strictly speaking, is not the
result of a contract; is not dependent upon the existence of contractual
privity; and exists independently of any buyer-seller relationship. ... 46
While the court above was confronted with the problem of lack of privity
rather than the existence of a standard warranty form, the policy laid down in
its decision is equally applicable to either problem.
In another case where the existence of a standard warranty was a factor, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the warranty did not deal with the question
of the manufacturer's liability where the failure of a defective part resulted in
personal damages. Thus construed, the standard warranty did not expressly dis-
claim warranties of merchantability and fitness for use.4 7 7 In 1955, this same
Pennsylvania court had to evaluate the following provision in a conditional sales
agreement:
This contract contains the entire agreement between the Seller and the
Buyer; there are no other representations, warranties or covenants by either
party. This contract may not be modified except in writing.
478
Here, Judge Hirt held that the provision did not expressly disclaim implied war-
ranties and, therefore, did not negate the warranty of merchantable quality.4 79
Finally, one of the leading cases on this question is Henningson v. Bloomfield
Motors.480 There, New Jersey's Supreme Court, after an extensive examination
of the existing policy considerations, decided that standard warranties which, in
effect, act as disclaimers of those obligations that normally attend a sale are not
favored by the better-reasoned recent decisions and must be strictly construed
against dealers and manufacturers.
In apparent opposition to the cases just discussed, some courts have held
that the seller, regardless of the advertising done or representations made to induce
475 E.g., Heningson v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Jarnot v.
Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products
Inc., 205 Advance Cal. App. Reports 525, 23 Cal. Rpts. 282 (1962).
476 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 205 Advance Cal. App. Reports 525, 23 Cal.
Rpts. 282, 284-85 (1962).
477 Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
478 Frigidinners, Inc. v. Branchtown Gun Club., 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d 202 (1954).
479 Ibid.
480 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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the sale, may effectively disclaim all of his obligations, both express and implied.4 8 1
The great majority of these cases, however, can be factually distinguished from those
which limit the effect of the standard warranty. Perhaps a leading example is
Kennedy v. Cornhusker Hybrid Co.482 which involved the sale of seed. Due to the
peculiar nature of the goods sold and the uncertainties naturally attached to such
goods, the court reasoned that the seller must be allowed to disclaim all of his
obligations as long as the consumer is actually or constructively aware of such
disclaimer and there is no bad faith, fraud or concealment involved. From this
decision and others like it the so-called "seed cases" have evolved. Rather than
classify them in direct opposition to the decisions like that in Henningson, however,
it is more correct to state that they constitute a necessary exception to the modem
doctrine that the seller may not reduce to an illusion his obligations arising from
the sale.
North Dakota, recognizing the extreme inequality of bargaining power between
the seller and the consumer, has legislatively provided that in certain sales the
right of the parties to waive all warranty obligations is limited.48 3 The statute
prohibits, in cases of sales of farm machinery, any agreement whereby the warranty
of fitness is purported to be disclaimed and provides that the buyer shall have a
reasonable time after delivery to examine and test the machinery to determine if
it complies with the warranty of fitness.4 4 This statute becomes part of all agree-
ments involving the sale of farm machinery and is to be read into them regardless
of any provisions in the contract to the contrary. 48 5
Admittedly, this legislation covers only a minute part of the vast area of sales
and guarantees protection, nonetheless it serves as a guidepost to those states that
have recognized the nature of the problem. "It may be that a still larger develop-
ment of statutory warranties may be imposed upon sellers in the future for the
buyer's protection; warranties which cannot be waived by contractual disclaimers.48 6
V. CONCLUSION
One cannot help but be impressed by the dimension and scope of the problem
of informed consumer buying. The gross national product is the highest that it
has ever been in the history of our economy. Consumer purchasing power is at an
all-time high; yet, it seems, his buying acumen can only be measured at the other
end of the scale. Certainly, one can question how well the principle of caveat emptor
has been eradicated.
To meet this problem in labeling and packaging practices, both federal and
state governments have enacted successively stronger legislation. Even now stricter
regulatory measures are in the offing. Yet the decried practices have persisted
and will continue to do so, simply because there will always be someone who thinks
that he can put one over on the public and is willing to take the necessary risk.
Present-day marketing tools in this area are geared toward a psychological
appeal to consumers. It has been the aim of the law, on the other hand, to take
the "psycho" out of "psychological" and to restore "logic" to the market place. In
so doing, the suggestion has been made that it would be wise to educate consumers
to act more rationally in making their purchases4 87 - to train them to look for
the information that they need - besides publicly condemning deceptive practices
through regulatory legislation. The hope is that consumers will become aware of
their own emotions and that they will know exactly what they are doing when they
decide to buy. But it has been contended: "What people actually spend their
money on are the psychological differences, brand images permitting them to express
481 Kennedy v. Cornhusker Hybrid Co., 146 Neb. 230, 19 N.W.2d 51 (1945).
482 146 Neb. 230, 19 N.W. 2d 51 (1945).
483 N.D. REv. CODE § 51-0707 (1960).
484 Uhrig v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 64 N.D. 189, 250 N.W. 922 (1933).
485 Dwinnell v. Boehmer, 60 N.D. 302, 234 N.W. 655 (1931).
486 VOLD, SALES § 91 (2d ed. 1959).
487 Hearings on Packaging and Labeling Practices, Part I, at 175.
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their individuality.... It is because of the improved quality and reliability of our
merchandise that we can allow ourselves the luxury of making our decisions on
the basis of more purely psychological factors." 48  As long as the consumer con-
tinues to generate from that complex organism, homo sapiens, training him is a
step in the right direction, albeit slight.
As the survey of the credit disclosure laws indicates, the difficulty here is not
a dearth of codified laws. The statutes are there; what is needed is to strengthen
them.
In its attempt to assist the principle of disclosure to full maturity, the "Truth
in Lending" Bill is experiencing difficulty. Many object that this is not the concern
of the federal government.489 Others have suggested that a more acceptable solution
would be to incorporate disclosure provisions into the Uniform Commercial Code.490
Again there is the possibility of a publicity campaign sponsored by consumer
groups which would blare the clarion call to awaken the consumer to his statutory
rights. The most promising proposal, however, is a statutory prescription of a
uniform contract form.491 In this way the consumer would soon come to expect
certain information to be revealed when he makes an installment purchase. In
addition, it would eliminate, to a great extent, another major problem -the con-
sumer's unwillingness to risk his own time and funds to protect his statutory rights.
With uniform contract forms required by law, state-initiated investigations could
more readily detect noncomplying contracts.
Consumer protection through the imposition of warranties is largely remedial.
The FTC, of course, attempts to secure proper representation of guarantees. But
it can only oversee the national manufacturer and distributor; it does not reach
the local salesman and his representations of a product's capacity or quality. Here,
the consumer must vindicate his rights through the provisions of the Uniform Sales
Act or the Uniform Commercial Code. But for the most part, his lot is improving.
The vanguard has been exhibited in such noticeable trends as the protection afforded
by express warranties, the expansion of policy considerations upon which implied
warranties are based, the limitation, judicially, of disclaimers, and the gradual erosion
of the archaic doctrine of privity.
One may question the amount of government intervention into these methods
of marketing, but consider:
It is the function of the market place, through the intercourse of in-
formed buyers and sellers, to accelerate production, distribution, and con-
sumption where they are required, and brake them where necessary. The
functioning of our economic system depends, therefore, on the absence of
unreasonable restraints, on the free flow of informhition, on the ability of the
public to exercise its best judgment, and on the general observation of
accepted standards of good business and human conduct.
4 92
Where the consumer has not been able to accomplish this on his own, the law




488 Id. at 173.
489 See e.g., Testimony of Prescott Bush, Senator from Connecticut, 1962 Hearings on
Truth in Lending, at 131.
490 This proposal was made in 1950. It was rejected because disclosure efforts were still in
the experimental stage. At that time the proposal may have had validity, since only 13 states
had retail installment acts requiring disclosure. Today, however, 42 states have such statutes.
491 The New York conditional sales contracts statute prescribes a form which all condi-
tional contracts are to follow. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAWS § 64-a(e). In North Dakota, uniform
forms are available through banks or from commercial printing companies. Letter from Eugene
Rich, State Examiner, North Dakota, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Feb. 25, 1963, on file in
Notre Dame Law Library.
492 Prepared statement of Alexander Wiley, Senator from Wisconsin, Hearings on Packag-
ing and Labeling Practices, Part 1, at 3. (Emphasis added.)
DISCLOSURE STATUTES ON THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVELS
TYPE OF STATUTE DISCLOSURE OF TERMS
Official
All- Motor License Cash Part Payment; Unpaid Cost of Fees;STATE Goods' Vehicle2  Requireds Price4  Trade-in Balance Insuranc2 Other Princija
Charges Balanc.
Alabama None'
ALL x Each Item x x x x xAlaska M V x02  x   x
ALL Proposed Finance Co." x x x X X X
Arizona MV x Both x x x x x
Arkansas
California ALL x x x x x x x1 MV x x x x x x x
Colorado ALL x Both
C V x Both x x x Lumped
Connecticut x All-Goods Finance Co.U x x X x x x
ALL x x x x x x
Delaware MV x Both x x x X x x
District of Columbia X'
ALL x Dealer X x x X X XFlorida fMV x Dealer X x x x x X
Georgia
Hawaii x All-Goods x x
Idaho x x x
Illinois x All-Goods x x
Indiana x All-Goods Finance Co. x X
Iowa None's x Both x x
Kansas x All-Goods Finance Co. x x
K ALL x x X
Kentucky MV x x x
Louisiana x Both x x
Maine x Finance Co."9 x X
Maryland x All-Goods Finance Co. Each Item x
ALL )0 x x
Maachusetts MV x Both x x
Michigan XU Both x x
Minnesota ALL Proposed X Xi MV x Both x x
Mississippi x Finance C." X x
Missouri x x x
Montana. x All-Goods Finance C. x x
NALL x Finance Co. x x
Nebraska Mcv xl' Both x x
Nevada x x x







x x xx x x
x x xX X X
x Lumped x
x X xx X X










New Jersey x All-Goods Both" x X x x x x
N ALL x22 x x x
New Mexico MV X Finance Co. x X X X X X
New York ALL X7 Finance Co.30 Each Item x x Lumped" x x
IfV x FinanceCo.3 X X X X X X
North Carolina x" Both x x x x
North Dakota x All-Goods x x x x x x
Ohio , x All-Goods x x X Lumped X
Oklahoma
OALL Proposed Each Item X x x x X
Oregon MV x x x x x x x
Pennsylvania x Both x x x Estimate x x
Rhode Island Nonew
South Carolina
South Dakota x Finance Co. x x X X X X
Tennessee x x x x x x x
Texas x x x x x
Utah x x x x x x x
Vermont Proposed x x x x x xX Finance Co. X X X X X X
Virginia x
51  
Both x x x x
Washington fALL X All-Goods Each Item x x x x x1MV x-  Dealer x x
West Virginia
Wisconsin A LL Both x X X Lumped X x
Wyoming
FTC Rsles x x x Estimate x
Truth in Lending Bill Proposed x x x x x x
DISCLOSURE STATUTES ON THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVELS
DISCLOSURE OF TERMS PENALTIES
Amount Amount Number, Denial. Buyer's
of of Amount, 1me Supension Fine Impr*onments Recovery,*
Finance Time Date of Sales orRevotion (Maxiium (Maximum Seler's
Charge Balance Installments Price of License Amount) Term) Bar'
5
Rate x x 1000 6 months x
x x 100
x x x x x 1000
x x x x 500 x
x x x x x
x x x x
X x x x x
Lumped x x x x x
x x x x x 25-500 x
x x x x x
x x x x 500 x
Rate x x 500 x
x x x x 500 x
Rate x x x 500 x
x x x x
Lumped-Rate x x x 500 X
Lumped x x x 1000 1 year
x x x x 500
x x x x x 500 6 months x
X x x 500 6 months x
x x x 500 x
X x x x 500 6 months x
Lumped x x x 500 x
x x x x 10010 x
x x x x 100-500 x
X x x x x 500 6 months x
x x x x 500
=
Both x
x x x x x
x x x x 500 x
x x x x 500 6 months x
x x x x 500 6 months x
x x x x x 500 6 months
x x 10-100 90 days
x x x
Rate 500 60 days
x x x x 500 x
x x x x x 500
x x 25-100
x x x x 500 x
Lumped-Ratem x x x x 500 x
X X x x x 500 x
x x x x Discretion of Court Discretion of Court
Rate X x 500 1 year x
Lumped-Rate x x 1000 1 year
x x x x 500 x
x x x x 500 x
x x x x 500
x x x x
x x x 500 x
x x x
x x x x
x x x x 500 6 months x
x. x x x x
x x x x 500 6 months x
Rate X x x 1000 6 months x
x x
Both x x x 500 1 year x3
Lumped 25-100 90 days
x x x 5000
Both 5000 1 yea X
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1 Those statutes whose disclosure provisions are of the all-goods variety are: ALASKA STAT. § 45.10.030(a)
(1962); A su. H.B. 243 § 44-870, 26th Leg. 1st Reg. Sess. (Feb. 28 1963)- Amz. S. 255 § 44-856, 26th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (1963); CAL. Civ. CODE § 180.3; Co!O. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 19-16-6(2) (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 42.84(a) (1960); Dms CooE ANN. tit. 6 §4305 (Cum. Supp. 1962); FIA. STAT. ANN. § 520.34(1)
(1962); HAwAii Rev. LAWS § 201A-3 (Supp. 19615; iVAHO CODE ANN. § 64.806 (Cum. Supp. 1961); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. ,12,1, § 225 (Smith-Hurd 1960); IN. ANN. STAT. § 58-904 (1961 Replacement); KAN. Gat. ANN.
16.507(f) (Supp. 1961); Ky. REv. STAT. Acts 1962 S. 97, § 2(5) (Cum. Issue 1962); MD. CoE ANN. art. 83,
129(a) (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, 612 (Cum. Supp. 1961); A Bill for an Act to Require Truth in
lending; Providmg Penalties Minn. (1963); M"fo. ANN. STAT. § 408.260(5) (Cum. Supp. 1962); MONT. REv.
CO- ANN. § 74- 07(f) (1947 Replacement); NEB. REv. STAT. § 45-303 (1960 Reissue); N.H. Rzv. STAT. ANN.
399-B:2 (Supp. 1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-27 (Cum. Supp. 1961); N.ML STAT. ANN. § 61-8-15 (1953
Replacement); N.Y. PAS. Paop. LAws §§ 402(3), and 64-a(e); N.D. Rev. CODE § 51-13-02(5) (1960); Omo
Rev.CODE 1317.02 (Anderson 1954)- Os. 5. 122, 52nd Leg. Ass., keg. Sess. (Feb. 1, 1963)- TE N. CoDE
AGe" § 47-1!903(a) (Cume. Snupp. 1962); Um Coo ANN. § 15-1-2a(B) (1953 Replacement); VT. H.B. 161,
Gen. Ass., keg. Se. (1963); WASH. . 415, 38th Se. (Feb. 12, 1963); 5. 750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963);H.B. 330, A. § 115-25(3), Wis. Ass (Feb. 27, 1963).
2 Thosem statutes whose dislosure provisions are limited to the sale of motor vehicles are: A.AsKA STAT.S28.10.050(b) (1962); ARiz. Re v. STAT. ANN. § 44-287 (Cume. Supp. 1962); CAL. Civ. CODE § 2982(a);
oo. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-6(2) (1953); Da.. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2906(a)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1962); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 520.07(2) (1962); Iowa COos ANN. § 322.3(6)(c) (Cume. Supp. 1962); Ky. Rev. STAT. §
.1 (1962); LA. S TA. ANN. § 956(E) (Cum. Supp. 1961); M. Rev. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, 1 254(11)
(9um. p. 1961); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 255B § 9 (Cum. Supp. 1961); Mics. STAT. ANN. § 23.628(13)(b)
(1957); NN. STAT. ANN. § 168.71(5)(b) (1960); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8075-13(b) (Cum. Supp. 1960); NE.
REV. STAT. § 60-617 (1960 Reissue); Nev. Rev. STAT. § 97.020(2) (1957)- N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 361-A:7(II)
(Supp. 1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-15-7(B) (1953 Replacement); N.V. Pas. PROP. LAWS § %02(5); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-303(b) (Cum. Supp. 1961); ORE. Rev. STAT. § 83.520(3) (1961 Replacement); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 69 § 614(B) (Cum. Supp. 1961); S.D. CooE § 6.04C03(5) (Supp. 1960)- Tax. Rev. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5074a (1951 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2355(f) (Cum. Supp. 1961); VA. dons ANN. § 46.1.545(b)
(1958 Replacement)- WAs. Rev. CoE ANN. § 46.70.130 (1962); Ws. STAT. ANN. § 218.01(6)(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1962); 16 C.F.R. § 197.2(b) (Supp. 1957). If motor vehicles are included within the coverage of the
all- oods statute the column is marked accordingly.
. Those states which require the licensing of retail dealers and/or finance companies which purchase retail
installment sales contracts are: ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-282 (Cum. Supp. 1962)- Aiuz. H.B. 243 § 44-852,
26th Leg., 1st Rei. Sess. (Feb. 28, 1963); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-2 (19535; CO N. GEN. STAT. ANN.
6§ 14-52 and 36-255 (1960); DEL. COD ANN tit 5 § 2902 (Cum. Supp. 1962); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 520.03
1962); IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-911 (1961 Replacement); IOWA CODE ANs. § 322.3(1) (1949); KAN. Ga-. STAT.
ANNe. § 16-503(a) (Supp. 1961); LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:952(B) (Cum. Supp. 1961); Ms. Rev. STAT. ANN.
ch. 59, § 250(I) (Cum. Supp. 1961); MD. COoE ANN. art. 83,§ 154 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 255B,L 2 (Cum. Supp. 1961); MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 23.628(3) (1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168.67(a) (1960);
SS. COoE ANN. § 8075.02 (Cum. Supp. 1960)- MONT REv. CODES ANN. § 74-603(a) (1947 Replacement);
N s. REv. STAT. §§ 45-312(1), and 60-619 (1960 keissue); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 361-A:2(I) (Supp. 1961);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16 -2 (Cum. Sup?. 1961) N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-15-3 (1953 Replacement); N.Y.
PaIs. PROP. § 492; N.C. Gas. STAT. § 20-287 (um. Supp. 1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 604 (Cum.
Supp. 1961); S.D. CODE § 6.04C09 (Supp. 1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,§ 2352 (Cum. Supp. 1961); VA. Coos
ANN. § 46-1523 (1958 Replacement); WASH. REv. Coos ANN. § 46.70.020 (1962); Wss. STAT. ANN. §
218.01(2) (1957).
4 The cash price includes any repairs, charges for delivery, cost of servicing or improving goods, costs of
accessories, and installation or other costs normally included in the delivered cash price of goods, unless the
statement of each separate item is indicated in the column.
5 The cost of insurance must be exactly and separately stated unless indicated in the column to thecontrary.6 The finance charge must be separately stated as a dollar amount unless indicated in the column that may
be lumped with the cost of insurance and/or may be stated in terms of a rate, or in terms of both a dollar
amount and rate.
7 In most of the statutes permitting the finance charge to be stated in terms of a percentage rate the
amount of the time balance may be omitted when the dollar amount statement is not used.
8 All statutes providing for the imprisonment of the violator state that such violator will be punished by
fine or imprisonment, or both.
9 Those states which enable the buyer to recover the charges he has paid when the seller violates the
disclosure provisions are: Cal.; Del. (all-goods statute); Fla. (motor vehicle statute); Hawaii; Ill.; Minn.;
N.Y. (conditional sales contracts statute); Tenn.; Utah. Recovery of reasonable attorney fees and court costs
are usually allowed the prevailing party.
10 Those states which bar the violating seller's recovery of any time price differential, delinquency or
collection charge are: Alaska; Ariz.; Cal. (all-goods statute); Colo.; Conn.; Del.; Fla. (all-goods statute)-
Idaho (rather than barring recovery, the statute in this state denies the seller the right to register or record
the conditional sales contract); Ill.; Kan.; Ky.; La.; Me.; Md.; Mass.; Miss.; Mo.; Mont.; N.H. (motor
vehicle statute); N.M. (motor vehicle statute); N.Y. (motor vehicle statute); N.D.; Ore.; Va. Reasonable
attorney's fees and court costs are usually awarded to the prevailing party. The seller is ordinarily permitted
to recover the cash price of the goods sold and also the cost of any insurance which he has purchased in
connection with the goods.
11 A very comprehensive bill of the all-goods variety was introduced in the 1959 Regular Session of the
Alabama Legislature S 174 Leg. Reg. Sess. (1959). However it was never reported out of the committee
to which it was referred. Letter From Charles M. Cooper, Director, Legislative Reference Service to the
Notre Dame Lawyer, March 11, 1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
12 The disclosure provisions are part of the Motor Vehicle Act. The dealer must furnish the purchaser
a Statement of Motor Vehicle Sale prior to the consummation of the sale. Disclosure under this statute is
very incomplete and unsatisfactory.
13 H.B. 243, § 44-870, 26th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Feb. 28, 1963); S. 255, § 44-856, 26th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sen. (1963).
14 Retail sellers holding contracts exceeding $10,000 are included. Ibid., H.B. 243.
15 Only motor vehicle dealers, in addition to the sales finance companies, must be licensed.
16 The Installment Sales of Motor Vehicles act does not contain disclosure requirements.
17 The current session of the Iowa General Assembly has had a bill for the creation of the office of
consumer counsel introduced before it. H.B. 453, 60th Gen. Ass. (Feb. 28, 1963).
18 Retail sellers holding contracts which in the aggregate exceed $25,000 any calendar year must also be
licensed.
19 Each subsequent offense is punishable by a fine of not over $500.
20 As a disclosure statute these provisions are largely ineffective since the information must he disclosed by
the secured party only to the extent that it is known at the time of the execution of the security agreement.
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21 The Motor Vehicle Finance Act of 1950 [Mica. STAT. AN. § 23.628 (1957)1 did not provide for the
repeal of either the Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Act [Micn. STAT. ANN. § 19.415(2) (1957)J or the Motor
Vehicle Code Provision [MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 9.1951 (1957)].
22 For any subsequent offense, the violator is subject to a like fine and/or imprisonment for not over
ales finance companies purchasing retail sale installment contracts, and dealers holding retail installment
contracts exceedin$ a total aggregate outstanding indebtedness of $50,000, must be licensed.
24 These provisions are part of the Motor Vehicle Dealer's License Act. The disclosure is not comprehensive
and seems to have been intended more as a means of record-keeping than as a method of informing the
consumer.
25 Nv. Ray. STAT. § 97.060 (1957) provides for civil actions against a seller for exceeding the prescribed
time price differential limits or aceeleration provisions, but provides no penalty for a violation of the disclosure
provisions.
26 This statute requires only the disclosure of the cost of the credit. It is largely ineffective insofar as
fully informing the consumer of the full costs of his purchase.
27 Supra note 196.
28 This statute provides only for disclosure when the seller retains a chattel mortgage in the personal
property sold. Its requirements are neither comprehensive nor complete.
29In addition to an all-goods statute with disclosure provisions for retail installment contracts, there is
also a statute requiring disclosure in conditional sales contracts. N.Y. Pkas. PROP. LAws § 64-a.
30 A bill has been introduced at the present Legislative Session which, if enacted, would require all
retail installment sellers who hold more than $25,000 of installment paper to be licensed as sales finance com-
paies. Letter From Vincent H. Crawford, Supervising Bank Examiner, New York to the Notre Dame Lawyer,
Feb r 26, 1963, on file in Notre Dame Law Library.
31 umping is permitted only under the conditional contract statute. N.Y. Psas. PROP. LAws § 64-a(g).
32 The finance charge may be expressed as a simple interest charge on the unpaid balance only under the
conditional sales contract statute. N.Y. Pmas. PRoP. LAws: § 64-a(e).
33 Supra note 198.
34 These provisions are embodied in the Motor Vehicle Dealers and Manufacturers Licensing Laws. They
do not offer complete disclosure protection.
35 A bill to establish a consumer counsel failed to pass the 1962 session of the General Assembly. S. 15,
Gen. Ass. Jan Sess. (Jan. 16, 1962). The bill still has retained considerable interest. Letter from John F.
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